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If an epistemological theory tells us that a particular policy of be-
lief formation is justified or a particular type of inference is ra-
tional, and that these claims are analytic, that they unfold our 
concepts of justification and rationality, an appropriate challenge 
is always, “But why should we care about these concepts of justi-
fication and rationality?” The root issue will always be whether 
the methods recommended by the theory are well adapted for the 
attainment of our epistemic ends, and that cannot be settled by 
simply appealing to our current concepts. 
 
— PHILIP KITCHER 
 
 
Sometimes the purposes of explanation and understanding are 
best served by not talking the way our grandparents talked. 
 
— FRED DRETSKE 
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Typography and Abbreviations 
 
 
 
To avoid confusion, the following typographical principles will be 
adhered to in the present study, unless otherwise is stated:  
 
Concepts: Words or expressions in capital letters (e.g., HORSE or 
SPATIAL LOCATION) designate concepts. Capital letters sur-
rounded by single quotation marks (e.g., ‘F’) serve as concept 
variables. 
 
Linguistic terms: Words or expressions surrounded by double 
quotation marks (e.g., “horse” or “spatial location”) designate 
linguistic terms or, better said, the mention rather than the use 
of the expressions in question. Capital letters surrounded by 
double quotation marks (e.g., “F”) serve as linguistic term vari-
ables. 
 
Referents: Words or expressions that are not surrounded by any 
quotation marks (e.g., horse or spatial location) designate the 
objects or phenomena picked out by the corresponding term 
or concept. Capital letters surrounded by no quotation marks 
(e.g., F) serve as referent variables. 
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For the sake of brevity, I will also use a series of abbreviations, listed 
below for the convenience of the reader: 
 
AC The Accessibility Constraint 
CA Constructive Analysis 
CIT The Cognitive-Introspective Thesis 
CPA Conceptual Purpose Analysis 
CPLM Clinical Prediction via Linear Models 
DCA Definitional Conceptual Analysis 
DF Diagnosis via Frequencies 
FA Factual Analysis 
GC The Guidance Conception of Epistemology 
IBAI Introspection-Based Access Internalism 
MA Meaning Analysis 
NRE Analysis via Narrow Reflective Equilibrium 
PCA Prototypical Conceptual Analysis 
RC A Reconstructed Concept of Justification 
RE-F Retention through Elaboration—Frequentist 
RE-G Retention through Elaboration—General 
REL Retention through Elaboration and Lag 
S Epistemic subject (variable) 
SPR Statistical Prediction Rules 
SST Selection via Statistical Training 
WRE Analysis via Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Epistemology has some serious work to do. Surely, no epistemologist 
would deny that. Still, it is one of the main tenets of the present study 
that much of contemporary epistemology has not been conducted in 
the way that it should. More specifically, it has not been conducted in 
a way conducive to what should be one of its main goals, namely to 
guide epistemic inquiry in the attainment of our most central epis-
temic goals. Furthermore, it will be claimed that the very reason that 
epistemology has failed to do so pertains to what I will argue is an 
entrenched—indeed, in a sense, a literally ancient—but implausible 
methodology. In fact, I will not only (a) argue that we ought to revise 
this methodology and (b) put forward an alternative, but also (c) dem-
onstrate the usefulness of this alternative methodology within the 
analysis of epistemic justification. There, it will first be argued that 
some of the most influential theories fail and that our concept of 
justification—considering the goals of epistemic inquiry—is best 
reconstructed in terms of truth-conductivity, and then, through a discus-
sion of psychological research relevant to reasoning strategies, shown 
how such a reconstructed concept may be used to improve on actual 
truth-seeking inquiry. 
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More specifically, the structure of the present study is as fol-
lows. Part I lays out and criticizes the entrenched methodology as well 
as presents and defends an alternative. The latter methodology is then 
applied in Part II in relation to the epistemological discussions about 
epistemic justification. Part I is, in turn, sub-divided into four chap-
ters. In chapter 1, I argue that there is a striking continuity between 
Plato’s Socratic method and the methodology of contemporary phi-
losophy, in that both Platonic and contemporary analysis is best con-
strued as a pursuit of definitions by way of intuitions. Although this 
methodology might very well have made sense to Plato, it is not so 
clear that it is well-motivated when divorced from an ontology of 
Forms and a faculty of rational insight. In particular, I argue that there 
is little support for the claim that concepts—i.e., what much of con-
temporary philosophy takes to be its proper objects of study—are 
best characterized in terms of what has become the format of choice: 
simple, clear-cut, necessary, and sufficient conditions. 
Chapter 2 considers a rectification in terms of so-called proto-
types, which some contemporary psychologists take to be a more 
suitable model for representing concepts. However, attending to 
psychological evidence thus only serves to raise the question whether 
a traditional armchair method at all presents a sensible methodology 
in the characterization of concepts, in light of the substantially more 
rigorous methods of empirical psychology. I will argue for a negative 
answer. But I will also note that the question becomes relevant only 
under the assumption that we should be at all interested in exhaustive 
accounts of our concepts. Contra this assumption, I suggest that our 
(present) concepts, at best, make up an interesting domain of 
epistemological study by providing the preliminary material in the 
search for an epistemic vocabulary that serves us better—a task that 
does not require anything like exhaustive accounts of our concepts. 
This is, to some extent, appreciated by philosophers character-
izing their inquiry as an attempt to reach a reflective equilibrium be-
tween their concepts, general norms, and (in some cases) best empiri-
cal theories about the world. However, the exact details of how to 
reach such an equilibrium are, unfortunately, not all that clear, beyond 
 15 
the valid but vague point that concepts and norms should not be 
insulated from external scrutiny.  
This idea is further elaborated on in chapter 3, in relation to a 
recent suggestion by Hilary Kornblith (e.g., 2006, 2002) to the effect 
that epistemology, if not philosophy at large, is a substantially empiri-
cal inquiry. I show that his point is, in fact, not contingent upon the 
further and admittedly controversial claim that all objects of investiga-
tion are natural kinds, but is perfectly compatible with all such objects 
being artifactual kinds. However, while granting that a lot of philoso-
phical investigation, thereby, should proceed in such a way that con-
cepts (and the analysis thereof) take the back seat as soon as they have 
served to fix the subject matter, I argue that this cannot be the end of 
the methodological story. Picking up the thread from chapter 2, I 
make a case for the claim that, to the extent that we are concerned 
with normative phenomena and concepts—which is often the case in 
epistemology—it makes sense to not only investigate referents and 
refine our concepts to the extent that they do not provide an accurate 
story of the phenomena they refer to, but also ask whether it is possi-
ble to reconstruct a concept that serves us better in light of what we 
might find out not only about its referent but also about its purpose. 
In chapter 4, I recapitulate the lessons from the previous chap-
ters by identifying two components to a revised methodological 
framework—one descriptive and one ameliorative. The first compo-
nent consists in the two-fold descriptive task of (a) identifying the sub-
ject matter through an elucidation of the relevant epistemic concept(s) 
and (b) aggregating a characterization of the phenomenon referred to by 
this (or these) concept(s). While the latter is best carried out by way of 
fairly straightforward empirical investigation, the former will turn out 
to call for something reminiscent of, albeit far less demanding than, 
conceptual analysis, as traditionally construed. More specifically, I 
argue for a notion of meaning analysis, building upon Hilary Putnam’s 
theory about meaning and stereotypes.1 While neither (necessarily) pro-
viding an accurate picture of the phenomenon to which they refer, 
                                                           
1 See Putnam (1975a, b). 
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presupposing a substantial distinction between analytic and synthetic 
truths, nor determining the corresponding terms’ reference, such 
stereotypes play a non-trivial role in understanding and communica-
tion and constitute a powerful, cognitive pathway to extra-mental 
phenomena. Hence, stereotypes demarcate a useful notion of mean-
ing.  
The second methodological component consists in the amelio-
rative task of (a) evaluating the extent to which our current epistemic 
concepts serve their purposes and (b) improving our concepts to the 
extent that they do not. Again, traditional conceptual analysis does not 
seem to get us what we need here. I will argue that a more plausible 
candidate for the job is (conceptual) purpose analysis—a kind of analysis 
that builds upon some recent suggestions from Jonathan Weinberg 
and Edward Craig.2 As for improving our epistemic concepts, I sug-
gest that improvement should be conducted by way of further empiri-
cal investigations—preceded and guided by a proper purpose analy-
sis—into candidate characteristics that, on incorporation, would en-
able us to attain our epistemic goals to a greater degree, where our 
epistemic goals are to be understood in relation to the attainment and 
maintenance of true belief in significant matters. 
I will refer to this revised framework of analysis as constructive 
analysis—a name chosen because of its dual connotation to the re-
finement and reconstruction of epistemic concepts as well as to the idea 
of, thereby, serving a useful purpose for actual epistemic inquiry in natu-
ralistic settings. This brings us to Part II of the study, where construc-
tive analysis is applied to epistemic justification—a phenomenon that 
has been subject to a lot of philosophical debate at least since Ed-
mund Gettier’s famous critique of the classic tripartite analysis of 
knowledge.3 In chapters 5 and 6, I consider two suggestions as to how 
we may understand this notion: epistemological deontologism and 
introspection-based access internalism. I argue that adherents of the 
former face a dilemma: either they opt for a substantial notion of 
                                                           
2 See Weinberg (2006) and Craig (1990) 
3 See Gettier (1963). 
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intellectual duty, in which case they, under the principle that ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can,’ have to commit themselves to the highly implausible 
thesis that we may chose voluntarily what to believe; or they resort to 
merely talking about duties in a metaphorical sense and, thereby, leave 
behind the very normative discourse that originally motivated their 
position. That is, unless they opt for a reconstruction along the lines 
of introspection-based access internalism, i.e., the idea that justifica-
tion pertains not to intellectual duties, but to the sound evaluation of 
our epistemic reasons by way of introspection, understood as the 
notice that the mind takes of its own states and operations. However, 
in light of recent evidence within cognitive psychology, the claim that 
we in general have anything like a reliable (or powerful) introspective 
access to the reasons actually underlying our beliefs seems highly 
dubious. 
This calls for a more plausible reconstruction. In chapter 7, I 
turn to my own attempt, taking into account not only what we have 
found out about the qualities that have (for better or worse) been 
taken to pertain to justification, but also the specific purpose that the 
corresponding concept can reasonably be expected to fill, in light of 
the norms in which it figures and the goals that endow it with norma-
tive force. Starting out with the quite pervasive idea that being justi-
fied pertains to having good reasons for taking a (set of) proposi-
tion(s) to be true, I venture into the details of the specific purpose 
JUSTIFICATION plays in relation to the goals identified in chapter 3. I 
conclude that the purpose of JUSTIFICATION, at the most general 
level, is to flag appropriate sources of information within the various 
(social) practices involved in the exchange of information. In light of 
the failure of deontologism and introspection-based access internal-
ism, however, I argue that the most plausible way to spell out this 
appropriateness is in terms of effective heuristics, designating justification 
conferring processes on a continuum stretching from basic belief-
forming processes to conscious reasoning strategies, effective in so far 
as they strike a good balance between generating a lot of true belief 
(power) and generating a majority of true belief (reliability). 
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An important—and, in my opinion, extremely welcome—
consequence of such a concept of justification, is that it identifies 
justification as a perfectly natural phenomenon, pertaining to the 
actual and possible track records of belief-forming mechanisms and 
strategies. In fact, as I will argue in chapter 8, this concept also en-
ables us to improve our cognitive outlooks, when combined with 
what cognitive science and psychology may teach us about the ways in 
which we tend to reason. More specifically, focusing on the three 
central epistemic endeavors prediction, diagnosis, and retention, and armed 
with a concept that speaks to our epistemic goals, it is demonstrated 
how the reconstructed concept of justification may be implemented 
within and improve on actual truth-seeking inquiry in naturalistic 
settings, through the advancement of sound reasoning strategies. 
Thereby, it is also shown how epistemology, conducted in terms of 
constructive analysis, may live up to the noble and time-honored 
epistemological challenge of not only describing but also guiding 
epistemic inquiry—a challenge that ought to lie at the heart of any 
naturalistic epistemology. 
 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I. 
  
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS AND 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. 
From Forms to Concepts 
 
 
 
Shortly before his trial and execution in 399 BC, Socrates meets with 
Theodorus—a skilled geometrician from Cyrene. As Plato tells the 
story, Theodorus introduces Socrates to one of his students, 
Theaetetus, with whom Socrates soon engages in a discussion. The 
topic is the nature of knowledge, which turns out to be quite elusive. 
Theaetetus is able to pin down a couple of paradigm examples, but 
laments that it is so much more difficult to find a satisfactory defini-
tion of knowledge than it is to define the properties that he encoun-
ters in class with Theodorus. Socrates encourages him to keep trying: 
 
Socrates: Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your 
own answer about roots be your model, and as you compre-
hended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of 
knowledge under one definition. 
 
Theaetetus: I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very of-
ten, when the report of questions asked by you was brought to 
me; but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory 
answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would 
have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety. 
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Socrates: These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; 
you have something within you which you are bringing to the 
birth.1 
 
In a dialogue that came to bear his name, Theaetetus takes Socrates’ 
encouragement to heart and embarks upon an excellent example of 
what has come to be known as the Socratic method. On this method, 
questions of the form “What is (an) F?” are approached through 
suggested definitions, disqualified in so far as they fail to include all 
intuitive instances (things that intuitively are F) or exclude unintuitive 
instances (things that intuitively are not F). And, only a definition that 
survives scrutiny for such counterexamples constitutes “a noble and 
true birth.”2 
 
 
1.1. WHENCE THE SOCRATIC METHOD? 
When attempting to understand this method, it is important to note 
what Socrates did not ask Theaetetus to do: He did not say, 
“Theaetetus, waste no more time talking to me—go examine actual 
instances of knowledge and then come back and tell me what knowl-
edge is.” No, Socrates tells Theaetetus to look inwards, to attend to 
that which he is “bringing to the birth,” in a persistent examination 
(and quite frequent refutation) of suggested definitions through the 
probing of intuitions. Why did Socrates do this? On the face of it, it 
seems that this, at best, would reveal what Theaetetus believes about 
knowledge—not what knowledge really is. Still, Socrates is, clearly, 
interested in the latter. So, why does he ask Theaetetus to look in-
wards? The reason may be brought out as follows.3 
                                                           
1 The Theaetetus in Plato (1953, p. 148de). 
2 The Theaetetus in Plato (1953, p. 150c). 
3 The following interpretation of such a rich and subtle body of work as 
Plato’s makes no claim of being the only possible one. My aim here is merely 
to deliver an interpretation that makes sense of Plato’s notion of analysis, 
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First, consider Plato’s ontology: The world is split into two on-
tologically distinct domains. Within the first domain, we find the 
fleeting phenomena encountered in ordinary sense experience, at 
times making up quite a disparate collection of things and events. In 
the second domain, we find a set of perfect and immutable Forms, 
serving as universals. A universal is that which is predicable of many, 
such as Redness and Roundness, and, hence, can be instantiated by nu-
merically distinct entities. Plato famously takes these Forms or univer-
sals to be ontologically separate from their instantiations. That is, even 
if there were no red things, there would still be Redness (i.e., the 
Form of Redness)—an idea that his student Aristotle later came to 
criticize. More specifically, Plato believes that 
 
(1.1.1)  instantiating a general property is a matter of taking 
part in the immutable Form corresponding to that 
property. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that instantiations take part in immutable 
Forms serves to unite the fleeting and imperfect phenomena of the 
first domain and, in effect, explains why particular yet distinct things 
(this red saucer, that red ball) may, nevertheless, fall in identical cate-
gories (red, round), since 
 
(1.1.2)  every Form has an essence, determining the fundamen-
tal nature of its instantiations. 
 
In fact, Plato seems to think not only that every Form has an essence, 
uniting its instantiations, but also that there is a certain sentential 
structure that is particularly suited for capturing such essences. More 
specifically, 
                                                                                                               
especially as it relates to modern philosophical practice. Needless to say, 
attempts to make sense of other aspects of Plato’s philosophy might very well 
yield different yet—given different ambitions—equally reasonable interpreta-
tions. 
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(1.1.3)  every essence is specifiable through a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for taking part in the corresponding 
Form. 
 
Given that the format best suited for providing necessary and suffi-
cient conditions is that of a definition, we may conclude that, 
 
(AF)  for every Form F—or, at least, most philosophically in-
teresting Forms—there is a definition, specifying the nec-
essary and sufficient condition for taking part in F. 
 
It is in this context that we find Socrates insisting on bringing all the 
various instances of knowledge under one definition—the linguistic 
counterpart of an essence. As such, it is not just any definition but a 
real definition, concerned with essences and real natures (in contem-
porary philosophy primarily pertaining to natural kinds, as we shall see 
below) rather than the meanings of words, or what may be called a 
nominal definition. 
Still, this does not explain why Socrates would insist on gener-
ating such definitions via the probing of intuitions. To explain this, we 
need to consider Plato’s semantics and epistemology. Over and above 
postulating Forms, Plato also assumes that there is a correlation be-
tween the Forms and the sets of things we tend to give the same 
name, such that 
 
(1.1.4)  every general term corresponds to a Form.  
 
This is Plato’s famous statement of the One-Over-Many Principle, as 
expressed in the Republic.4 Furthermore, he seems to assume that there 
                                                           
4 See the Republic in Plato (1953, p. X 596a). In his later dialogues, Plato is 
more skeptical about the extent to which our conceptual apparatus cuts the 
world at its joints. See, e.g., the Sophist in Plato (1953, p. 218bc) and the States-
man in Plato (1953, p. 262d-263a). 
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is a connection between general terms and Forms that enables us to 
go from the competent use of the former to at least the beginning of 
a grasp of the latter. To see this, consider the so-called Paradox of 
Inquiry, later to resurface as the Paradox of Analysis in C. H. Lang-
ford’s discussion of G. E. Moore’s notion of analysis,5 but originally 
posed by Meno (in the Platonic dialogue bearing his name) in relation 
to the following two questions:  
 
If you already know what F is, how can there be a genuine 
search as to the nature of F? 
  
If you do not know what F is, how will you know (a) how to 
aim your search or (b) that you have stumbled upon a satisfac-
tory account of F? 
 
One way to understand these questions is as posing a challenge to 
identify a middle-road between a complete insight into F (making analy-
sis redundant) and a complete lack of insight into F (making analysis 
impossible). In the Meno, Socrates’ direct response is the Doctrine of 
Recollection. According to this doctrine—constituting the culmina-
tion of Socrates’ famous interrogation of the slave boy about how to 
double the area of a square—learning in general and analysis in par-
ticular is a process involving a recollection of something that we used 
to know when our souls were still disembodied. Again, it is helpful to 
construe the invocation of this admittedly somewhat obscure doctrine 
in terms of an ambition to pinpoint an incomplete grasp, such that it is 
incomplete enough to not make analysis redundant, yet complete 
enough to not make it impossible. In this context, it is interesting to 
note the question Socrates asks Meno about the slave boy before 
initiating the interrogation: “He is a Greek and speaks our language?”6 
Why would Socrates ask that? Well, supposedly, he wants to be able 
                                                           
5 See Langford (1942). 
6 The Meno in Plato (1970, p. 82b). Thanks to Gareth Matthews for directing 
my attention to this passage. 
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to communicate with the boy and a prerequisite for successful com-
munication is speaking the same language. Hence, when Socrates asks 
the boy if he knows what a square is, the boy has some idea of what 
he is talking about. And the same goes for “line,” “equal,” “larger,” 
“smaller,” and so on, for all the terms Socrates uses in his discussion 
with the boy. More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that, in the 
general case, 
 
(1.1.5)  competently employing a general term “F” at the very 
least involves having an incomplete grasp of the corre-
sponding Form F, in the sense of being able to (a) re-
alize of some instances that they are instances of F 
and (b) realize of some other phenomena that they 
are not instances of F. 
 
This, furthermore, seems to be the strategy of Plato when he ap-
proaches the problem in the Phaedo, where he has Socrates indicate 
that it is possible to recognize (at least some) positive as well as nega-
tive instances of a Form, without already being in the possession of a 
definition, specifying the necessary and sufficient condition for instan-
tiation.7 More specifically, assuming (1.1.5), we may approach the 
paradox as follows: The circumstance in which an analyzer finds 
herself is such that she does not already possess the necessary and 
sufficient condition specifying the essence of the analysandum Form. 
Yet, she is, qua competent user of the term “F,” able to identify some 
instances as instances of F and some other phenomena as not being 
instances of F. Thereby, she has both (a) the material to aim her 
search for a complete account of F, and (b) an idea of what such an 
account would look like (where this idea goes beyond mere formal 
constraints such as non-circularity, etc.). 
Having delimited the circumstance of the analyzer in terms of 
a state of incomplete grasp or insight, we may understand the goal of 
                                                           
7 See the Phaedo in Plato (1953, p. 100de). 
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analysis as that of fully grasping the essence of the analyzed Form. 
Given (1.1.3), we may spell this out in such a way that 
 
(1.1.6)  fully grasping the essence of a Form consists in grasp-
ing the necessary and sufficient condition for taking 
part in that Form. 
 
Now, Plato makes the epistemological assumption that the proper 
way to gain a more complete insight into Forms—that is, the proper 
way to go from the incomplete grasp involved in competently em-
ploying the term to a full grasp of the corresponding Form—is 
through the probing of intuitions, i.e., our dispositions to categorize 
entities as being an instance of a particular Form—be it the Form of 
temperance, courage, piety, virtue, knowledge, etc. Why would Plato 
make such an assumption? 
The most obvious Platonic rationale invokes, again, the Doc-
trine of Recollection, now understood as the idea that we (a) are in 
possession of true beliefs about the essences of Forms, (b) fail to 
know that we are due to an inevitable forgetfulness that takes place 
prior to becoming embodied, yet (c) may still successfully convey parts 
of these true beliefs through our ability to competently use general 
terms. More specifically, Socrates suggests—right after having put 
forward the Doctrine of Recollection—that the way to access these 
forgotten insights is not through teaching but questioning, since only 
the latter enables one “to discover—that is, to recollect—what one 
doesn’t happen to know or (more correctly) remember, at the mo-
ment.”8 
This is why the spontaneous judgments of competent speakers 
provide the basic material for the Socratic method, and probably also 
why Plato chose to present his views in the form of dialogues; in a 
process involving careful scrutiny, questioning and answering, these 
judgments might just be carrying important information about the 
Forms. In other words, 
                                                           
8 The Meno in Plato (1970, p. 86b). 
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(BF)  the probing of intuitions may serve to elucidate the condi-
tions defining the essences of Forms.9 
 
Consequently, we find Socrates referring to himself as a midwife, 
encouraging Theaetetus to look inwards—not outwards—and attend 
to that which he is bringing to birth, in a constant probing of intui-
tions through repeated questioning and refutation in light of hypo-
thetical cases. Because under the assumption that there is an immuta-
ble Form for knowledge, all the imperfect instances of knowledge 
within the domain of everyday life are perfectly uninteresting, as far as 
true understanding goes. What is not uninteresting, however, is that (a) 
all instances of knowledge have an essence by virtue of taking part in a 
single immutable Form of knowledge—an essence specifiable through 
a definition in terms of a necessary and sufficient condition for taking 
part in this Form—and (b) it is possible to elucidate this essence and, 
hence, make available the relevant definition, by the appropriate prob-
ing of our intuitions. Hence, the Socratic method. 
Now, if (AF) and (BF) were nothing but revered pieces of an 
outdated philosophical theory, Plato’s discussion with Theaetetus 
would (justifiably) be reduced to historical anecdote. However, I will 
in the following two sections first point to a striking methodological 
similarity between the Platonic dialogues and modern analytical phi-
losophy, and then argue that, even in spite of the fact that few (if any) 
philosophers today explicitly espouse Plato’s ontology, semantics, and 
epistemology,10 the best explanation of this similarity is that contem-
porary analogues of (AF) and (BF) implicitly underlie much of con-
temporary analytical philosophy. 
 
 
                                                           
9 Cf. Ramsey (1998, p. 165). 
10 There is even a scholarly debate as to whether Plato still defends an ontol-
ogy of Forms in the Theaetetus. See, e.g., McDowell (1973). 
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1.2. PLATONIC REMNANTS IN CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY 
Turn now to contemporary epistemology, where the following may 
serve to illustrate the continuity in methodology: According to a tradi-
tionally influential epistemological analysis, knowledge is justified true 
belief.11 In other words, if and only if a subject believes a true propo-
sition, and has good reasons for doing so, she knows that proposition. 
And this is not just any claim about knowledge—it is a definition of 
knowledge. Consequently, and just like in the Platonic dialogues, 
epistemologists have come to evaluate it by determining whether it, 
on reflection, is susceptible to any intuitive counterexamples, i.e., 
whether it, in the words of Frank Jackson, survives “the method of 
possible cases.”12 So, consider the following scenario from a seminal 
paper by Edmund Gettier: 
 
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. 
And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following 
conjunctive proposition: 
 
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has 
ten coins in his pocket. 
 
Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the 
company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, 
and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket 
ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: 
 
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket. 
                                                           
11 The exact source of this analysis is not altogether clear. Indeed, it has even 
been suggested by Alvin Plantinga (1990, p. 45) that the “tradition” underly-
ing the analysis might not be more than an artifact of the extensive critique it 
has had to endure. However, see Chisholm (1957) and Ayer (1956) for two 
oft-cited cited proponents. 
12 See Jackson (1998). 
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Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), 
and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong 
evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that 
(e) is true. 
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he him-
self, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, 
he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then 
true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is 
false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) 
is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justi-
fied in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that 
Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of 
the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not 
know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his be-
lief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he 
falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.13 
  
When confronted with examples of this kind, a lot of philosophers 
have found themselves inclined to agree with Gettier; intuitively, there 
are instances of justified, true belief that do not count as knowledge. 
What does this tell us about the proposed definition? As noted by 
James Cornman, Keith Lehrer, and George Pappas in Philosophical 
Problems and Arguments: An Introduction: 
 
[…] we shall tentatively consider a definition satisfactory if, af-
ter careful reflection, we can think of no possible examples in 
which either the defined word truly applies to something but 
the defining words do not, or the defining words truly apply to 
something but the defined word does not. When we can think 
of such an example, then we have found a counterexample to 
the alleged definition showing that we do not have an accurate 
reportive definition. If we can find no counterexample to a 
                                                           
13 Gettier (1963, pp. 121-122, emphasis in original). 
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definition, then we may regard it as innocent until a counter-
example is found to prove otherwise.14 
 
Hence, according to entrenched philosophical dialectics, we conclude 
that knowledge is not justified true belief.15 And, what we have just 
seen is nothing less than a paradigm example of epistemological 
analysis. Epistemological analysis, as it has traditionally been con-
strued and is still carried out to a large extent, is the analysis of epis-
temic concepts via intuitions. However, the intuitions relied on are 
not just any intuitions. On a very liberal reading, an intuition is any 
fairly direct belief that is associated with a strong feeling of being true. 
This is the sense in which we may “intuit” that there is an external 
world and that nothing can be blue and green all over. What we will 
be concerned with here, however, is something different, namely what 
is typically referred to as categorization intuitions. Such intuitions take the 
following form: 
 
Phenomenon x is (not) an instance of (the concept) ‘F.’ 
 
Such categorization intuitions are taken to provide interesting, phi-
losophical data by virtue of being caused by and, hence, sensitive to 
underlying categorization dispositions, in turn caused by the concepts that 
the subject in question possesses. In short, categorization intuitions 
reveal concepts, i.e., the very target of much contemporary epistemol-
ogy. We will return to the details of the relation between concepts and 
intuitions below. For now, however, we only need to note that we 
have delimited the sense in which epistemological analysis is conceptual 
analysis.16 And the same goes for analytical philosophy at large, which, 
in the methodological vein of Plato, is best described as the enterprise 
                                                           
14 Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas (1982, p. 18). 
15 For a penetrating and exhaustive survey of the first two decades of discus-
sion following Gettier’s paper, see Shope (1983). 
16 See Kornblith (2002). See also Stich (1998) on the prevalence of analytical 
epistemology. 
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of constructing theories—be it about knowledge, consciousness, the 
morally obligatory, etc.—the plausibility of which is taken to be 
largely, if not completely, determined by their susceptibility to coun-
terexamples derived from categorization intuitions, supposedly un-
covering the very concepts that the theories are supposed to capture. 
It is important, however, to acknowledge the leeway between 
“largely” and “completely” in the previous sentence, considering that 
different philosophers committed to a conceptual analytic methodol-
ogy might, nevertheless, bestow categorization intuition with different 
evidential value. Hence, Saul Kripke, one of the most influential phi-
losophers of the 20th century: 
 
[…] some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive 
content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is 
very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t 
know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have 
in favor of anything, ultimately speaking.17 
 
As Kripke evidentially is fully aware of, some philosophers take a 
more moderate standpoint. For example, according to David Lewis—
one of the 20th century’s most prominent metaphysicians—
categorization intuitions certainly play an important role in philoso-
phical theorizing, in supplying us with a set of “pre-philosophical 
opinions” that ought to be respected in so far as we are “firmly at-
tached” to them. However, according to Lewis there is also a certain 
amount of “give-and-take” in the construction of philosophical theo-
ries as a result of the possibility of conflicts between respecting all our 
intuitions and providing a fully systematic account.18 We will return to 
this idea in the next chapter when discussing so-called reflective equi-
librium approaches to analysis. 
Still, even on a moderate account, categorization intuitions 
play a central and important methodological role, and have done so 
                                                           
17 Kripke (1980, p. 42). 
18 See Lewis (1973, p. 88). 
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for quite a while. As noted by Goldman, this is certainly not to say 
that philosophers have always described their methodology in the 
language of intuitions.19 Take, for example, Locke’s discussion of 
personal identity and the famous prince-cobbler case: 
 
For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the conscious-
ness of prince’s past life, enter and inform the body of a cob-
bler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would 
be the same person with the prince […].20 
 
Clearly, Locke’s talk about what “every one sees” is easily translatable 
into what everyone intuits. In more recent years, philosophers have 
come to talk more explicitly in terms of intuitions. As the above made 
clear, the Gettier discussion constitutes an exceptionally clear example 
of contemporary, intuition-driven philosophy, as does the literature 
on causal theories of meaning after the publication of Putnam and 
Kripke and the discussion of personal identity as discussed by Derek 
Parfit and Judith Jarvis Thomson.21 In fact, this practice of supporting 
and refuting philosophical analyses with reference to categorization 
intuitions and the concepts that they, supposedly, reveal, is so wide-
spread that it has been referred to it as part of “the standard justifica-
tory procedure” in philosophy.22 
Hence, Michael DePaul and William Ramsey: 
 
Refutations by intuitive counterexamples figure as prominently 
in today’s philosophical journals as they did in Plato’s dia-
logues. In recent times, efforts to provide philosophical analy-
ses of knowledge, the nature of meaning and reference, the 
human mind, and moral right and wrong—to name only a few 
examples—have been both defended and attacked by appeal 
                                                           
19 See Goldman (2007). 
20 Locke (1996, book II, chapter xxvii, 15; my emphasis). 
21 See Putnam (1975b), Kripke (1980), Parfit (1984), and Thomson (1971). 
22 See Bealer (1998). 
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to what is considered to be intuitively obvious. Even philoso-
phers who do not advertise themselves as engaged in the 
search for necessary and sufficient conditions nevertheless 
lean heavily upon our judgments and counterexamples to sup-
port or criticize positions. While there have always been a few 
philosophers who have been skeptical of the search for precise 
analyses, this type of philosophy is still very widely practiced. 
For many, appealing to our intuitions is the only available op-
tion for uncovering the true nature of the many things that oc-
cupy philosophy.23 
 
This prompts a question: How can a more than 2000 year old phi-
losophical method, developed in relation to a now more or less 
unanimously rejected ontology of Forms and epistemology of rational 
insight, not only have survived until this day, but still constitute the 
standard method of philosophical inquiry? The answer, I will suggest, 
is that the Platonic picture has been replaced by a largely implicit view 
on concepts that warrants contemporary analogues of (AF) and (BF)—
analogues that explain the structural similarity between the Socratic 
method and contemporary, philosophical analysis. 
 
 
1.3. DEFINITIONAL CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
If we want to understand contemporary conceptual analysis, it is 
crucial to identify the object of analysis. As already noted, contempo-
rary philosophical analysis is concerned with concepts rather than 
Forms. Unfortunately, however, contemporary analysis has managed 
to evolve in a way largely disconnected from the psychological study 
of actual conceptual categorization. An account of the psychological 
commitments of conceptual analysis, therefore, has to take the form 
of an inference to the best explanation, identifying the (actual or hy-
pothetical) view of concepts that would make most sense out of con-
ceptual analytic practice. 
                                                           
23 DePaul and Ramsey (1998, pp. vii-viii). 
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This pursuit will proceed in three phases. In the first, I will 
characterize conceptual analytical practice as the pursuit of necessary 
and sufficient application conditions for linguistic terms. I will then 
identify three desiderata that are prevalent in such practice and use 
them to extract three substantial hints about the specific structure of 
the underlying concepts that is assumed by such practice. In the sec-
ond phase, I will argue that the resulting (proto-)view of concepts is 
compatible with all three main philosophical theories about con-
cepts—i.e., concepts as abilities, concepts as abstract objects, and 
concepts as mental representations. This will highlight the sense in 
which conceptual analytic practice does not commit one to any par-
ticular philosophical theory of concepts. However, in the third phase, I 
will argue that conceptual analysis, as traditionally practiced, neverthe-
less makes most sense against the background of one particular psycho-
logical theory about concepts, i.e., the so-called Classical Theory of 
Concepts. 
So, as for the first phase, we may note that conceptual analysis 
in analytic philosophy typically inquires into concepts by way of defin-
ing linguistic terms. Why would philosophers do this? Why would they 
suppose that philosophical inquiries into linguistic terms reveal any-
thing philosophically interesting about concepts? My suggestion is 
that it has been supposed that there is an intimate connection be-
tween concepts and the meaning of words. The connection, I propose, 
is the following: 
 
Bridge 
Meaningful words express concepts. 
 
Two comments are necessary. First, Bridge does not commit us to 
saying that there is a one-to-one mapping between concepts and 
meaningful words. For one thing, there are ambiguous words, i.e., 
words that correspond to several concepts, as well as synonyms, i.e., 
concepts that correspond to several words. For another, there are 
many concepts that do not have a word (in some cases, not even a 
string of words) to go with them. 
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Second, Bridge does not imply that the concepts that a person 
possesses fix everything about what the words she uses communicate in 
use. For example, over and above conveying that someone is armed, 
“She’s got a gun” will communicate different things depending not 
only on the concepts possessed by the speaker and expressed by the 
words, but also on the context of the utterance, e.g., whether the sen-
tence is uttered at a shooting range or during an armed robbery. 
However, none of this serves to undermine the claim we are 
considering as an explanation of why attending to linguistic terms 
would help you understand concepts, namely that, when someone 
uses a meaningful word, that word expresses a (as in: at least one) 
concept. Furthermore, this claim rests upon a substantial and well-
established empirical hypothesis. Hence, Gregory Murphy: 
 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence for the conceptual 
basis of word meaning. […] Indeed, I do not know of any 
phenomenon in the psychology of concepts that could con-
ceivably be found in words that has not been found. If word 
meanings are not represented in terms of concepts, then they 
must be represented in terms of something else that just hap-
pens to have the exact same properties as concepts. By Oc-
cam’s razor, I will conclude that word meanings are repre-
sented in terms of concepts.24 
 
In short, the empirical evidence is such that an impressive amount of 
the phenomena discovered in the empirical work on human concep-
tual and, in many cases, non-verbal classification, also turn up in the 
corresponding linguistic tasks. For example, people tend to consistently 
deem some instances of a kind to be more representative or “typical” 
instances than other. Analogously, sentence planning and word acces-
sibility, as revealed through sentence processing tasks, is sensitive to 
typicality. Furthermore, human conceptual structure has been shown 
to exhibit a basic or preferred level, in the sense that, given a neutral 
                                                           
24 Murphy (2002, pp. 393-394). 
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setting, people will be more prone to categorize things in terms of 
some kinds (dog) rather than another (something to be saved in case 
of fire). Analogously, people are more prone to describe things in 
terms of words corresponding to such basic kinds, i.e., to describe 
something as a “cat” rather than a “Siamese,” under neutral circum-
stances.25 
It should be noted that this story about how meaningful words 
express concepts remains neutral as to both (a) what it is to possess a 
concept (is it to grasp a Form/Fregean Sense, to instantiate a mental 
representation, or to have a set of cognitive abilities?) and (b) whether 
meaning, construed thus, serves to determine reference. Using a distinc-
tion from Kripke, I will, eventually, suggest that, although meaning 
may not determine reference it, nevertheless, serves to fix reference, in 
the particular sense of presenting us with (non-rigid) cognitive path-
ways to actual, external phenomena.26 However, if meaning is a func-
tion of concepts possessed, the question of reference determining 
factors will ultimately turn on how we want to understand conceptual 
content.  
Since the works of Putnam and Kripke, many philosophers 
(this one included) have become convinced that the intrinsic, psycho-
logical state of the speaker (or what is sometimes referred to as narrow 
content) does not determine reference, at least in the case of natural 
kind terms and proper names.27 Rather, reference is, in part, deter-
mined by the speaker’s environment (yielding so-called wide content).28 
Although we will find reason to return to this issue in chapters 2 and 
3, the important thing to note for now is that the idea that meaningful 
words express concepts does not, in itself, commit us to any particular 
                                                           
25 See Murphy (2002, pp. 393-399). 
26 See Kripke (1980, pp. 55 and 57) on fixing reference by way of descriptions 
and accidental properties, and (1980, p. 96) on the role of such reference 
fixing in the determination of reference, by way of acts of baptism. 
27 See Putnam (1975b) and Kripke (1980), 
28 See Segal (2000) for a dissenting voice. 
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view of conceptual content, nor of any particular story about the 
factors determining reference. 
Returning to philosophical analysis, we may note that the fa-
vored format for capturing meanings is that of necessary and sufficient 
application conditions for linguistic terms. More specifically, consider the 
following characterization of what I will refer to as Definitional Con-
ceptual Analysis, or DCA for short: 
 
Definitional Conceptual Analysis (DCA) 
For a given analysandum ‘F,’ identify a set of characteristics P1, 
P2, … Pn and a function R such that R takes P1, P2, … Pn as 
arguments in a structure that may involve simple conjunctions 
as well as other logical connectives and quantifiers, yielding an 
analysans in the form of a definition, citing a necessary and suf-
ficient application condition for the corresponding term “F.” 
 
In the philosophical literature, three desiderata are commonly invoked 
in the construction of conceptual analyses, the first of which I would 
like to characterize thus: 
 
Desideratum 1: Simplicity 
The set of characteristics cited in the analysis (i.e., P1, P2, … 
Pn) should be fairly small and their relation (as modeled by R) 
straightforward, so as to make sure that the resulting analysans 
is as simple as possible.29 
 
As noted by William Ramsey, this desideratum is most plausibly moti-
vated in analogy with the explanatory sciences, where it is typically 
assumed that, if the suggested set of defining characteristics is too 
complex, disjunctive or convoluted, there is reason to suspect that we 
simply have not gotten it right yet, and that the definition is the result 
                                                           
29 Cf. Ramsey (1998, p. 163) and Weatherson (2003, p. 9). 
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of an ad hoc adding of epicycles rather than an accurate characteriza-
tion of the phenomenon at issue.30 
A second desideratum that has, to my mind, not been suffi-
ciently acknowledged is the following: 
 
Desideratum 2: Exactitude 
The characteristics cited in the analysis should have clear-cut 
boundaries, so as to ensure that category membership is a 
straightforward yes-or-no affair. 
 
By invoking this requirement, we are asking for a not just any neces-
sary and sufficient conditions but necessary and sufficient conditions 
that yield an extension that exhibits no fuzzy edges. This requirement 
is supposed to serve the purpose of ensuring that the extension of the 
analysans (constructed out of these characteristics) should, in turn, 
have no fuzzy edges and that it, thereby, provides a clear-cut account 
of the concept at issue. We will discuss this requirement as well as its 
motivation in more detail later. 
For now, the interesting thing to note is that the most straight-
forward way to make sense of these two requirements, and the possi-
bility of their joint satisfaction, is that concepts—i.e., the very object 
of study in conceptual analysis—may be represented via simple, clear-
cut, necessary, and sufficient conditions. For brevity’s sake, let us stipulate 
that 
 
Neatness 
a neat condition is a simple, clear-cut, necessary, and sufficient 
condition. 
 
As the reader surely notes, this makes for an interesting structural 
similarity between Platonic and contemporary analysis, with the cru-
cial and already acknowledged difference that Plato is concerned with 
the essences of Forms while modern analytic philosophy is interested 
                                                           
30 See Ramsey (1998) 
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in concepts as expressed by meaningful words. Still, if concepts may 
be represented by way of neat conditions, it is plausible to assume the 
following analogue of (AF): 
 
(AC)  For every concept ‘F’—or, at least, most philosophically 
interesting concepts—there is a definition, specifying a 
neat condition for F-hood. 
 
As noted already in the previous section, the favored way of not only 
producing but also evaluating such definitions is by way of categoriza-
tion intuitions, which is yet another way in which contemporary phi-
losophical methodology is analogous to Plato’s. More specifically, it is 
typically assumed that, if the analysis allows for intuitive counterex-
amples, it must either (a) be accompanied by an explanation of why 
our intuitions are misguided and, hence, not accurately tracking the 
concept at issue—in which case I will say that the counterexample is 
not genuine—or (b) be considered as not giving an accurate analysis of 
the analysandum. Hence, our third desideratum: 
 
Desideratum 3: Exhaustiveness   
The definition provided via the condition cited in the analysis 
should be exhaustive in the sense of not admitting any genuine 
intuitive counterexamples.31 
 
Whence this requirement? This brings us to a further similarity be-
tween Platonic and contemporary analysis, to the effect that the pos-
session of a concept involves a tacit (albeit potentially incomplete) 
knowledge of its defining conditions.32 However, since this knowl-
edge is tacit, it is not something that may be straightforwardly pro-
duced by any competent user of the corresponding term. Still, in so 
far as categorization intuitions are the products of the concepts pos-
sessed, it is reasonable to assume that there is an elucidatory bridge 
                                                           
31 Cf. Ramsey (1998, p. 163). 
32 Cf. Ramsey (1998, p. 165). 
 40 
between the categorization intuitions of speakers and the concepts 
that they possess, such that the former provide substantial hints about 
the latter. As noted by Goldman: 
 
It’s part of the nature of concepts (in the personal, psychologi-
cal sense) that possessing a concept tends to give rise to beliefs 
and intuitions that accord with the contents of the concept. If 
the content of someone’s concept F implies that F does 
(doesn’t) apply to example x, then that person is disposed to 
intuit that F applies (doesn’t apply) to x when the issue is 
raised in his mind.33 
 
Goldman is here concerned merely with concepts “in the personal, 
psychological sense,” by which he means concepts as mental repre-
sentations—a notion that we will delve deeper into below. It should 
be noted, however, that any reasonable account of concepts has to 
maintain a correlation between concepts and categorization intuitions. 
This may be brought out in two steps: First, if concepts are to do any 
explanatory work, they have to, at the very least, explain why we tend 
to categorize the world in the ways that we do. In other words, on any 
reasonable theory of concepts, our categorization dispositions will be 
non-accidentally correlated with the concepts that we possess. This 
establishes a link between categorizations and concepts. Second, if 
forming a categorization intuition is a matter of determining how we 
would categorize something, our categorization intuitions are non-
accidentally correlated with our categorization dispositions. In other 
words, our categorization intuitions are correlated with our categori-
zation dispositions, which, in turn, are correlated with the concepts 
that we possess.34 
Hence, the following analogue of (BF): 
 
                                                           
33 Goldman (2007, p. 15). 
34 Cf. Laurence and Margolis (2003, pp. 278-279). 
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(BC)  Probing the categorization intuitions of competent users 
of a term may serve to elucidate the defining condition 
that attaches to the corresponding concept.35, 36 
 
Just like in the Platonic dialogues, this elucidation plays a positive as 
well as a negative methodological role. On the one hand, it provides 
positive material for candidate analyses, i.e., candidate necessary and 
sufficient conditions that, under Simplicity and Exactitude, should be 
simple and clear-cut. On the other hand, it also serves to evaluate 
such analyses and, hence, play the potentially negative role of disquali-
fying them in so far as they either include counter-intuitive instances 
or fail to include intuitive instances, under the requirement of Exhaus-
tiveness. 
 
 
                                                           
35 A similar assumption seems to be driving the Chomskyan tradition in 
linguistics, where the intuitive judgments of speakers are taken as linguistic 
evidence—on some readings the only available evidence—for particular sets of 
rules and principles of the speaker’s language. See Devitt (2006) for a critical 
discussion and Samuels, Stich, and Tremoulet (1999) for the analogy between 
the linguistic and the conceptual analytic case. 
36 It might be claimed that there is a methodological problem here in deter-
mining when we are dealing with a case of a conflicting intuition of a compe-
tent user or an irrelevant intuition of an incompetent user. It seems to me that 
the only way to separate these is by recourse to the over-all, categorical track-
records of users. More specifically, correlations in categorizations between 
users give rise to (semantic) norms, specifying the correct use of concepts and 
terms. In so far as a user’s track-record of categorization does not deviate to 
any great extent from this norm, she may be deemed competent and her 
intuitions taken to carry some weight in elucidations. However, in so far as a 
user’s track-record deviates greatly from the norm, the most plausible expla-
nation is either incompetence or non-standard use—either of which gives us 
reason to disregard that person’s intuitions as far as elucidation goes. Thanks 
to Åsa Wikforss for calling my attention to this issue. 
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1.4. ON ANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF CONCEPTS 
This concludes the first phase of our inference to the best explana-
tion, prompting the following question for the second: What are the 
prospects for cashing out (AC) and (BC) within the three main phi-
losophical theories of concepts, i.e., concepts as abilities, concepts as 
abstract objects, and concepts as mental representations? 
As for the abilities view, it takes concepts to be nothing but 
sets of abilities typical to cognitive agents. Hence, defining a concept 
would involve specifying such a set. Under (AC), this definition would 
have to take the form of a neat condition delimiting the relevant set of 
abilities. This particular form might be resisted, and indeed has been 
resisted by philosophers attracted to the abilities view. Most notably, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein argued, via several failures to define GAME, that 
few (if any) concepts have definitions, if understood in the above 
sense of neat conditions rather than complicated networks of “family 
resemblances,” where category membership need not be a straight-
forward yes-or-no affair.37 
More recently, psychologists Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn Mer-
vis have argued that Wittgenstein’s claim can be experimentally 
substantiated by way of so-called Prototype Theory—a theory that we 
will find reason to look closer at below.38 For present purposes, how-
ever, it is important to note that taking concepts to be abilities does 
not in itself give us any reason to resist (AC). The same goes for (BC); 
there is nothing in the abilities view that hinders one from assuming 
that the defining conditions attaching to a concept may be elucidated 
by probing the categorization intuitions of competent users of the 
corresponding term. In fact, this even seems to be assumed by Witt-
genstein, considering the method he uses to rebut purported analyses 
of GAME: refutation by intuitive counterexamples. Indeed, for such 
counterexamples to say anything interesting about (our conceptions 
of) what is not a game, they have to track (our conception of) what is a 
game. And although the failure to provide a positive characterization 
                                                           
37 See Wittgenstein (1953). 
38 See Rosch and Mervis (1975). 
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in terms of neat conditions may lend some credibility to the idea that 
concept should not be represented thus, it does not discredit (BC). 
Now, turning to concepts as abstract objects. Here the case is 
somewhat more straightforward, especially in light of the fact that we 
have already demonstrated the compatibility of (AF) and (BF) with one 
of the main candidates for concepts as abstract objects, i.e., Platonic 
Forms. Hence, assuming that concepts just are Forms, we have also 
shown the latter to be compatible with (AC) and (BC), mutatis mutandis. 
It does not take much effort to extend this case to the other main 
candidate: Fregean senses. On this view, to possess a concept is to 
grasp a sense.39 Such senses play the dual theoretical role of (a) deter-
mining the referent and (b) accounting for the mode in which the 
referent is presented and, thus, for the possibility of cognitive differ-
ences between co-referring expressions (such as “seven plus four” 
and “the square root of one hundred and twenty one”). What would it 
mean to define the sense of an expression? It would mean to specify 
the description that a (particular or generic) subject grasps when ac-
cessing a referent. In other words, to possess a concept is to grasp the 
description in question. If so, however, it seems fairly reasonable to 
assume that the categorization intuitions of competent users of par-
ticular terms provide substantial information about that description. 
Hence, assumption (BC). For (AC) to be warranted, however, this 
description needs to take the form of a definition in terms of a neat 
condition. Just like in the above, this is, clearly, something that one 
might have independent doubts about, but it is not ruled out by the 
mere fact that concepts are senses—which is all that matters for pre-
sent purposes. 
This brings us to our final philosophical theory of concepts: 
concepts as mental representations.40 On this view, concepts are men-
                                                           
39 To anyone familiar with contemporary terminology, Frege’s taxonomy is 
slightly confusing here. To Frege, a sense (“Sinn”) is not the same thing as a 
concept (“Begriff”), which is the referent (“Bedeutung”) of a predicate. 
40 See, e.g., Fodor (2003) and Pinker (2007; 1994). It should be noted that 
understanding concepts in terms of mental representations in no way com-
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tal tokens of particular types, playing a direct causal-functional role in 
the mental life of subjects. To have a concept is to token such a type 
and for two subjects to share a concept is simply to token the same 
type.41 This way of thinking about concepts has been particularly 
influential in the interface between philosophy, cognitive science, and 
empirical psychology. It is important to note, however, that the phi-
losophical relevance of empirical research on human categorization is 
in no way contingent upon concepts being mental representations, 
rather than abilities, Platonic Forms or Fregean senses. As noted in 
§1.3 above, the very Bridge tying together the inquiry into application 
conditions for words with the structure of concepts turns on the 
substantial, empirical hypothesis that meaningful words express con-
cepts. However, agreeing to this does not commit one to a particular 
ontological theory of concepts. Platonists may still claim that concepts 
are Forms and using a meaningful word is a question of grasping such 
Forms, just like the Fregean may claim that concepts are senses and 
that using a meaningful word is a question of grasping such senses. 
Similarly, an adherent of the abilities view may hold that concepts are 
nothing but sets of cognitive abilities, e.g., pertaining to discrimination 
and inference, and that the meanings of words are satisfactorily ex-
plained with reference to such abilities. Finally, psychologists might 
prefer to think about concepts in terms of mental representations. I 
happen to share this preference and will, henceforth, refer to mental 
representations by the term “concept,” unless otherwise is stated.  
However, this does not take away from the fact that what is ul-
timately being studied by psychologists interested in concepts is hu-
man categorization, i.e., facts pertaining to the ways in which people 
                                                                                                               
mits one to the idea that concepts can be analyzed. See e.g., Fodor (1981). See 
also Pinker (2007, pp. 92-102) for a critical discussion. 
41 As noted by Putnam (1975b, p. 222), Frege’s reluctance to identify concepts 
with psychological states seems to be a result, at least in part, of overlooking 
this latter possibility, with the consequence that “Frege’s argument against 
psychologism is only an argument against identifying concepts with mental 
particulars, not with mental entities in general.” 
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categorize the world. And unless one wishes to sever the (explanato-
rily quite potent) connection between such categorization and the 
concepts that, supposedly, explain the structure of and patterns of our 
categorizations, one will have to agree to that 
 
Constraint 
the classificatory structures that arise out of concept use offer 
substantial constraints on the correct theory of concepts, in 
such a way that, given certain patterns in classificatory struc-
tures, we may rule out certain theories as incorrect. 
 
As seen above, DCAs are typically constructed in the form of defini-
tions, citing neat application conditions for terms, supposedly captur-
ing the meanings of concepts. However, as we noted in passing 
above, it has been suggested that the structure of human concepts—
i.e., the very object of conceptual analytic study—as revealed by the 
classificatory structures that arise out of concept use, are not satisfac-
torily captured by neat conditions. More specifically, we will now see 
that the classificatory structures unveiled by psychologists studying 
human categorization display properties incompatible with the idea 
that concepts exhibit the structure of neat conditions, which, given 
Constraint, seems to imply that (AC) is not scientifically warranted. 
 
 
1.5. THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF CONCEPTS 
There was indeed a time when psychologists assumed that concepts 
were best captured by neat conditions—a view that is usually referred 
to as the Classical Theory of Concepts. This view may be summed up as 
follows: 
 
The Classical Theory of Concepts 
Concepts are best described in terms of definitions, providing 
necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership 
in such a way that  
(1) there are no distinctions between category members; and 
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(2) for every category, every object is either in or not in that 
category.42 
 
However, researchers soon found reason to doubt this classical pic-
ture, initially through the aforementioned work of Rosch and Mer-
vis.43 First of all, it turned out to be extremely hard to find any con-
cept, the meaning of which could be summed up through a neat con-
dition—a point that, as we have seen, was made already by Theaetetus 
in his discussion with Socrates and later by Wittgenstein. More impor-
tantly, however, and as for the particular characteristics called for by 
(1), it was found that the categorizations we, in fact, make reveal a 
taxonomy where members of a category form a continuum, and some 
members (often quite consistently) are judged as better examples of 
the category than others—a phenomenon that has come to be re-
ferred to as the typicality effect. In other words, while some entities (such 
as trucks and tablecloths) clearly do not qualify as birds, some entities 
within the category of birds are clearer examples than others. 
For example, even in cases when the relevant traits we, sup-
posedly, would include in a list of necessary and sufficient characteris-
tics are equally salient, robins are considered more typical instances of 
birds than eagles, which is revealed in reaction time experiments on 
subjects’ tendencies to pair specimens with particular kinds.44 Fur-
thermore, and as for (2), it was also found that, rather than categoriz-
ing objects against the background of neat conditions, category mem-
bership is a question of similarity to typical instances along different 
dimensions, where some features are more “important”—i.e., get 
assigned a greater weight—than others. And, in many cases where the 
similarity between the typical instances and a judged item gets lower, 
                                                           
42 This formulation is borrowed from Murphy (2002, p. 15), with some slight 
re-formulations to fit the taxonomy of this study. 
43 See Rosch and Mervis (1975). 
44 See, e.g., Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973). See also Rosch (1977). 
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there is no clear answer to the question whether the item is or is not 
in the category.45 
Clearly, the rejection of the Classical Theory presents a prob-
lem for DCA. More specifically, while not directly refuting the idea 
that concepts may be captured via necessary and sufficient conditions, 
the aforementioned empirical results do serve to challenge the as-
sumption that concepts should be construed along the lines of (1) and 
(2) above, i.e., as yielding categories where no distinctions are made 
between category members and every category has clear-cut borders 
that delimit it from every other category.46 As such, the rejection of 
the Classical Theory directly discredits Exactitude—i.e., the “clear-cut” 
aspect of neatness—as a desideratum for analysis and for the follow-
ing two reasons: First, given that human categorization, contra (1), 
reveals a continuum structure in light of the typicality effect, such that 
some members are deemed to be “better” instances than others, it is 
plausible to assume that some “bad” members will not be all that 
different from some non-members, and that there, hence, seldom will 
be any sharp boundaries between different categories. This very as-
sumption is made further plausible by the evidence that, contra (2), 
suggests that categories are generated in reference not to clear-cut 
characteristics but rather to similarity to typical instances. Hence, the 
kind of characteristics called for by Exactitude simply does not seem to 
be of the right kind, if we are interested in capturing human concepts. 
As noted by Ramsey, we may even find some support for a re-
jection of the Classical Theory by looking at actual philosophical 
dialectics in relation to DCA conducted under Exactitude—at least if 
combined with Exhaustiveness.47 Against the background of these two 
desiderata, an instance of DCA may be refuted in either of two ways. 
On the one hand, it may be refuted through the identification of a 
genuine intuitive instance that does not possess all the properties cited 
in the definition, which would show that the characteristics are not 
                                                           
45 See, e.g., Murphy (2002, pp. 30-31). 
46 Cf. Margolis and Laurence (1999, p. 24). 
47 See Ramsey (1998). 
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necessary. However, granted what psychological research tells us about 
the structure of concepts, it is to be expected that such instances are 
not too hard to come across. All we have to do is identify a situation 
in which one or more of the proposed definitional features (say, abil-
ity to fly) are lacking but the summed weight of the ones that are 
present (feathers, beaks, wings, vertebrate, egg-laying, etc.) is suffi-
cient to, nevertheless, yield an inclusive verdict. 
The other way in which analyses may be refuted is through the 
identification of an instance that has all the features cited in the defi-
nition but that, nevertheless, does not intuitively fall within the cate-
gory in question, which would show that the features in question are 
not sufficient. Again, such instances might not be too hard to find, 
given that any of the two following claims holds: (a) Feature weight 
assignments are context-dependent, in which case it is possible frame 
counterexamples in terms of contexts that tip the scale towards nega-
tive characterization, and, thereby, enable feature distributions with a 
summed weight that normally yield an inclusive verdict (a subject is an 
unmarried man, hence, he is a bachelor) to fail to do so because of 
contextual factors (the subject happens to be the Head of the Catholic 
Church); or (b) features might cancel each other out when figuring in 
non-standard scenarios, so that a set of features that would normally 
lead one to judge an instance as a member of a particular category (x 
is a device with a seat-cushion and a back-rest and is designed to sit 
in; hence, x is a piece of furniture) does not get categorized thus, since 
it has a feature that, in particular circumstances (say, if installed in a 
car), is more common to another category (a car seat).48 
In conclusion: Given that concepts are represented in a way 
that best accommodates the phenomena uncovered by psychologists 
critical to the (today almost unanimously rejected) Classical Theory, it 
is to be expected that analytical philosophy, if practiced along the lines 
of DCA under the requirement of Exactitude and Exhaustiveness, gener-
ates an abundance of counterexamples and refuted theories. And 
                                                           
48 See Ramsey (1998, p. 171-2) and Smith and Medin (1981). 
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everyone familiar with the analytical philosophical tradition would be 
hard pressed to deny that this is what we, in fact, have seen.  
 
 
1.6. WHENCE THE DESIRE FOR EXACTITUDE? 
One question remains, however: If the Classical Theory of concepts is 
so untenable, how come philosophers have been so attracted to the 
idea of characterizing concepts in terms of clear-cut definitions? One 
reason is that it presents a unified theory of several heavily researched 
phenomena, the three most important being concept acquisition, 
concept categorization, and the determination of reference.49 If pos-
sessing a concept means possessing a neat condition, we may say that 
learning a concept just involves acquiring such a condition, that catego-
rizing just involves applying such a condition, and being the referent 
simply involves satisfying such a condition. 
Undoubtedly, this is a very attractive story and it is not made 
less attractive by the fact that it is able to subsume the explanations of 
three very important phenomena under one simple and unified the-
ory. In light of this, it also makes sense that it was to be rejected first 
when all three components had been shown implausible, with the 
1970’s marking the beginning of the downfall. We have already re-
viewed some of the results regarding typicality, discrediting this pic-
ture in relation to categorization. As it happened, the same phenom-
ena were found also in the categorizations made by children, further 
discrediting the idea that we acquire concepts via clear-cut defini-
tions.50 As a final blow, the works of Putnam and Kripke provided 
compelling reason to believe that—at least as far as proper names and 
natural kind concepts go—we are hardly ever in possession of condi-
tions specific enough to determine the referents.51 
Still, this does not necessarily explain why philosophers con-
cerned with conceptual analysis have focused on clear-cut definitions. 
                                                           
49 Cf. Margolis and Laurence (1999, p. 10). 
50 See Murphy (2002, pp. 318-319 and 336-340) for a recent overview. 
51 See Putnam (1975b) and Kripke (1980). 
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This brings us to another important and historically influential motif: 
the idea that the products of conceptual analysis should, ideally, be 
incorporable into axiomatic systems, i.e., systems constructed out of a 
finite (and usually small) set of axioms, a (potentially infinite) set of 
theorems, and a set of inference rules specifying how to infer the 
latter from the former. This idea can be found already in the writings 
of Plato but figures in a slightly more worked out form in the works 
of his student Aristotle. Just as his tutor, Aristotle considered deduc-
tive science to be the most noble and important form of science and 
argued that the proper logical structure of such science is axiomatic. 
More specifically, the sentences of such sciences should either corre-
spond to axioms or be derivable from them by way of inference rules. 
More importantly for our purposes, an analogous requirement 
is put on the component terms of such deductive sciences, which are 
to be introduced either without any definitions, i.e., as basic terms, or 
to be defined on the basis of such basic terms. One very intuitive way 
to conceptualize such axiomatic systems is in relation to set theory. 
The sets of set theory are abstract objects that serve to define other 
concepts via a membership relation, unions, and the intersections of 
sets. Traditionally, membership in sets has been construed in such a 
way that (a) no distinction is made between different members of the 
same set, with the consequence that set-membership is a pure yes-no 
question, while (b) a very clear distinction holds between members 
and non-members of a set, to the effect that the borders that delimit 
sets are completely clear-cut.52  
If philosophy is to be conducted in accordance with this 
axiomatic ideal, concepts—i.e., the targets of philosophical analysis—
must be tailored to fit this picture. And, undoubtedly, construing 
concepts as determinate sets is not without its advantages. For one 
thing, it provides a very useful framework for specifying what it is for 
two concepts to be identical versus contrary (the sets completely 
coincide versus do not intersect) as well as to be similar and/or dif-
                                                           
52 More recent attempts to re-conceptualize sets as fuzzy sets, where set mem-
bership rather is a matter of probability or degree, deny the first assumption. 
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ferent (the sets intersect to this-or-that degree). Furthermore, and as 
for properties in an axiomatic context, a set-theoretic framework also 
yields clear criteria for what warrants inferring one concept from an-
other: the set corresponding to the inferred concept is either a super-
set of the set corresponding to the concept from which it is inferred 
(as when inferring X IS BLUE from X IS LIGHT BLUE), or the sets com-
pletely coincide (as when inferring X IS CRIMSON from X IS OF A RICH 
DEEP RED COLOR INCLINING TO PURPLE). In other words, determi-
nate sets, clearly, provide a powerful tool in the construction of axio-
matic systems of concept. 
As we have seen, however, the classificatory structures that 
arise out of actual, human classification do not lend themselves to a 
characterization in terms of such determinate sets, which has direct 
implications for philosophical methodology. Or to put the point more 
bluntly, as William Lycan has done recently in a retrospective piece on 
the Gettier discussion: 
 
It is well to remind ourselves that no effort of analytical phi-
losophy to provide strictly necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a philosophically interesting concept has ever succeeded. 
And there should be a lesson in that.53 
 
So, what is the lesson? Clearly, something needs to be learned, but it is 
too early to be pessimistic about the project of analyzing concepts as 
such. The next chapter considers two rectifications of traditional 
methodology, the first one in terms of prototypes and the second one 
in terms of reflective equilibria. This will serve to highlight yet another 
problem for conceptual analysis—does an essentially armchair 
method provide the best methodology for understanding concepts, in 
light of the more rigorous methods of empirical psychology?—and, 
ultimately, lead us to the more fundamental question: Why should we 
analyze concepts in the first place? 
 
                                                           
53 Lycan (2006, p. 150). 
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1.7. CONCLUSION 
There is a striking continuity between the Socratic method of Plato’s 
dialogues and that of contemporary philosophy, such that analysis is 
construed as the pursuit of definitions by way of intuitions. I have argued 
that one way to understand this continuity is with reference to how 
the Platonic idea that philosophical insight corresponds to insight into 
the essences of eternal Forms has been replaced with the contemporary 
idea that the proper objects of philosophical investigation are the 
meanings of terms as represented by the structures of concepts. De-
spite this shift in target, however, one central idea has been preserved, 
namely that the targets of analysis are best characterized in terms of 
simple, clear-cut, necessary, and sufficient conditions. However, when 
turning to our best psychological evidence regarding the structure of 
our concepts, we found little support for the idea that such conditions 
provide the best format for representing concepts. In the next chap-
ter, we will consider two attempts to rectify conceptual analysis, the 
first one in terms of prototypes and the second one in terms of reflec-
tive equilibria. 
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Chapter 2. 
Prototypes and Reflective Equilibria 
 
 
 
In a sense, the lesson of the previous chapter is perfectly straightfor-
ward: Any philosopher concerned with the analysis of concepts—be 
they epistemic or not—has to take the empirical work on actual hu-
man categorizations seriously. This also highlights the sense in which 
the problem about neat conditions constitutes an internal objection to 
conceptual analysis, in the sense that it does not discredit the project 
of analyzing concepts as such, but merely throws doubt on a particular 
way of analyzing.  
For this reason, the problem seems perfectly solvable; all we 
need to do is find an empirically more warranted way to characterize 
concepts. In the present chapter, we will first consider a solution in 
terms of what I will call Prototypical Conceptual Analysis, working 
with concepts as prototypes rather than neat conditions. This will not 
only highlight questions regarding whether the armchair provides a 
satisfactory methodological vantage point for the understanding of 
concept, given the more rigorous methods of empirical psychology, 
but also certain issues regarding why we should analyze concepts in 
the first place—issues that will, ultimately, drive us to question Ex-
haustiveness as a plausible desideratum for epistemological analysis.  
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This will bring us to the second solution in terms of the idea 
that the goal of analysis is not to provide exhaustive accounts of our 
concepts, but rather to construct theories that put our most central 
intuitions in a reflective equilibrium with our general principles or 
theories about the world. It is argued that, construed thus, this idea, at 
best, comes out to a call for honest, intellectual inquiry, grounded in 
our best empirical theories. Needless to say, such inquiry should play 
an important role in philosophical inquiry, epistemology being no 
exception. However, the challenge lies in providing methodology that 
specifies exactly what weights to assign to our current concepts and 
norms in philosophical theorizing, exactly at what stage empirical 
inquiry enters, and exactly what is the mark of a good analysis—
challenges that will be taken up in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
 
2.1. PROTOTYPICAL CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
While being fairly conclusive as for the refutation of the Classical 
Theory, the psychological research is, unfortunately, suggestive at best 
when it comes to exactly what theory should replace it. Nevertheless, 
on one popular view, concepts are represented as having the structure 
of prototypes, understood as abstracted sets of typical features. As was 
hinted in the previous chapter, categorization, on this view, is a simi-
larity comparison process. More specifically, it is a function of the 
number and weight of prototype features possessed by the catego-
rized item, where the weight signifies the importance of the feature in 
question, mirroring the assumption that some features are more im-
portant than others. For example, although both the property of 
doing harm and being made of metal probably figures the prototype 
for WEAPON, the presence of the former is, clearly, more important 
than the latter.1 
So, let us evaluate the prospects for doing conceptual analysis 
in terms of prototypes rather than neat conditions, by way of what I 
                                                           
1 See Murphy (2002, pp. 42-43). 
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will refer to as Prototypical Conceptual Analysis, or PCA for short. Such 
an analysis, I suggest, would take the following form: 
 
Prototypical Conceptual Analysis (PCA) 
For any ‘F,’ identify a prototype set Q and a threshold value T, 
such that Q contains a set of prototypical features, assigned 
appropriate weights in such a way that the weighted sum pre-
dicts positive categorization for ‘F’ when, and only when, it 
exceeds T.2 
 
Construed thus, it is important to note is that PCA is not working 
under assumption (AC) but rather under the following analogue: 
 
(AP)  For any concept ‘F,’ there is a set of prototypical features 
assigned weights that, together with a threshold value, 
predicts categorization. 
 
Let us look closer at this assumption in relation to the three desiderata 
set up earlier. It was noted above that characterizing concepts in 
terms of neat conditions failed to do justice to the dual fact that (a) 
instances often form a continuum where some instances are quite 
consistently considered “better” instances than others, and that (b) 
there is not always a clear answer to the question whether a particular 
item is or is not an instance. Both of these facts may be accounted for 
when concepts are construed as prototypes. Given that items may 
have more or less of the weighted features in Q, items that have 
enough features to exceed T will form a continuum in accordance 
with (a). Furthermore, given that T may be construed either as an 
absolute value, or a value satisfied in so far as it is approximated, the 
present model can not only handle situations calling for a specific cut-
off value, but also situations with vague concept boundaries, in accor-
dance with (b). Hence, PCA rejects Exactitude, in allowing for the 
                                                           
2 Goldman and Pust (1998, pp. 193-194) seem to have something like this in 
mind. See also Goldman (2007, p. 23).  
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possibility of intra-concept distinctions and non-clear-cut boundaries 
rather than neat conditions—a focus well motivated by the scientific 
findings reviewed in relation to DCA above. 
Furthermore, if we hold on to Exhaustiveness, PCA latches on 
to the features and weights assumed by (AP) and yields predictions of 
categorization judgments. As such, PCA admits of no counterexam-
ples. However, as already the above characterization makes clear, 
PCA would under Exhaustiveness, most likely, result in utterly compli-
cated analyses, and, thereby, fail to satisfy Simplicity. Still, if one looks 
at actual philosophical practice, PCA is no different from DCA here, 
which, in a context where it is to be expected that counterexamples 
are cheap (as was argued in the previous chapter), has generated noto-
riously complicated analyses of seemingly ordinary notions. Unlike 
DCA, however, PCA would not generate complicated analyses due to 
an inaccurate theory of concepts. Rather, PCA would yield compli-
cated analyses because concepts and categorizations are, as a matter of 
fact, constituted and governed by quite complicated mechanisms.  
 
 
2.2. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AS AN EMPIRICAL TASK 
This observation also serves to highlight the point that conceptual 
analysis may be construed as an explicitly empirical task—i.e., as relying 
on (current) sense experiential input—which is in stark contrast to 
how it has been conducted by analytic and armchair prone philoso-
phers. Considering the common opinion that conceptual analysis is a 
priori, it will serve us well to elaborate on the distinction between 
empirical and armchair (i.e., non-empirical) inquiry in relation to the 
distinction between a priori and a posteriori warrant. First, what is a 
priori and a posteriori warrant?  
As I will use the terms, a priori warrant is warrant that appeals 
to pure thought or reason alone, and a posteriori warrant is simply 
warrant that is not a priori.3 In explicating the relevant sense of “ap-
peals to” it has become customary to distinguish between evidential 
                                                           
3 Cf. BonJour (1998, p. 11). 
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and (merely) enabling factors. Hence, while visual perception may be 
evidentially relevant to my belief that the sky is blue, it plays a merely 
enabling role in my belief that everything that is blue is colored; with-
out visual experience, I would (arguably) not have been able to form 
the concepts BLUE and COLORED, nor raise the question whether all 
blue things were colored. However, as soon as I have acquired these 
concepts, I will be able to conclude that everything that is blue is 
colored by recourse to pure thought or reason alone, without any 
evidential input from perceptual experience or the like. Against the 
background of this distinction, we may reformulate our characteriza-
tion of the a priori and a posteriori as follows: a priori warrant is warrant 
that appeals to pure thought or reason alone as far as evidential factors 
go, and a posteriori warrant is simply warrant that is not a priori. 
Now, do the two distinctions—i.e., empirical and non-
empirical method, on the one hand, and a posteriori and a priori war-
rant, on the other—coincide? No, they do not. It should be clear that 
a priori warrant never involves an empirical method, but it hardly 
follows that a posteriori warrant never involves a non-empirical 
method. Some paradigm examples of an empirical method do, indeed, 
proceed by way of a posteriori sources of warrant—knowledge through 
perceptual observation being one of them—but this does not take 
away from the fact that some warrant is neither a priori nor flows in 
any straightforward way from sense experience. Take introspection 
and memory, for example, neither of which can be plausibly said to 
give rise to a priori warrant. However, since they do not rely on (cur-
rent) input provided by our five senses in any obvious way, they 
would still qualify as non-empirical sources of warrant under the 
above characterizations. 
The following table sums up and exemplifies the suggested re-
lation between the distinction between the a posteriori and a priori, on 
the one hand, and that between an empirical method and a non-
empirical method, on the other: 
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 A priori warrant A posteriori warrant 
Empirical method - Perceptual observation. 
Non-empirical 
method 
Mathematics and 
logics. 
Memory and introspec-
tion. 
 
As suggested by Goldman, this way of construing the a priori/a posteri-
ori distinction has the advantage that it enables us to formulate two 
distinct approaches to conceptual analysis and the use of categoriza-
tion intuitions. First, take the third-person approach to conceptual investi-
gation: 
 
The experimenter presents a subject with two verbal stimuli: a 
description of an example and an instruction to classify the ex-
ample as either an instance or a non-instance of a specified 
concept or predicate. The subject then makes a verbal re-
sponse to these stimuli, which is taken to express and applica-
tion intuition. This intuition is taken as a datum—analogous to 
a meter reading—for use in testing hypotheses about the con-
tent of the concept in the subject’s head.4 
 
As Goldman notes, the resulting evidence is “distinctly observational, 
and hence empirical.” More specifically, this is an example of concep-
tual analysis construed in empirical (i.e., sense experiental), a posteriori 
(i.e., non-a priori) terms. However, it does not look much like the way 
in which conceptual analysis has traditionally been conducted. This 
brings us to the first-person approach to conceptual analysis, where one is 
primarily consulting one’s own categorization intuitions.5 Now, con-
strued thus, conceptual analysis, clearly, does not involve making any 
perceptual observations. However, on the above definitions, it does 
                                                           
4 Goldman (2007, p. 20). 
5 Note that calling this the first-person approach is only meant to imply that we 
are dealing with a person consulting her own intuition—not that she necessar-
ily has a privileged access to the matters at hand. 
 59 
not, thereby, follow that the resulting warrant is a priori. Hence, Gold-
man: 
 
Since some sources of warrant are neither perceptual nor a 
priori, application intuition might be another such source. In-
deed, the process of generating classification intuitions has 
more in common with memory retrieval than with purely intel-
lectual thought or ratiocination, the core of the a priori. The 
generation of classification intuitions involves the accessing of 
a cognitive structure that somehow encodes a representation 
of a category. Of the various sources mentioned above, this 
most resembles memory, which is the accessing of a cognitive 
structure that somehow encodes a representation of a past epi-
sode.6 
 
In other words, conceptual analysis from a first-person approach is 
best described as an instance of a non-empirical (i.e., non-sense expe-
riental), a posteriori (non-a priori) investigation. 
Now, let us return to PCA and pose the question: What is the 
most promising approach to conceptual analysis conducted in terms 
of prototypes, the first-person or the third-person approach? In an-
swering this question, we need to keep in mind that we, on PCA, not 
only need to determine the prototypical features of the concept in 
question, but also the weight of each feature, not to mention any 
contextual factors that might influence the actual assignment of such 
weights. And make no mistake: This is all as it should be, if we want 
fully exhaustive characterizations of our concepts. And, as such, the 
empirical study has, as already noted, been conducted with impressive 
assiduity within psychology.7 
More specifically, consider the following reformulated ana-
logue of (BC): 
                                                           
6 Goldman (2007, p. 20). 
7 See Smith and Medin (1981) and Murphy (2002) for two good overviews of 
the psychological study of concepts. 
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(BP)  Probing the categorization intuitions of competent users 
of a term may, under very special circumstances, serve to 
elucidate the prototypical features and weights that attach 
to the corresponding concept. 
 
This brings out another internal objection to conceptual analysis: If 
we are to hold on to the ambition of exhaustively characterizing con-
cepts, conceptual analysis has to go beyond mere armchair exercises 
in favor of hands-on empirical investigation, since mere armchair 
reflection is a less reliable guide to our concepts than empirical sci-
ence. There are (at least) three reasons for this. First, the methods of 
empirical science is better suited for coping with performance errors 
on part of the intuiting subject, i.e., with situations in which our intui-
tions are off the mark due to human limitations in attention span, 
computational capacity, and the like. Second, when compared to the 
experimental condition of the single, intuiting subject, empirical sci-
ence has superior resources for not only collecting but also handling 
large sets of data. Third, due to greater methodological rigor, as well 
as increasingly sophisticated technical apparatus, empirical science is 
more likely to provide a more exact picture of our concepts. After all, 
it was not until the dawn of scientific, psychological study of concept 
that such subtle but important phenomena as typicality were discov-
ered.  
Note that this is not a call for giving up on intuitions alto-
gether. This is a point about methodology—not skepticism. As such, 
it does not aim to reject the idea that we might very well have an 
intuitive grasp of the contents of our concepts along the lines of the 
first-person approach. Indeed, any inquiry into our concepts will rely 
on introspective reports regarding such content. It is to deny, how-
ever, that the armchair provides the most methodologically sound 
location for the analysis of concept, given the more rigorous methods 
of empirical psychology, that typically not only proceeds by way of a 
more substantial body of data (as in: data that is more substantial than 
what is provided by the introspective reports of a single philosopher 
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and her colleagues) but also takes seriously the methodological prob-
lems that face psychological research in general and the use of intro-
spective reports in particular. Hence, the formulation “Under very 
special circumstances” in (BP) above. 
Here, it should also be noticed that, since the inception of pro-
totype theory in the 1970’s, much attention has been paid to a ques-
tion that many defenders of the theory has failed to address: What are 
the mechanisms determining what features get included in the proto-
type set and the weights that these features get assigned? This is a 
question best answered in the context of conceptual development. As 
it turns out, prior knowledge plays an important role in the construc-
tion and evolution of a prototype set in the sense of providing sub-
stantial constrains not only on what features are allowed in the set but 
also on the weights that are assigned to these features.  
For example, in the case of artifactual kinds, little attention is 
typically paid to superficial properties with no relation to design and 
purpose, quite independently of how often these properties occur in 
instances.8 Similarly, people forming concepts of animals typically pay 
no attention to such properties as the age or sex of the instances. In 
fact, in the case of natural kinds, people tend to be fairly realist in 
their categorization habits, treating the properties used to pick out 
instances not so much as defining features but something closer to 
symptoms of an underlying essence—an approach that gives rise to 
increasingly sophisticated feature sets that are better predicted by 
factors pertaining to prior knowledge about the kind of features that 
are important (e.g., for inductive inference) than by simply keeping 
count of how often particular features appear in category members.9 
Consequently, prototype theories, at least as traditionally formulated, 
fail to predict the subtleties of conceptual development. 
These are all very interesting issues and any serious attempt to 
defend a prototype approach to conceptual structure would have to 
involve a thorough treatment of them all. Indeed, this is exactly what 
                                                           
8 See, e.g., Murphy (1993, 2002). 
9 See, e.g., Keil (1989). 
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we find within the psychological literature on concepts.10 However, 
we need to remember that we are here interested in conceptual analy-
sis as it figures in philosophy generally and in epistemology in particu-
lar. It was noted above that conceptual analysis has traditionally been 
conducted under the assumption that analysis should provide exhaus-
tive accounts of our concepts, i.e., analyses that reveal every concep-
tual nook and cranny. Clearly, this is not an unreasonable desideratum 
within the branch of psychology concerned with the study of con-
cepts. Indeed, nothing short of exhaustive accounts would reveal 
exactly those subtleties that we need to understand in order to get a 
better grip on the exact structures of concepts and the way in which 
they develop. However, is Exhaustiveness an important desideratum in 
the philosophical analysis of concepts?  
To the extent that it is, the above considerations would force 
philosophers concerned with conceptual analysis to not only take into 
account the problems discussed in chapter 1 in relation to neat condi-
tions and the fall of the classical theory, but also face up to the chal-
lenges involved in providing a positive theory of concepts that is 
more in keeping with the available empirical evidence. However, 
keeping in mind the possibility of a difference in desiderata between 
psychologists concerned with unveiling the mental mechanisms gov-
erning our categorizations, and the epistemologist concerned with 
describing and aiding the epistemic inquirer, it is time to ask our-
selves: Why should epistemologists be interested in exhaustive ac-
counts of our epistemic concepts in the first place? 
 
 
2.3. NORMS, GOALS, AND EPISTEMIC ARCHITECTURES 
If we take a look at the literature engaged in the analysis of epistemic 
concepts, we note that epistemologists are not interested in analyzing 
just any concepts. The ones of interest are the particularly normative 
                                                           
10 See Murphy (2002, pp. 183-190) for a recent overview and discussion, 
including the extent to which the problems in question extend to so-called 
exemplar theory—a close cousin to prototype theory. 
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concepts. The easiest way to understand how such concepts work is 
by contrasting them with non-normative concepts such as TABLE and 
DOG. By employing such concepts—indeed, by employing any (non-
syncategorematic) concept—we are, clearly, concerned with categoriza-
tion, i.e., with grouping particular entities under general terms. As 
such, concepts like TABLE and DOG may be put to use within an ex-
plicitly normative context pertaining to (the norms of) proper word 
use, as in “You shouldn’t call Fido a cat—he’s clearly a dog.”  
This, however, does not make the statement “Dogs are thus-
and-so” normative, which we may see if we contrast them with such 
concepts as KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION, and RATIONALITY. The 
latter are all concepts by which we may evaluate fellow epistemic 
inquirers—that is, categorize their conduct as being or not being an 
instance of knowledge, justification, rationality, etc.—but where we, 
merely by virtue of such a categorization, also make an explicitly normative 
judgment about the extent to which what they are doing is good from 
an epistemic point of view. More specifically: Unlike “that is a dog,” 
the statement “Paul is justified” has normative implications since the 
latter, but not the former, is not only associated with a set of semantic 
norms regarding proper word use, but also a set of particularly epis-
temic norms according to which you should be justified, since being 
justified is, supposedly, conducive to certain epistemic goals. 
So, what are epistemic norms, then? Here, epistemic norms 
will be understood as hypothetical imperatives of the following form: 
 
Given epistemic goal G, every element in A should (be) F,11 
 
where A is a set of epistemic subjects, possibly containing just one 
member, and ‘F’ any arbitrary epistemic concept. In other words, the 
normative framework I am working with here is explicitly instrumental-
                                                           
11 An alternative formulation would be “Given goal G, every element in A 
should (be) F, under circumstances C.” However, as long as C is incorporable 
into the conceptual component ‘F,’ characterizing norms and principles in 
terms of the more general form will not result in any lack of precision. 
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ist, in that it takes epistemic normativity to be a question of the extent 
to which something constitutes or is a means to an epistemic goal. 
For the sake of brevity, I will refer to anything constitutive of or con-
ducive to an epistemic goal—i.e., anything that may be properly 
plugged in for “F” in the above formulation—as an epistemic desidera-
tum.12 
However, as will become more obvious as we go along, it 
serves us well to distinguish between two kinds of normativity. I will 
refer to the first kind as general normativity. General normativity simply 
concerns what is good in the instrumental sense of being constitutive 
of or conducive to a goal. As such, general normativity does not take 
into account what an agent may or may not bring about voluntarily. 
For example, as epistemic agents, we strive to attain certain epistemic 
goals, one central and important being true belief. (This goal will be 
qualified and discussed at length in chapter 4.) Given this goal, it is, 
clearly, something good to believe truly, just like it might be good to 
digest properly, even though our digestive apparatus is not within our 
voluntary control. For this reason, the following norms are endowed 
with general epistemic normativity, where the italicized phrases desig-
nate desiderata: 
 
S should believe truly; 
S should believe by way of reliable belief-forming processes. 
 
Now, clearly, believing truly and reliably are good things, even though 
we cannot just believe truly or reliably at will. At the same time, there 
are several things we can do to put ourselves in a position of believing 
truly or reliably. This motivates the introduction of a more fine-
grained notion of normativity: action-guiding normativity. Action-guiding 
normativity takes into account not only what may be more or less 
good in relation to a specified set of goals, but also what agents may 
                                                           
12 Note that the notion of an epistemic desideratum that I am working with 
here differs from Alston’s (2005), who uses the same term to specifically 
designate desirable features of belief. 
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or may not do to put themselves in a position of meeting those goals. 
For example, given that true belief is a goal of S’s, the following are 
plausible candidates for norms endowed with action-guiding norma-
tivity, where the italicized phrases designate desiderata: 
 
S should scrutinize her grounds for belief by way of introspection; 
S should attend more to the advice of experts than novices; 
S should take care to review her evidence before passing judgment; 
S should not engage in excessive guesswork or wishful thinking.  
 
The particular merits of the aforementioned norms—i.e., whether or 
not they actually are more or less appropriately related to our epis-
temic goals—will be discussed at length in the second part of this 
study. For now, it is important to note that it does not follow from 
the fact that we take certain activities to be plausible means to attain 
our goals, that those activities do, in fact, constitute plausible means to 
attain our goals. For example, in ancient Greece, the prophesies of the 
Pythia, the priestess presiding over the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi, 
were taken to provide substantial information about the future, and 
kings regularly consulted her in highly significant matters, such as 
whether or not to go to war. In other words, many people in Ancient 
Greece would most likely subscribe to something like the following 
norm: 
 
S should give high credence to the predictions contained in the prophecies 
of the Pythia. 
 
More than this, people did not just subscribe to this norm for any 
reason; they subscribed to it because they believed that it enabled 
them to increase their chances of having true beliefs about the future. 
Today, however, we would take them to be mistaken in believing this, 
reject this norm in favor of more modern norms of predictions, and 
perhaps explain the Pythia’s vivid “prophecies” with reference to the 
hallucinogenic vapors rising from the Castalian Spring that sur-
rounded her. That is, without denying that the above norm might 
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have played an ever so important role in Ancient matters of predic-
tion, we would want to argue that people in Ancient Greece were 
mistaken in taking it to be conducive to their (and our) epistemic goal 
of attaining true beliefs about the future. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed further in chapter 4, it 
should be noted that S having certain epistemic goals does not imply 
that these goals may not be overruled by non-epistemic considera-
tions in more naturalistic settings. In other words, that it is a goal of 
S’s to have true beliefs does not imply that S should have true beliefs 
all things considered. The presence of such a goal is perfectly compatible 
with that S, in many situations, should not have true belief, due to 
certain non-epistemic considerations pertaining to, say, (decision-
making) speed, cost-effectiveness, etc. 
By way of taxonomy, I will in the following refer to both gen-
eral and action-guiding normativity when talking in terms of norms 
and normativity, unless otherwise is specified. Furthermore, I will 
refer to conglomerates of concepts, norms, and goals as epistemic archi-
tectures (at this stage, without passing any judgment on their epistemic 
merits) designating both fairly simple sets as well as sets involving a 
rich variety of concepts, norms, and goals in increasingly complex 
constellations, representing actual as well as merely possible (and 
more or less promising) frameworks for epistemic inquiry.13 
 
                                                           
13 My notion of epistemic architectures bears some similarity to Goldman’s 
(1992b) epistemic folkways. However, unlike Goldman, I will (a) not assume that 
there is enough conceptual homogeneity to warrant talk about our epistemic 
folkways, for reasons that will be discussed in chapter 3, and (b) not only 
include concepts and principles but also epistemic goals. As we will see in 
chapter 4, it seems more plausible to assume that there is less of a variation in 
the epistemic goals than in the epistemic concepts of different architectures 
or epistemic (folk)ways. However, see Goldman (2001, p. 477), where he 
seems to concede the latter point. 
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2.4. EPISTEMIC ROMANTICISM 
Taking such epistemic architectures as an important epistemological 
object of study, we may now identify a candidate rationale for why we 
should analyze epistemic concepts: 
 
(SYNC) Our epistemic concepts and norms are in full sync 
with our epistemic goals, in the sense that, by adhering to the 
norms in which our epistemic concepts figure, we are pre-
sented with the optimal way of reaching our epistemic goals. 
 
If (SYNC) holds, we have reason to embrace what Weinberg, Nich-
ols, and Stich have referred to as Epistemic Romanticism, i.e., the thesis 
that the correct epistemic norms are, somehow, already implanted 
within us and (assuming introspective access) discoverable with the 
proper process of self-exploration.14 Consequently, the descriptive task 
of exhaustively analyzing our epistemic concepts (and, indirectly, the 
norms in which they figure) may be motivated by the fact that it coin-
cides with the normative task of (exhaustively) spelling out how we 
should conduct epistemic inquiry.  
More specifically, we are provided with a rationale for the par-
ticular methodological approach of Intuition-Driven Romanticism, charac-
terized by Weinberg as coming out of the idea that “the job of epis-
temologists is to get [the concepts and norms] out and set them out 
clearly” and that “the best way to do so is to pump our spontaneous 
judgments about applying or withholding terms of epistemic praise or 
blame to various hypothetical cases.”15 Furthermore, if Intuition-
Driven Romanticism is (and has been) as widespread an approach as 
Weinberg et al. claims, it is easy to see why conceptual analysis has 
remained a preferred method even when divorced from Platonic 
essences and wedded to meanings: It presents a direct elucidatory 
route to the concepts and norms that we should abide by. 
                                                           
14 See Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001). 
15 Weinberg (2006, p. 29). 
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A question remains, however: Why should we assume 
(SYNC), i.e., that our epistemic concepts, norms, and goals are in full 
sync? Or put differently: Why assume that what we should do and what 
we (for whatever reason) are prone to do coincide? Well, for one thing, 
our belief-forming tendencies and strategies have been designed over 
millions of years of natural selection and, furthermore, a lifetime of 
learning. Surely this must have served to eliminate quite a few sub-
optimal features of human cognition. Or as noted by Quine in an oft-
cited passage: “Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a 
pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their 
kind.”16 
More specifically, consider the following (admittedly informal) 
reductio: Say that our epistemic concepts, norms and goals are out of 
sync with each other in the sense that, when employing our epistemic 
concepts and adhering to our epistemic norms, we tend to not reach 
our epistemic goals. Under the plausible assumption that one central 
epistemic goal is true belief, it follows from our concepts, norms and 
goals being out of sync with each other that we tend to not have true 
beliefs when employing our epistemic concepts and adhering to our 
epistemic norms. Furthermore, since true (or at least approximately 
true) belief is an integral part of attaining most practical goals, includ-
ing those involved in survival, it, furthermore, seems to follow that we 
tend to not survive—which is demonstrably false. Hence, we reject 
the initial assumption. 
However, this reductio, at most, lends support to the idea that 
 
(SYNC*) our epistemic concepts and norms are sufficiently in 
sync with our epistemic goals to guarantee that, by adhering to 
the norms in which our epistemic concepts figure, we tend to 
have sufficient success in reaching our epistemic goals to guar-
antee the attainment of most practical goals. 
 
                                                           
16 Quine (1969, p. 126). 
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More specifically, the above reductio does not show that our epistemic 
architectures are in full sync but only that they are not radically out of 
sync (i.e., that we are not inveterately wrong in our inductions, as Quine 
would say), which is completely compatible with the idea that 
 
(ALT) our epistemic concepts and norms are not necessarily in 
full sync with our epistemic goals, in the sense that there might 
be an alternative set of concepts and norms such that, if we 
were to employ those concepts and norms instead, we would 
reach our epistemic goals to a greater degree than we are cur-
rently doing. 
 
Note that (ALT) should not be read as a mere modal claim about 
possible sets or concepts and norms (although such a reading is suffi-
cient to drive a conceptual wedge between our actual concepts and 
norms and the concepts and norms that we should use). Instead, I will 
understand it in the stronger sense, as opening up for the potential 
improvement of our epistemic architectures, in not only entertaining the 
possibility that there might be an alternative set of norms and con-
cepts that would enable us to reach our epistemic goals to a greater 
degree, but also that this set might just be accessible and applicable. 
Let me illustrate this point by way of a hypothetical example: 
Say that an elucidation of our (or, at the very least, a prevalent) con-
cept of justification yields the conclusion that to be justified is to 
reason in accordance with one’s evidence in the specific sense of 
scrutinizing the evidential connections that hold between one’s beliefs 
and their grounds and only assent to those propositions that survive 
such scrutiny. Assume, furthermore, that this concept is prevalent 
enough to warrant the claim that utilizing it tends to yield true belief 
to an extent that enables one to attain most practical goals to a suffi-
cient degree. Now, consider the following empirical result: Our ability 
to scrutinize the evidential relations between our beliefs and their 
grounds are, in many situations, weakened by the dual fact that (a) we 
seldom have introspective access to the grounds for our beliefs, and, 
in the cases where we do, (b) we often misconstrue them in ways that 
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may be flattering to our self-images but that, nevertheless, makes for 
quite unreliable reasoning tendencies.17 If so, however, there is an 
alternative way to conceive of justification, if only in the minimal 
sense of taking this empirical fact into account and, thereby, providing 
a more promising tool in the attainment of true belief. 
This somewhat vague statement will be spelled out later, when 
we will delve into these and similar empirical results, as well as their 
implications for analysis, in chapter 6 below. For now, however, it 
suffices to note that the example serves to illustrate a possible sce-
nario in which epistemic architectures that are not radically out of 
sync may still be improved by way of an alternative (and amended) 
concept, which is all we need to show in order to establish  (ALT). 
And as such, (ALT) undermines Intuition-Driven Romanticism, in 
not only (a) calling for an empirical investigation into the merits of 
our current architectures, but also (b) directly discrediting an exclusive 
focus on the norms and concepts we currently employ, while ignoring 
the possible sets of norms and concepts that may serve us better in 
the pursuit of our epistemic goals. 
This presents two problems for conceptual analysis, as tradi-
tionally construed. First, in raising the question why we should be 
exclusively concerned with our current concepts, it serves to question 
Exhaustiveness. Granted, the first step of analysis should be the uncov-
ering of the cognitive architectures that are (for better or worse) used 
in the normative evaluations of epistemic inquirers, since it is exactly 
against the background of a clearer picture of these aspects that the 
epistemologist may improve on the architectural components that are 
not sufficiently in line with a specified set of epistemic goals. How-
ever, as will become more obvious in the next chapter, this neither 
implies that we are better off with exhaustive rather than approximate 
accounts, nor that epistemology should only be concerned with con-
cepts, which brings us to the second point: improvements have to 
incorporate—indeed, be preceded by—an empirical evaluation of the 
                                                           
17 See Wilson (2002). 
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epistemic merits of our architectures. Hence, Philip Kitcher, when 
discussing the failure of appeals to conceptual truths in epistemology: 
 
If an epistemological theory tells us that a particular policy of 
belief formation is justified or a particular type of inference is 
rational, and that these claims are analytic, that they unfold our 
concepts of justification and rationality, an appropriate chal-
lenge is always, “But why should we care about these concepts 
of justification and rationality?” The root issue will always be 
whether the methods recommended by the theory are well 
adapted for the attainment of our epistemic ends, and that 
cannot be settled by simply appealing to our current con-
cepts.18 
 
To sum up, two questions have been raised. First, given that there is 
no guarantee that our current architectures present the optimal path-
way to our epistemic goals, what epistemological weight should be 
given to our current epistemic concepts? Second, if traditional con-
ceptual analysis is not likely to do the trick, what is the role of more 
straightforwardly empirical investigation in epistemology? The follow-
ing sections evaluate two methodological suggestions as to how to 
answer these questions. Both suggestions will eventually be deemed 
unsatisfactory. Chapter 3 constitutes my attempt to provide adequate 
answers. 
 
 
2.5. NARROW REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
The previous section served to discredit the idea that Exhaustiveness is 
an important desideratum for analysis, although we will have to wait 
until the next chapter for a more conclusive argument against it. For 
now, we will instead look closer at an influential methodological sug-
gestion that, unlike DCA and PCA, relinquishes Exhaustiveness in favor 
of the construction of philosophical theories that put our categoriza-
                                                           
18 Kitcher (1992, pp. 63-64). 
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tion intuitions and norms in a reflective equilibrium, i.e., in a state of 
stable and balanced co-existence. 
The idea of a reflective equilibrium was introduced by Nelson 
Goodman—without using the label “reflective equilibrium,” how-
ever—as a way to account for the justification of inductive norms.19 
More specifically, Goodman argued that inductive norms are justified 
in so far as they can be brought to cohere with a large set of particular 
judgments about acceptable inferences. However, this is not to say 
that our particular judgments hold any kind of privileged status. On 
the contrary, they can be rejected as misguided if shown to stand in 
conflict with general norms that we not only find acceptable but that 
may also account for a wide range of (other) particular cases. In other 
words, reflection and rejection goes both ways. 
We will not be concerned with reflective equilibrium as a the-
ory of justification for inductive norms. Rather, we will be concerned 
with reflective equilibrium as a desired end state of philosophical 
analysis. As such, the method of reflective equilibrium was introduced 
by John Rawls in his theory of justice.20 According to Rawls, the ap-
propriate way to formulate and choose among different conceptions 
of justice is in a situation in which our knowledge is constrained in 
very specific ways. For example, we are not to know the color of our 
skin, to what class or income bracket we belong, etc. Under such 
circumstances of constrained knowledge—in what Rawls called the 
initial situation—we would choose norms guaranteeing equal basic 
liberties to all, making sure that those that are worst off are as well off 
as possible. 
However, Rawls also argued that we should not automatically 
accept the norms that, thereby, emerge. The norms must be in a re-
flective equilibrium with our considered judgments about justice. 
Hence, when searching for the most favored description of the initial 
situation we have to “work from both ends,” as Rawls puts it: 
 
                                                           
19 See Goodman (1983; originally published in 1955). 
20 See Rawls (1971). 
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We begin by describing it so that it represents generally shared 
and preferably weak conditions. We then see if these condi-
tions are strong enough to yield a significant set of principles. 
If not, we look for further premises equally reasonable. But if 
so, and these principles match our considered convictions of 
justice, then so far well and good. But presumably there will be 
discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We can either 
modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our 
existing judgments, for even the judgments we take provision-
ally as fixed points are liable to revision. By going back and 
forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual cir-
cumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and con-
forming them to principles, I assume that eventually we shall 
find a description of the initial situation that both expresses 
reasonable judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of 
affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium.21 
 
More specifically, consider the following suggestion: 
 
Analysis via Narrow Reflective Equilibrium (NRE) 
For any analysandum ‘F,’ reflect on (a) the logical and eviden-
tial interconnections among your intuitive categorization judg-
ments regarding (being) F, as well as (b) any general norms that 
may be brought to bear on (being) F, and then construct a 
theory resolving any conflicts that are uncovered in the course 
of these reflections, so as to bring your beliefs and norms in a 
reflective equilibrium. 
 
When such a reflective equilibrium has been reached, our norms and 
judgments coincide, and any “irregularities or distortions” in either 
have been ironed out in the name of coherence. It is important to 
stress that, in the pursuit of such coherence, our categorization intui-
tions, and the concepts that they can be taken to reveal, are no more 
                                                           
21 Rawls (1971, p. 20). 
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holy than the norms we happen to adhere by. Consequently, just like a 
general norm may be reconsidered in light of a conflict with particular 
judgments to which we are strongly attached, a conflicting categoriza-
tion judgment need not in all cases constitute a flaw in the theory, but 
in some cases rather be rejected, given that the norm responsible for 
the conflict can reasonably be deemed more central, explanatory, and 
hence, more important than that particular judgment. Hence, the 
rejection of Exhaustiveness. 
However, NRE fails to take into account the particular reason 
discussed in the previous section as to why Exhaustiveness should be 
rejected, namely that there is no guarantee that our current norms and 
concepts are sufficiently in sync with our goals. NRE is a method by 
which we may clarify our stance and, in the process of doing so, bring 
our beliefs and norms into greater coherence. As such, it may amend 
conflicts between the particular and general judgments to which we 
are prone to assent. But the goal of analysis is not merely to prune our 
norms and judgments so as to fit together—it is also to make sure 
that our conceptual tools serve us well in the attainment of our goals. 
As construed above, the method of reflective equilibrium is not sensi-
tive to the kind of mismatches that we discussed in the previous sec-
tion and that motivated the rejection of Exhaustiveness. Merely bring-
ing our general norms and categorization intuitions in a reflective 
equilibrium carries no promise to the effect that our norms or con-
cepts are, thereby, altered in a way so as to be more in line with our 
goals. 
 
 
2.6. WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
Rawls shows some signs of being aware of this problem—or at least a 
close cousin of it. Later on in his book, he writes that there are “sev-
eral interpretations of reflective equilibrium” and that 
 
[…] the notion varies depending upon whether one is to be 
presented with only those descriptions which more or less 
match one’s existing judgments except for minor discrepan-
 75 
cies, or whether one is to be presented with all possible de-
scriptions to which one might plausibly conform one’s judg-
ments together with all relevant philosophical arguments for 
them. In the first case we would be describing a person’s sense 
of justice more or less as it is although allowing for the 
smoothing out of certain irregularities; in the second case a 
person’s sense of justice may or may not undergo a radical 
shift. Clearly it is the second kind of reflective equilibrium that 
one is concerned with in moral philosophy.22 
 
Similarly, Michael DePaul notes that the process of seeking reflective 
equilibrium, properly construed, cannot be a question of mere coher-
ence: 
 
Even if the philosopher manages to bring her considered judg-
ments and moral theory into a state of balance or [narrow] 
equilibrium via such a process of mutual adjustment, her work 
will not be finished. The philosopher must seek an even wider 
equilibrium. She must also consider the connections between 
her moral beliefs and principles and the other sorts of beliefs, 
principles and theories she accepts or rejects.23 
 
This is also the move made by Norman Daniels when fleshing out 
Rawls claims in terms of so-called wide reflective equilibrium.24 “The 
method of wide reflective equilibrium” Daniels explains, “is an at-
tempt to produce coherence in an ordered triple of sets of beliefs held 
by a particular person, namely (a) a set of considered moral judg-
                                                           
22 Rawls (1971, p. 49). 
23 DePaul (1998, p. 295). 
24 As noted above, the idea of wide reflective equilibrium seems to be present 
implicitly already in Rawls (1971). See also Rawls (1974/5, p. 8), where the 
idea is explicit. 
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ments, (b) a set of moral norms, and (c) a set of relevant background 
theories.”25 He continues: 
 
We begin by collecting the person’s initial moral judgments 
and filter them to include only those of which he is relatively 
confident and which have been made under conditions condu-
cive to avoiding errors of judgment. […] We then propose 
alternative sets of moral principles that have varying degrees of 
“fit” with the moral judgments. We do not simply settle for the 
best fit of principles with judgments, however, which would 
only give us narrow equilibrium. Instead, we advance philoso-
phical arguments intended to bring out the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the alternative sets of principles (or com-
peting moral conceptions). These arguments can be con-
structed as inferences from some set of relevant background 
theories (I use the term loosely). Assume that some particular 
set of arguments wins and that the moral agent is persuaded 
that some set of principles is more acceptable than others […] 
We can imagine the agent working back and forth, making ad-
justments to his considered judgments, his moral principles, 
and his background theories. In this way he arrives at an equi-
librium point that consists of the ordered triple (a), (b), (c).26 
 
Naturally, the extent to which incorporating such arguments and 
theories into the pursuit of equilibrium may handle the kind of mis-
match called attention to above depends on exactly how we under-
stand the way in which they may or may not be responsive to the ends 
we are striving for. More specifically, putting a certain theory or ar-
gument on the scale that we are attempting to put in an equilibrium 
will only promote the construction of an analysans that serves us well 
if the theory or argument is sensitive to whether or not construing the 
analysandum in one way rather than another will promote the attain-
                                                           
25 Daniels (1979, p. 258). 
26 Daniels (1979, pp. 258-259). 
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ment of the goals in question. For this reason, we need to incorporate 
explicitly empirical theories about the world, since only such theories 
may serve as a benchmark for whether or not our current norms and 
concepts serve us well in the attainment of our goals. 
In other words, consider the following suggestion: 
 
Analysis via Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) 
For any analysandum ‘F,’ reflect on (a) the logical and eviden-
tial interconnections among your intuitive categorization judg-
ments regarding (being) F, (b) any general norms that may be 
brought to bear on (being) F, as well as (c) our current best 
theories either about or in any other way relevant to the phe-
nomena at hand, and then construct a theory resolving any 
conflicts that are uncovered in the course of these reflection so 
as to bring your beliefs, your norms, and our current best 
theories about the world in a reflective equilibrium. 
 
By incorporating not only categorization judgments and norms, but 
also our best current theories about, or relevant to, the phenomena in 
question, WRE leaves room for the evaluation of the extent to which 
our current concepts and norms do or do not provide us with the best 
tools to attain our goals. As noted by Timothy Williamson, however, 
the problem with a characterization like WRE is that it is sadly inade-
quate as even a summary description of the philosophical method of 
research.  
 
The question is not whether philosophers engage in the mu-
tual adjustment of general theory and judgment about specific 
cases—they manifestly do—but whether such descriptions of 
it are sufficiently informative for epistemological purposes.27 
 
                                                           
27 Williamson (forthcoming, chapter 7, pp. 35-36; page references refer to 
manuscript). 
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More specifically, as it stands, WRE is little more than a call for hon-
est, intellectual inquiry, grounded in our best empirical theories about 
the world. As such, it, clearly, has a place in a sound, philosophical 
methodology. The only problem is that the main challenge does not lie 
in noting that philosophers, in constructing their theories, need to 
take into account not only our categorization intuitions and norms 
but also our best theories about the world, but in providing a story 
about exactly what role our categorization intuitions and norms 
should play in philosophical methodology, and how these intuitions 
and norms should be weighed against empirical evidence and our 
current best theories about the world, so as to yield an analysans that 
provides an improved tool in the attainment of our goals. 
The next chapter considers one suggestion as to how this chal-
lenge should be met, in the form of Hilary Kornblith’s recent argu-
ments to the effect that our concepts are only relevant to philosophi-
cal inquiry in so far as they provide a set of paradigmatic examples, 
paving the way for empirical inquiry into their referents, where the 
only factor relevant to a concept’s worth is the extent to which it 
provides an accurate story about its referent. My own suggestion is 
introduced in chapter 3 and fleshed out in chapter 4, and agrees with 
Kornblith in that empirical inquiry should play a substantial role in 
philosophical inquiry, but criticizes his particular theory for failing to 
leave room for certain types of conceptual improvement that can 
reasonably be assumed to be crucial in epistemology. 
 
 
2.7. CONCLUSION 
In the present chapter, a rectification of conceptual analytic method-
ology, working with prototypes rather than neat conditions, served to 
put the spotlight on the fact that philosophical analysis, as it has tradi-
tionally been conducted, provides an inferior methodology in the 
understanding of concepts, in light of the substantially more rigorous 
methods of empirical psychology. However, it was also shown that 
this issue becomes relevant only if we assume that giving exhaustive 
accounts of our concepts really is an important desideratum for analy-
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sis. I ventured to suggest that it is not and that an investigation into 
our current epistemic repertoire is primarily interesting to the extent 
that it informs us of a starting point for potential improvement—a 
task that does not require exhaustive analyses. 
So what does it require? A second rectification was considered, 
coming from the idea that proper philosophical theorizing consists in 
bringing our categorization judgments in a reflective equilibrium with 
our general norms and theories. However, under its most plausible 
construal, the suggestion, unfortunately, only amounted to the claim 
that philosophical theorizing should proceed along the lines of hon-
est, intellectual inquiry, grounded in our best current theories about 
the world, while it answered none of the substantial questions regard-
ing the proper place of categorization intuitions, concepts, norms and 
empirical evidence in epistemological theorizing. It will be the burden 
of the next two chapters to answer these questions, and it will be 
shown that the challenges posed by them call for something quite 
different from what has traditionally been thought of as conceptual 
analysis. 
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Chapter 3. 
Epistemology and Empirical Investigation 
 
 
 
Recently, Hilary Kornblith has argued that epistemological investiga-
tion is substantially empirical.1 As we saw in the previous chapter, it is 
not necessary for an adherent of conceptual analysis to deny this. 
However, Kornblith’s claim is not restricted to a question of episte-
mological method but also concerns the proper target of epistemological 
investigation, an important component in Kornblith’s case being that 
knowledge—one of the main targets of epistemological investiga-
tion—is a natural kind and, hence, open to straightforward, empirical 
investigation, quite independently of any traditional semantic-
philosophical inquiry into the concept KNOWLEDGE. In this sense, 
Kornblith puts forward an external objection to conceptual analysis, 
i.e., an objection questioning that we should analyze concepts in the 
first place. 
In the present chapter, I will argue two things. First, I will 
show that Kornblith’s claim about epistemology being a substantially 
empirical investigation is, in fact, not contingent upon the further and, 
admittedly, controversial assumption that all objects of epistemologi-
                                                           
1 See Kornblith (2007, 2006, and 2002). 
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cal investigation are natural kinds. Second, I will argue that, contrary 
to what Kornblith seems to assume, this methodological contention 
does not imply that there is no need for attending to our epistemic 
concepts in epistemology. Understanding the make-up of our con-
cepts and, in particular, the purposes they fill, is necessary for a 
proper acknowledgement of epistemology’s role in conceptual im-
provement.  
This constitutes a rebuttal of his external objection in so far as 
it establishes that the analysis of epistemic concepts has an important 
part to play in epistemology. However, as we shall see in chapter 4, it 
does not constitute a defense of the entrenched picture of conceptual 
analysis, since conceptual improvement, as it turns out, calls for a kind 
of analysis very different from conceptual analysis as traditionally 
construed. 
  
 
3.1. WHOSE CONCEPTS? 
Let us tackle the issue from this angle: An extremely valid question 
that is posed far too rarely within epistemology (if not analytical phi-
losophy at large) is: When doing conceptual analysis, whose concepts 
are being studied? If philosophers are genuinely interested in studying 
any concepts but their own (and, perhaps, some of their colleagues’), 
it is somewhat surprising that the empirical methods of psychology 
have not yet found their way into the philosophy departments, if only 
in order to determine whether the studied concepts are shared by the 
folk, who they all too often are ascribed to.2 In this respect, Frank 
Jackson’s defense of conceptual analysis is admirably candid: 
 
I am sometimes asked—in a tone that suggests that the ques-
tion is a major objection—why, if conceptual analysis is con-
cerned to elucidate what governs our classificatory practice, 
don’t I advocate doing serious opinion polls on people’s re-
                                                           
2 For a commendable exception, see the empirical semantics of Arne Naess 
(1938, 1953). 
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sponses to various cases? My answer is that I do—when it is 
necessary.3 
 
Unfortunately, however, Jackson’s nod to empirical methods turns 
out to be somewhat half-hearted, when he, already in the next sen-
tence, gives an example of the kind of polling he has in mind: 
 
Everyone who presents the Gettier cases to a class of students 
is doing their own bit of fieldwork, and we all know the an-
swer they get in the vast majority of cases. But it is also true 
that often we know that our own case is typical and so can 
generalize from it to others. It was surely not a surprise to 
Gettier that so many people agreed about his cases.4 
 
Interestingly enough, recent empirical evidence on the responses to 
Gettier cases tells a different story. According to a study by Weinberg, 
Nichols, and Stich, there is some reason to believe that there might 
just be a quite substantial variance when it comes to the categorization 
intuitions of different people when considering Gettier cases—a 
variance that could indicate a set of concepts more heterogeneous 
than epistemologists talking about “our” concepts have assumed.5 
Granted, Weinberg et al.’s study is far from conclusive. However, 
within the last years, Richard Nisbett—a prominent social psycholo-
gist that we will get more acquainted with below—has amassed a 
rigorous body of data indicating cross-cultural differences in thought 
patterns, and presented in his book The Geography of Thought.6 It is in 
                                                           
3 Jackson (1998, pp. 36-7). 
4 Jackson (1998, p. 37). 
5 See Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001). 
6 See Nisbett (2006). It should be noted that none of the studies conducted by 
Nisbett and his colleagues indicate that these differences are innate. To the 
contrary, the differences in question are highly dependent on cultural factors 
such as social surrounding and upbringing and may, in some cases, even be so 
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the context of this research program and this body of data that the 
methodological implications of Weinberg et al.’s study should be 
evaluated. Understood thus, its results (however tentative) give us 
reason to ask that the “we” whose concepts are being illuminated by 
the categorization intuitions in question is specified, and that the 
supposition that there is a considerable overlap in the intuitive judg-
ments of different people, at the very least, is argued for rather than 
simply taken for granted. 
However, even if there, in fact, were a great uniformity among 
the categorization intuitions of the folk, and their intuitive judgments 
could be taken to reveal a set of philosophically uncontaminated 
epistemic folk concepts, it is not altogether obvious that such a set 
provides the best material for epistemological analysis. Hence, Korn-
blith: 
 
We do not go out of our way, in the sciences, to have observa-
tions made by individuals so ignorant of relevant theory that 
their corpus of beliefs contains no theories at all which might 
threaten to affect their observations. By the same token, one 
might think that, in philosophical theorizing, consulting the in-
tuitions of the folk, who have given no serious thought to the 
phenomena of knowledge, justification, the good, the right, or 
whatever subject happens to be at issue, not only shields the 
resulting intuitions from the potential bad effects of a mis-
taken theory, but it also assures that the positive effects of ac-
curate background theory cannot play a role. Those who have 
devoted a lifetime to thinking about knowledge and justifica-
tion, for example, are certainly capable of making mistakes, 
and their theory-mediated judgments about these matters are 
certainly not infallible. But this hardly suggests that we should, 
instead, prefer the intuitions, uninformed by any real under-
standing, of the ignorant. The suggestion that we should at-
                                                                                                               
sensitive to context that a subject can be primed to switch back and forth 
between different ways of reasoning. 
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tempt to capture pre-theoretical intuition, however, seems to 
privilege the intuitions of the ignorant and the naive over 
those of responsible and well-informed investigators. I cannot 
see why this would be a better idea in philosophy than it is in 
science.7  
 
In short, ignorance is not an asset in the laboratory, nor should it be 
considered one in philosophical inquiry.8 If such an analogy with 
natural science is to be upheld, however, one might justifiably won-
der: Why should philosophy be concerned with concepts at all, rather 
than the real facts of the matter? As Kornblith writes: 
 
The uninformed observer and the sophisticated scientist are 
each trying to capture an independently existing phenomenon, 
and accurate background theory aids in that task. Experts are 
better observers than the uninitiated. If the situation of phi-
losophical theory construction is analogous, however, as I be-
lieve it is, then we should see philosophers as attempting to 
characterize, not their concepts, let alone the concepts of the 
folk, but certain extra-mental phenomena, such as knowledge, 
justification, the good, the right, and so on. The intuitions of 
philosophers are better in getting at these phenomena than the 
intuitions of the folk because philosophers have thought long 
and hard about the phenomena, and their concepts, if all is 
working as it should, come closer to accurately characterizing 
the phenomena under study than those of the naive. So on this 
                                                           
7 Kornblith (2007, p. 34). 
8 Of course, this is not to deny that controlled ignorance might sometimes be a 
scientific virtue, as in cases of double and triple blind studies. Clearly, there is 
a big difference between promoting general ignorance and promoting controlled 
ignorance, informed by knowledge about the best ways to avoid bias. And 
while the latter might, indeed, be a virtue in many cases, the idea here is that 
the former should never be deemed an asset—neither in science nor in phi-
losophy.  
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view the target of philosophical analysis is not anyone’s con-
cept at all. Instead, it is the category which the concept is a 
concept of.9 
 
This line of reasoning is fleshed out in Kornblith’s Knowledge and Its 
Place in Nature, where he makes an intriguing case for the re-
conceptualization of epistemological analysis from a largely non-
empirical investigation (be it an a priori one or not) to a substantially 
empirical investigation, arguing that knowledge—one of the main 
targets of epistemological investigation—is a natural kind, open to 
straightforward empirical scrutiny.10 Assuming that knowledge is not 
unique in this respect, which is an assumption that Kornblith, indeed, 
seems to make, consider the following reconstruction of his reason-
ing: 
 
The Argument 
(A)  All objects of epistemological investigation are natural 
kinds. 
(B)  If (A), epistemological investigation is substantially em-
pirical. 
(C)  Hence, epistemological investigation is substantially em-
pirical (A, B, MP). 
(D) If (C), a thorough understanding of our epistemic con-
cepts, over and above the phenomena that they pick out, 
is irrelevant to epistemological investigation. 
(E)  Hence, a thorough understanding of our epistemic con-
cepts, over and above the phenomena that they pick out, 
is irrelevant to epistemological investigation (C, D, MP). 
 
As far as I know, Kornblith has never explicitly stated this argument. 
Still, I take it to provide one of the most reasonable rationales for 
Kornblith’s more general claims about the implications of his results 
                                                           
9 Kornblith (2007, p. 35). 
10 See Kornblith (2002). 
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concerning knowledge to epistemological analysis at large.11 The plau-
sibility of this interpretive claim should become more obvious as we 
proceed. 
That being said, I will, in the following, scrutinize, qualify, and 
criticize the Argument in two steps. More specifically, §§3.2 through 3.4 
will serve to contest (A) but defend (C) by showing that the latter 
premise is plausible even given that all objects of epistemological 
investigations are artifactual (or “socially constructed”) rather than 
natural kinds. Then, in §§3.5 through 3.7, I will show that (E), never-
theless, does not follow from (C), since (D) is false and the claim that 
epistemological investigation is substantially empirical, hence, does not 
imply that an understanding of our epistemic concepts is irrelevant to 
epistemology. 
 
 
3.2. ON NATURAL KINDS AND THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF PREMISE (A) 
It should be beyond doubt that the Argument is valid. Indeed, it con-
sists in two modus ponens arguments, where the conclusion of the first, 
i.e., (C), makes up the first premise of the second. However, I would 
like to contest its soundness. For one thing, it hinges on (A), i.e., the 
controversial assumption that all objects of epistemological investiga-
tion are natural kinds. As already mentioned, Kornblith has, indeed, 
argued that knowledge, as it is being studied by cognitive ethologists 
(cognitive ethology being the study of animal cognition), is a natural 
kind. However, the crucial question here is whether this claim may be 
generalized to other objects of epistemological study, so as to render 
(A) plausible. 
To answer this question, we need to say something about what 
constitutes a natural kind. In the words of Kornblith, the underlying 
ontological assumption involved in postulating natural kinds is that 
“the world consists not merely of individuals but of kinds of individu-
als as well” and that “this division of the world into kinds is not of 
                                                           
11 See, e.g., Kornblith (2006). 
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our own invention.”12 Hence, characterizing the world in terms of 
some kinds rather than others may not only be more or less conven-
ient—i.e., serve our purposes to a greater or lesser degree—but also 
more or less accurate. By way of a positive example, we have good 
reason to believe that H2O is a natural kind, independent of human 
thought and present long before chemistry had reached a level of 
sophistication enough to unveil and describe it. By way of a negative 
example, we have little reason to believe that the Aristotelian distinc-
tion between sublunary objects (objects inside the orbit of the moon) 
and superlunary objects (objects outside the orbit of the moon) corre-
sponds to anything like a natural division in nature.  
It should be noted already at the outset that this notion of a 
natural kind is different from the one popular during the hey-days of 
logical empiricism. In the early 20th century, many philosophers of 
science subscribed to the idea that physics gave a privileged descrip-
tion of the world in the specific sense that it was just a matter of time 
before the foundations provided by physics could unify the sciences. 
Paul Griffiths sums up the relevant changes in the notion of a natural 
kind as follows: 
 
The “unity of science” has dwindled to a minimal notion of 
supervenience—the world studied by economics or population 
biology does not change independently of the world studied by 
molecular biology or by microphysics. In this new philosophy 
of science the exception-ridden generalizations of many life 
and social sciences are seen as the only way to uncover some 
of the regularity inherent in natural processes. […] To reduce 
these sciences to their physical substrate is to eschew some 
epistemic access to that regularity. It is to know less about real-
ity. [In the words of Richard Boyd,] [t]his new philosophy of 
science has given rise to an “enthusiasm for natural kinds” in 
many special sciences. […] Natural kinds are no longer con-
ceived as the subjects of the fundamental laws of nature. They 
                                                           
12 Kornblith (1993, p. 14). 
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are simply nonarbitrary ways of grouping natural phenom-
ena.13 
 
In a sense, this “new” way of conceiving of natural kinds is more in 
keeping with an idea that stems back far further than the beginning of 
the 20th century. An arguable precursor (and oft-cited metaphor) can 
be found in Plato’s method of “Collection and Division,” on which 
we should take care to “see together things that are scattered about 
everywhere and to collect them into one kind (mia idea)” and then “cut 
the unity up again according to its species along its natural joints, and to 
try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.”14 A further 
example can be found in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
where Locke distinguishes between nominal and real essences.15 
Nominal essences are the abstract ideas we associate with (general) 
names and these ideas may or may not correspond to real essences, 
i.e., the insensible structures responsible for the properties that we 
encounter in perception. Interestingly enough, Locke arguably con-
siders the question of whether our nominal essences correspond thus 
to be impossible to answer, since the real essences are simply beyond 
our ken.16 He thereby takes a moderately skeptical position about real 
essences, or what we today would call natural kinds. Already this 
position is quite daring, however, in light of the even more radically 
nominalist standpoint that there are no natural kinds whatsoever—that 
categorizations never reflect structures inherent in nature but merely 
more or less entrenched (yet arbitrary) ways of slicing up the world.17 
The motivation for such a nominalist position is most plausi-
bly that, given the general virtue of ontological parsimony, the burden 
of proof is on the natural kind defender to provide a convincing an-
swer to the following question: What explanatory work would postu-
                                                           
13 Griffiths (1997, p. 213). 
14 The Phaedrus in Plato (1953, p. 265d-e; my emphasis). 
15 See Locke (1996, book III, chapter vi, 2). 
16 See Locke (1996, book III, chapter vi, 9). 
17 See, e.g., Goodman (1983). 
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lating natural kinds do that cannot be done just as well by assuming 
that kinds are nothing but creations of the mind?18 Kornblith suggests 
an answer: Only if we assume that there are natural kinds can we 
explain the success of mature science. More specifically: 
 
If the scientific categories of mature sciences did not corre-
spond, at least approximately, to real kinds in nature, but in-
stead merely grouped objects together on the basis of salient 
observable properties that somehow answer to our interests, it 
would be utterly miraculous that inductions using these scien-
tific categories tend to issue in accurate predictions. Inductive 
inferences can only work, short of divine intervention, if there 
is something in nature binding together the properties which 
we use to identify kinds.19 
 
In other words, the best explanation of scientific success is that many 
(if not all) of the nominal kinds utilized in scientific prediction actually 
correspond to natural kinds.20 As Kornblith puts it: “When a success-
ful scientific theory quantifies over some sort of object, that is the 
most powerful evidence we may have that those objects genuinely 
exist.”21 
                                                           
18 In fact, some of Locke’s own writings seem to suggest this very line of 
reasoning. See his (1996, book III, chapter vi, 4). 
19 Kornblith (1993, pp. 41-42). 
20 This implication from success to realism, together with the more general 
idea that explanatory success provides evidence for the existence of the phe-
nomena postulated in the explanation, has been contested in the literature on 
scientific realism, perhaps most famously by Arthur Fine (1986) and Bas van 
Fraassen (1980). However, since the aim of this paper is not to defend Korn-
blith’s argument for the existence of natural kinds, I will not delve into this 
debate here. Still, I refer the reader to Ahlström (2006), where I express my 
doubts about the viability of Fine and van Fraassen’s position, especially in 
light of an inability on their part to account for scientific failure. 
21 Kornblith (1993, p. 55). 
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Why is this so? The reason, Kornblith suggests, is the follow-
ing:  
 
Identity Conditions for Natural Kinds 
The identity conditions for natural kinds are given by clusters 
of homeostatically related properties, i.e., properties that 
“when realized together in the same substance, work to main-
tain and reinforce each other, even in the face of changes in 
the environment.”22 
 
By virtue of the fact that natural kinds comprise such homeostatically 
related properties, it is possible to reliably infer the presence of some 
properties from the presence of others. Take water, for example. 
Water consists of molecules of two hydrogen atoms connected to an 
oxygen atom. Moreover, this particular chemical constitution is re-
sponsible for a wide range of other properties, such as being transpar-
ent, potable, a good solvent, and a compound that boils at 212 de-
grees Fahrenheit (under standard pressure). As a consequence, these 
and other characteristic properties of water form a homeostatic clus-
ter, which is exactly why we may reliably infer a rich variety of proper-
ties and facts from knowing that we are interacting with water, rather 
than with some other substance or motley collection of properties.  
Similarly, a bird is any member of the evolutionary branch—or 
clade, as biologists say—Aves. By sharing a common ancestry, mem-
bers of Aves also tend to share a series of properties from the molecu-
lar to the behavioral level, which is exactly why we may reliably infer a 
multitude of properties from knowing that we are interacting with a 
bird, regarding everything from what toxins it will metabolize to what 
learning algorithms it will employ. Put differently, natural kinds are 
projectible in the sense that observations about them may be projected 
onto new instances. More importantly, according to Kornblith, the 
categories of water and bird are not unique in this respect. In actual-
                                                           
22 Kornblith (1993, p. 33). 
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ity, this generalizes to all natural kinds, which explains why latching 
on to natural kinds in prediction tends to yield predictive success.23 
Having thus shed some light on what it is to be a natural kind, 
is it plausible to assume that all objects of epistemological investiga-
tion are natural kinds? Take epistemic justification, for example—a 
phenomenon that has been the subject of extensive scrutiny within 
contemporary epistemology. What are the prospects for extending 
Kornblith’s case for knowledge to justification? Unfortunately, unlike 
KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION is not an entrenched concept in cogni-
tive ethology. Hence, it is questionable whether Kornblith’s case for 
knowledge can be extended to justification in any straightforward 
way. In fact, it is hard to see exactly how JUSTIFICATION, together 
with such related concepts as EVIDENCE, UNDERSTANDING, and 
RATIONALITY, at all could correspond to natural rather than artifactual 
(or “socially constructed”) kinds, the latter of which do not comprise 
homeostatically structured conglomerates of properties independent 
of human understanding, but grids whose structure reflects nothing 
but human intentions (in a sense that will be elaborated on below). 
Still, as has been noted by Alvin Goldman and Joel Pust, the lack of 
natural kind status hardly places the topic of justification (or that of 
evidence, understanding, and rationality) outside the scope of episte-
mological analysis.24 
So, on pain of radically restricting the scope of epistemological 
analysis (an option that I will not consider), the defender of The Argu-
ment has to face up to the following problem: 
 
Problem 1 
Unless (A) holds, there is little reason to believe that the appli-
cability of epistemological analysis stretches beyond the analy-
sis of one particular object of epistemological investigation, 
                                                           
23 See also LaPorte (2004), who defines natural kinds as kinds with a high 
explanatory value in science—a definition that seems to yield roughly the 
same extension as Kornblith’s. 
24 See Goldman and Pust (1998, pp. 186-187). 
 92 
namely knowledge. And even this particular application is con-
tingent upon the admittedly controversial claim that knowl-
edge, in fact, is a natural kind. 
  
The following two sections discuss two solutions to Problem 1, both of 
which amount to the claim that there is a case to be made for extend-
ing the conception of epistemological analysis as substantially empiri-
cal to the analysis of artifactual kinds. 
 
 
3.3. A FIRST ATTEMPT TO SAVE (C): CONTENT EXTERNALISM 
The first solution starts out with the observation that it might be 
plausibly argued—and, indeed, has been argued by Putnam and, more 
recently, by Kornblith25—that content externalism provides the cor-
rect semantic not only for natural kind terms but also for artifactual 
kind terms. Rather than directly contesting this line of argument, the 
second solution (which is the one I will favor) concludes that, as it 
turns out, the plausibility of extending the claim about empirical 
analysis to artifactual kinds is largely independent of which semantic 
theory one accepts for the latter. Before evaluating any of these solu-
tions, however, we need to say something about what constitutes 
artifactual kinds and, in particular, what distinguishes them from 
natural kinds. 
To a first approximation, we may characterize artifactual kinds 
negatively as not comprising homeostatically clustered properties. 
However, even disregarding the fact that this characterization is 
hardly informative, it does not even uniquely pick out artifactual 
kinds, unless natural and artifactual kinds exhaust the realm of kinds 
(which they do not). So, by way of a positive characterization, we may 
say that artifactual kinds are somehow dependent on human inten-
tions. However, this formulation is not only vague but also potentially 
misleading if not further qualified. Take polyethylene or ampheta-
mine, for example. Since they are synthetic substances, it is plausible 
                                                           
25 See Putnam (1975b) and Kornblith (forthcoming a). 
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to assume that neither of them would be around if it were not for 
certain human intentions, pertaining to the need for a light, flexible, 
yet tough material or a substance to fight fatigue and increase alert-
ness among servicemen. 
Still, this only serves to show that the existence of some (in-
stances of) synthetic substances is casually dependent on certain hu-
man intentions. It does not show, however, that the kinds to which 
those substances correspond are ontologically dependent on human 
intentions. That is, it does not show that the identity conditions for poly-
ethylene or amphetamine—i.e., the conditions specifying what makes 
something an instance of polyethylene or amphetamine—are in any 
interesting sense intertwined with human intentions. Indeed, an ac-
knowledgement of this very fact is implicit in what we take to be the 
best explanation of why polyethylenes and amphetamines fit into 
reliable inductive generalizations better than any random motley of 
properties. This explanation assumes that polyethylenes and am-
phetamines are endowed with an underlying chemical composition 
(i.e., C2H4 and C9H13N, respectively), and that this, furthermore, ac-
counts for the fact that some inductions involving the respective 
substances are successful (e.g., from “this is amphetamine” to “this 
will increase stamina but decrease appetite if ingested”) while others 
are not (e.g., “this is made of polyethylene” to “this is blue”). Hence, 
they may plausibly be considered natural kinds. 
Not so for, say, pens—a clear example of an artifactual kind. 
There is no need to assume that all pens share an underlying nature to 
explain why certain inductions involving pens are successful (e.g., 
from “this is a pen” to “this can be used to write with”) while others 
are not (e.g., from “this is a pen” to “this is warm”). The reason is 
that instances of artifactual kinds owe their kind membership exclu-
sively to the fact that they fulfill certain purposes. More specifically, I 
suggest the following: 
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Identity Conditions for Artifactual Kinds 
The identity conditions of artifactual kinds are given by sets of 
human intentions, pertaining to the fulfillment of certain pur-
poses.26 
 
Clearly, this is not to say that artifactual kinds consist of sets of human 
intentions and purposes, but that what determines whether or not 
something is an instance of a particular artifactual kind pertains to 
whether that something can fulfill certain purposes and, thereby, 
answer to a specific set of human intentions.27 Thus, a pen is a pen 
(roughly) by virtue of fulfilling the purpose of drawing and writing 
and, thereby, answering to certain human intentions regarding creative 
outlet and communication, just like a key is a key (roughly) by virtue 
of serving the purpose of locking and unlocking doors, lockers, etc., 
and, thereby, answering to a set of human intentions regarding con-
trolled access to certain spaces.28 
Let us now consider Kornblith’s claim that the semantic 
mechanisms of reference for artifactual terms are insensitive to these 
ontological differences between natural and artifactual kinds.29 Take 
an SUV, for example—clearly, an example of an artifactual kind. 
Unlike the case of water and polyethylene, there is no reason to as-
sume that SUVs share a hidden nature, since an explanation of why 
                                                           
26 See Thomasson (2003) for a more thorough treatment of a suggestion 
along these lines. 
27 It might be argued that it, for some artifactual kinds, is not sufficient for 
kind membership that something merely can fulfill certain purposes and, 
thereby, answer to certain human intentions, but that it also has to have come 
about as the result of an intention to fulfill those purposes. See Thomasson 
(2003, p. 594) for a discussion. 
28 I am not suggesting that such sets of intentions can be summed up in 
anything like a clear-cut conjunction of properties. This picture—just like 
actual categorizations of artifacts—is fully compatible with conceptual fuzzi-
ness and in-between cases. 
29 See Kornblith (forthcoming a). 
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we categorize the world and successfully reason in terms of SUVs and 
non-SUV type vehicles does not need to go beyond factors pertaining 
to certain (potentially superficial) properties regarding form (e.g., 
relative size) and function (e.g., performance), answering to certain 
human intentions concerning traveling and transportation. In fact, I 
am, personally, not sure what makes something an SUV and, in par-
ticular, not what distinguishes it (if anything at all) from a jeep, van or 
any other fairly big motor vehicle with four wheels. Regardless of 
whether I, thereby, just happen to be exceptionally uninformed con-
cerning motor vehicles, however, I take it that I, nevertheless, just 
succeeded in referring to SUVs. How can that be?  
Perhaps it is due to the dual fact that (a) there are people in my 
linguistic community that do know what makes something an SUV 
and (b) my successful reference to SUVs is parasitic upon their knowl-
edge and ability to discriminate SUVs from non-SUV type vehicles. 
But are these conditions necessary for successful reference? Is it, in 
particular, necessary that there is at least one member of my linguistic 
community that knows what, thereby, constitutes SUVs? Remember 
that what makes something an SUV pertains to a set of human inten-
tions and purposes—not anything like an underlying nature, shared by 
all SUVs. So, is successful reference contingent upon there being at 
least one member of my linguistic community that knows what this 
set is, i.e., to what intentions SUVs need to answer and what purposes 
they need to fulfill? Consider the following two responses, corre-
sponding to two variants of content externalism: 
 
Social Externalism about Artifactual Kind Terms 
Successful reference to artifactual kinds (only) requires that 
there is at least one member of the relevant linguistic commu-
nity (i.e., an “expert”) that can correctly delineate the set of 
human intentions and purposes that provides the identity con-
ditions for the kind in question. Subsequent instances of suc-
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cessful reference to this kind are then parasitic upon the dis-
criminatory competence of this member.30 
 
Causal Externalism about Artifactual Kind Terms 
Successful reference to artifactual kinds (only) requires that a 
sample of the kind has been picked out in an initial act of bap-
tism through an ostensive definition, fixing the set of human 
intentions and purposes that provides the identity conditions 
for the kind in question and establishing a socially sustained 
chain of reference upon which subsequent instances of suc-
cessful reference to whatever bears a certain equivalence rela-
tion (perhaps spelled out in terms of certain potentially super-
ficial properties regarding form and function) to the ostended 
sample are parasitic.31 
 
Clearly, neither formulation is intended to constitute a full-fledged 
theory. If anything, they both give rise to further questions. Take 
Causal Externalism, for example. For one thing, it is somewhat puz-
zling how the mere causal relation involved in an act of baptism could 
fix a unique set of human intentions and, consequently, pick out a single 
kind. For example, take a wooden, box-like, and fairly heavy object of 
35 by 35 inches that we may name b. Picking out b as a sample for an 
artifactual kind, what determines the relevant set of intentions, given 
that b, among many other things, can be used to sit on (i.e., as a chair), 
to sit by (i.e., as a table), to stop doors from closing (i.e., as a door-
stop), or, to stop people from ascending (not to mention hurt them 
quite badly in the process), if the box is pushed down a set of stairs? 
One plausible suggestion is that there is something about the 
mental state of the baptizer that determines the relevant set of inten-
tions, namely that the mental state (at the very least) instantiates that 
very set of intentions. If so, however, it becomes harder to distinguish 
Causal from Social Externalism. For example, is successful reference 
                                                           
30 Cf. Burge (1986). 
31 Cf. Kornblith (forthcoming a). 
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contingent upon (a) the act of baptism and the resulting chain of 
reference, or (b) the fact that there is a baptizer, carrying the heaviest 
burden in the division of linguistic labor due to her insight into the 
relevant set of intentions (granted introspective access, of course)? It 
is not so clear to me which one is the case here.32 
However, the relevant question for our purposes is how to 
analyze artifactual kinds and, in particular, whether any of the above 
considerations render the claim that epistemology is substantially 
empirical implausible. They do not. The idea that epistemology is 
substantially empirical can be plausibly extended to artifactual kinds, 
regardless of whether Social or Causal Externalism holds and for the 
following reason: Both Social and Causal Externalism are fully compati-
ble with successful reference despite substantial ignorance regarding 
many properties of the entities or phenomena picked out. Granted, 
Social Externalism implies that there is at least one member of the 
relevant linguistic community that has insight into the identity condi-
tions of the kind in question. So, in the general case, the baptizer, 
clearly, knows something about the artifactual kind she is baptizing, 
such as that it can be used for certain purposes and, thereby, answer 
to certain human intentions. However, her knowledge of many of the 
properties that make up instances of the artifactual kind in question 
may be ever so limited—or better said: there is nothing in her role as 
a baptizer that hinders her knowledge from being limited thus. That is, 
even if we reject Causal in favor of Social Externalism, the epistemically 
most privileged user of an artifactual kind term, i.e., the baptizer herself, 
may have an ever so limited insight into the properties that do or may 
make up instances of the kind in question. 
As the reader surely suspects, it is exactly in this potential gap 
between successful reference and insight into the properties of the 
referent picked out that our first solution to Problem 1 gets its foot-
hold, since such a gap makes possible scenarios in which (a) a major-
ity of speakers either are largely ignorant of or have a highly inaccurate 
                                                           
32 See Stanford and Kitcher (2000) for a discussion of this and similar prob-
lems. 
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conception of many of the properties that make up the instances that 
they are successfully referring to and (b) even the most epistemically 
privileged speaker (i.e., the baptizer) may have an ever so limited 
insight into the multitude of properties that may not in any straight-
forward way be inferred from the intended purpose of the kind in 
question. Given such a gap, I take it that it would reasonably follow 
that epistemology is substantially empirical, even given that most (if 
not all) objects of epistemological investigation are artifactual kinds. 
 
 
3.4. A SECOND ATTEMPT TO SAVE (C): CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENT 
The problem with this solution, however, is that it is far from contro-
versial that anything like Social or Causal Externalism provides the cor-
rect semantics for artifactual kind terms. While remaining essentially 
neutral on this particular issue, and in an attempt to develop a some-
what more dialectically robust rationale for (C), I will now argue that, 
even if a strong form of internalism turned out to provide the correct 
semantics for artifactual kind terms, this would in no way undermine 
the claim that epistemology is substantially empirical. The argument 
will also indicate that it was not externalism that did the job in the 
above solution after all. 
So, consider the following: 
 
Strong Internalism about Artifactual Kind Terms 
Successful reference to artifactual kinds requires that the 
speaker can correctly delineate the set of human intentions and 
purposes that provides the identity conditions for the kind in 
question. 
 
Strong Internalism makes up the other extreme of the semantic spec-
trum; it is not enough that there is an appropriate causal chain of 
reference, nor that someone in the linguistic community can delineate 
the set of intentions in question—the speaker must herself be able to 
make such a delineation for her to successfully refer. Perhaps this is a 
more plausible thesis about the semantics of artifactual kinds, or per-
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haps it is not. What is important to note for our purposes is that even 
if Strong Internalism turned out to be true, this would only imply that 
every competent user of artifactual kind terms were in the same epis-
temic situation as the epistemically most privileged user in the Social 
Externalism scenario. That is, while being extremely informed as to the 
relevant set of human intentions and purposes, they may still, qua 
competent users, have an ever so limited insight into many of the 
properties that make up actual instances of the kind in question. More 
importantly, they may, in the epistemic case, be ever so uninformed 
concerning properties of epistemological significance—or so I will now 
argue. 
First, consider the following definition: 
 
Conceptual Accuracy 
A concept is accurate to the extent that it provides a correct and 
complete description of its referent. 
 
The idea here is two-fold: (a) There are aspects of concepts that do 
not serve to determine reference, and (b) these aspects may be repre-
sented in terms of descriptions. Let us look closer at (a) first. As was 
noted above, we may distinguish between factors that serve to fix 
reference and factors that serve to determine reference.33 For example, 
while whatever conceptual component responsible for my tendency 
to think of horses as having four legs may serve to fix the reference of 
HORSE—i.e., to be a helpful tool in picking out actual horses in my 
environment—it does not determine reference, for the simple reason 
that some horses are amputees. As such, factors fixing reference, 
clearly, play an important cognitive role in our mental life, by signifi-
cantly facilitating our interaction with the extra-mental world. Contra 
the descriptivist, however, they should not be confused with the fac-
tors determining reference. We will return to this point below. 
Let us now turn to (b). If no conceptual aspect could be repre-
sented in terms of descriptions, it is hard to see how concepts at all 
                                                           
33 See Kripke (1980, pp. 55, 57, and 96). 
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could be the objects of any kind of analysis in the first place. On any 
view of concepts—be it concepts as abilities, Forms, senses or mental 
representations—concepts serve to categorize the world, and the 
systems of categorization that arise from concept use may be repre-
sented in terms of descriptions. Hence, a concept that serves to put all 
and only blue objects that weigh more than two pounds in one cate-
gory may be characterized in terms of the description “is blue and 
weighs more than two pounds,” quite independently of one’s favored 
ontology of concepts. This is not to say that whatever mental occasion 
that is causally responsible for the categorization takes the form of a 
description—that would have to be established through empirical 
research—which is exactly why I am not saying that concepts are 
descriptions but merely that certain aspects of a concept for present 
purposes may be represented in terms of descriptions. 
Reluctance to talking about concepts and descriptions in the 
same sentence typically stems from an aversion to the aforementioned 
idea that referents are determined by concepts by virtue of the former 
satisfying descriptions inherent in the latter. However, as should be 
clear by now, this is certainly not the idea being defended here. If 
anything, the present notion of conceptual accuracy serves to state in 
clearer terms the very externalism that served to refute this descriptiv-
ist picture of the factors determining reference: In so far as any form 
of content externalism holds, having an accurate concept—i.e. a con-
cept providing a correct and complete description of its referent—is 
not a prerequisite for successful reference. However, since we are, for 
the moment, assuming that Strong Internalism provides the correct 
semantics for artifactual kind terms, we will focus on the fact that not 
even Strong Internalism implies that having an accurate concept of an 
artifactual kind is a prerequisite for successfully referring to it. The 
reason may be brought out as follows: 
Take any object x of epistemological investigation. If x is an 
artifactual kind, there is a set T of human intentions and purposes that 
determines the identify conditions for x. What will T contain? Given 
that x is an artifactual epistemic kind, it will most likely contain inten-
tions and purposes pertaining to the attainment of certain epistemic 
 101 
goals, say, true belief in significant matters. (We will return to the 
exact make-up of our epistemic goals in chapter 4 below.) Is it possi-
ble to say something more specific? Well, if Strong Internalism holds, we 
may note that, unless we want to radically restrict the extent to which 
people may successfully refer to x, we have to restrict the richness of 
information contained in T since, in the general case,  
 
the more information is contained in T, the more rare is suc-
cessful reference to x. 
 
Given that reference to x is widespread, however—which is, hope-
fully, the case for most epistemic kinds—we may, at the very least, say 
that 
 
being acquainted with the information contained in T cannot 
involve a complete knowledge of all properties that make up 
instances of x. 
 
Hence, even given Strong Internalism, the semantically most informed 
person—i.e., the person that has the most complete grasp of what is 
contained in the set T, that determines the identify conditions—might 
still be in the dark as to many of the properties that make up instances 
of x. In other words, she may still have an inaccurate concept of the 
kind in question. 
I take it that few would deny this claim, if understood in the 
weak sense of there always being further facts that could be found out 
that do not flow from what we know just by virtue of being able to 
successfully refer. For example, just by virtue of successfully referring 
to pens and keys, I may (at least on the Strong Internalist’s story) know a 
whole host of things about pens and keys and, in particular, things 
that I may easily infer from being acquainted with the relevant sets of 
intentions and purposes. At the same time, there may very well be a 
lot of things that I do not know about pens and keys, such as its exact 
mechanical make-up, its molecular constitution, etc. As pointed out 
by Paul Griffiths, this is to be expected considering that the factors 
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determining the identity conditions are substantially less rich in the 
case of artifactual kinds than in the case of natural kinds: 
 
The traditional natural kinds are among the richest. The kind-
hood of a physical element determines almost all its salient 
properties. […] In contrast, knowing what sort of thing an ar-
tifact is, knowing that it is a bracelet for example, may fix very 
few of its features. There are just too many ways to skin a cat, 
or in this case too many ways to decoratively encircle the 
wrist.34 
 
Of course, it does not follow that being familiar with the multitude of 
ways that pens or keys may be crafted or wrists may be decoratively 
encircled is necessarily very significant to me, given that my goals, as far 
as pens, keys, and bracelets go, are restricted to successful, everyday 
interactions. What I want to claim, however, is that the same does not 
hold in the epistemological case. In particular, I want to claim that 
what is not contained in T—i.e., what is still to be found out when we 
have enough knowledge for successful reference to occur—is of 
epistemological significance. 
My argument for this claim runs as follows. First, remember 
what was said in the previous chapter about the improvement of 
epistemic architectures. The underlying rationale for taking such im-
provements to constitute an important part of the epistemologist’s 
job description is the idea that epistemology should guide epistemic 
inquiry. This idea will be further elaborated on in the second part of 
this study, but we may note already at this point that one important 
component to this element of guidance is that epistemology should 
see to it that our epistemic vocabulary is as apt as possible, where a 
vocabulary is apt in so far as it invokes apt concepts, and  
 
                                                           
34 Griffiths (1997, p. 190). 
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Conceptual Aptness 
a concept is apt to the extent that it serves its intended purpose 
well in use. 
 
To say that concepts serve purposes is not meant to imply anything 
controversial. At a very basic level, the purpose of concepts is simply 
to enable us to think certain thoughts, have certain beliefs, etc., and, 
thereby, interact with the world in more or less successful ways. As 
noted by Armstrong (following Ramsey), beliefs are the maps by 
which we steer.35 Clearly, some ways of steering are more successful 
than others. That is, some ways of steering will get us what we want 
to a greater extent than others. Furthermore, one important factor in 
successful intellectual navigation are the concepts used, since concepts 
provide frameworks for thinking and believing, in the sense of different 
ways of categorizing the world. This point may be illustrated in the 
epistemic domain by noting that we, as epistemic inquirers, are en-
gaged in a certain project of epistemic evaluation and doxastic revi-
sion, (roughly) aimed at attaining and maintaining true belief in sig-
nificant matters. An integral part of succeeding in this latter task is 
having an apt epistemic vocabulary, where an apt epistemic vocabu-
lary is a vocabulary that can be used to categorize and, thereby, evalu-
ate fellow inquirers and the world in a way that serves the purpose of 
attaining and maintaining true beliefs in significant matters. Clearly, 
some concepts will serve this purpose better than others. In particu-
lar, the following seems a reasonable claim: 
 
If epistemic vocabulary V1 is more refined than vocabulary 
V2—i.e., if V1 incorporates accurate concepts to a larger extent 
than V2 does—then V1 is more apt than V2, ceteris paribus.36 
                                                           
35 See Armstrong (1973) and Ramsey (1931). 
36 I will attend to the issues about the identity conditions of concepts—i.e., 
whether and to what extent a refined concept can be said to remain “the 
same” over the course of refinement—more fully below when discussing 
conceptual reconstruction. 
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Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that getting acquainted with 
the properties that make up actual instances of x—and, in particular, 
those properties that may not be readily inferred from being ac-
quainted with what is contained in T—would enable us to refine our 
concept of x, in the sense of pruning it so as to provide a more cor-
rect and complete description of its referent. Finally, it seems fairly 
uncontroversial that the proper method for getting acquainted with 
those properties will have to be empirical. 
However, some might be skeptical as to whether we thereby 
get to know something that adds to our concepts. More specifically, it 
might be argued that there is no doubt that you may come to know all 
kinds of interesting and maybe even significant things by way of an 
empirical investigation into referents. However, the things you, 
thereby, come to know do not (at least not in all instances) add to the 
concept in question—only those things that are necessarily true do. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, this is false if we under-
stand the relevant conceptual aspect in terms of so-called stereo-
types.37 For one thing, the predicates that make up stereotypes do not 
even need to be true of the referent (let alone necessarily true). To see 
this, we need to remember two things, namely that (a) an important 
reason to postulate concepts is to explain the ways in which we think 
and act, and that (b) mistaken theories and, hence, stereotypes for 
WATER and ATOM in no way hindered pre-1750 chemists and late 15th 
century physicists from picking out certain very real physical phenom-
ena in nature that not until centuries later came to be accurately de-
scribed. Given (a) and (b), it would be an explanatory disaster to only 
allow truths—let alone necessary truths—as conceptual components. 
The particular ways in which pre-1750 chemists tended to interact 
with water, and late 15th century physicists tended to interact with 
atoms, are best explained not in terms of any perfectly accurate theo-
ries of the phenomena in question, but by the actual stereotypes to 
                                                           
37 See Putnam (1975a, 1975b). 
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which they corresponded, however inaccurate they may have turned 
out to be. 
Even this point aside, however, we may note that there are in-
dependent reasons to assume that not even those stereotypical com-
ponents that happen to be true of the referent need to be necessarily 
true. For example, take the fact that human parents tend to care for 
their offspring. Clearly, not all parents care for their offspring. Never-
theless, it seems that most parents, at the very least, have a tendency to 
care for their offspring. However, this is not a necessary property of 
parents (unlike, say, that all parents are older than their offspring). 
Given a slightly different evolutionary history, we might have had a 
substantially different relationship between parents and offspring, 
such that the former had no tendency whatsoever to care for the 
latter. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that it is not part of the 
stereotype of HUMAN PARENT that parents tend to care for their off-
spring. When we think of parents and their offspring, we think of the 
former as having a tendency to care for the latter. And there are good 
reasons for doing this; in the actual world—the world that we live in 
and interact with—parents tend to care for their offspring. So, to the 
extent that our concepts figure in the ways that we interact with and 
explain the world, and stereotypes provide viable ways to represent 
certain cognitive aspects of such thought and interaction, it serves us 
well to incorporate “…tends to care about their offspring” in our 
stereotype for HUMAN PARENT.  
By way of another example, take the fact that many birds mi-
grate south in the winter. This is not a necessary property of these 
birds (unlike, say, that all and only birds are members of the biological 
clade Aves). If there were not seasonal changes in the climate, there 
would be no reason for birds to migrate south in the winter. As it 
happens, however, there are seasonal changes and these very seasonal 
changes make certain birds migrate south during the summer. Hence, 
when we think of these birds, we tend to think of migration—at least 
if we are somewhat informed as to the habits of birds. And there are 
good reasons for thinking about birds thus; in the actual world—a 
world with seasonal changes and birds that are sensitive to them—
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many birds migrate south during the winter. Hence, to the extent that 
our concepts figure as prominent tools in the ways that we interact 
with and explain the world, and stereotypes can be taken to represent 
important cognitive aspects of those tools, it serves us well to incor-
porate “…migrates south in the winter” in our stereotype for BIRD. 
Parents, birds and other natural kinds aside, let us turn to justi-
fication, by way of epistemological illustration. Construed as an arti-
factual kind, the set of intentions and purposes that determines its 
identity conditions would most likely pertain to the flagging of appro-
priate sources of information, where the appropriateness is under-
stood in terms of truth-conductivity. (Or so I will argue in chapter 7 
below.) More than that, on Strong Internalism, every competent speaker 
would be perfectly familiar with the details of this set. But does this 
imply that they, thereby, know everything there is to know about 
justification? Does it, in particular, follow that there is nothing else to 
find out that is of epistemological significance?  
That seems unreasonable. In particular, it would be of episte-
mological significance to find out, among other things, (a) what exter-
nal phenomena actually satisfy the relevant requirements of truth-
conductivity, (b) about the multiplicity of properties that make up 
these phenomena, and, perhaps more importantly, (c) how these 
properties fit into the causal fabric of the world and, hence, may not 
only be better understood but also be manipulated to the benefit of 
the epistemic inquirer—all of which seem to be things that cannot, in 
any straightforward way, be inferred from the relevant set of inten-
tions and purposes, nor be discovered without recourse to an empiri-
cal investigation. Furthermore, given that we drop the implausible 
requirement that only necessary truths may figure as conceptual com-
ponents, there is nothing that hinders the results of such investigation 
from being incorporated into an increasingly accurate and, hence, 
more useful concept of justification. 
So, in the general case, and in so far as conceptual refinement 
may rightfully play a substantial role in epistemology, the claim that 
epistemological investigation is a substantially empirical investigation 
is largely independent not only of whether the objects of epistemo-
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logical investigations are natural or artifactual kinds, but also of any 
content externalist or internalist considerations with respect to the 
latter. In other words, given that the above line of reasoning does, 
indeed, apply to most if not all objects of epistemological investiga-
tion—and I see no reason why it would not—we may conclude that 
the claim that epistemological analysis is substantially empirical does 
not hinge on (A). Indeed, the preceding discussion provides us with 
reason to take the following argument to be sound: 
 
(A*)  For every object x of epistemological investigation, x is 
either a natural or an artifactual kind. 
(B*)  If (A*), epistemological investigation is substantially em-
pirical. 
(C)  Hence, epistemological investigation is substantially 
empirical (A*, B*, MP). 
 
This concludes my solution to Problem 1. Next, we will be looking into 
why (D) does not hold—i.e., why it does not follow from (C) that an 
understanding of our epistemic concepts is largely irrelevant to epis-
temological investigation. In the process of doing so, we will not only 
provide further evidence to the effect that epistemology is substan-
tially empirical, but also introduce a more radical means to attaining 
an apt vocabulary: conceptual reconstruction. 
 
 
3.5. FACTUAL ANALYSIS AND THE AC PRINCIPLE 
Returning to The Argument, let us now turn to premise (D) and the 
conclusion (E), stating that a thorough understanding of our epis-
temic concepts, over and above the phenomena that they pick out, is 
irrelevant to epistemological investigation. Kornblith’s commitment 
to this conclusion comes out most clearly in his critique of the idea 
that the (sole) job of epistemology is to analyze epistemic concepts by 
way of categorization intuitions about hypothetical cases—a view that 
he characterizes as follows: 
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Appeals to intuition are designed to allow us to illuminate the 
contours of our concepts. By examining our intuitions about 
imaginary or hypothetical cases, we should be able to come to 
an understanding of our concepts of, for example, knowledge 
and justification. The goal of epistemology on this view, or, at 
a minimum, an essential first step in developing an epistemo-
logical theory, is an understanding of our concepts.38 
 
Kornblith continues: 
 
My own view is that our concepts of knowledge and justifica-
tion are of no epistemological interest. The proper objects of 
epistemological theorizing are knowledge and justification 
themselves, rather than our concepts of them.39 
 
In light of the reasonable claim that some initial examination of our 
epistemic concepts might be necessary in order to fix the subject 
matter, Kornblith makes it clear that his main disagreement with the 
tradition of epistemology as conceptual analysis concerns the scope of 
such a semantic investigation. More specifically, he claims that the 
semantic investigation called for is “utterly trivial” and, thereby, in no 
way related to the two thousand year old project that, in a tradition 
stemming from Plato’s Theaetetus and culminating in the Gettier-
inspired literature, typically falls under the heading of the analysis of 
knowledge and justification.40 
When trying to put this claim in more precise terms, it serves 
us well to make a distinction between two stages of epistemological 
investigation. The first one corresponds to the identification of an epis-
temological object F, i.e., of fixing the subject matter (if only tenta-
tively) through picking out a selection of what we take to be paradig-
matic instances of ‘F.’ In doing this, our concepts of F, and the cate-
                                                           
38 Kornblith (2006, pp. 11-12). 
39 Kornblith (2006, p. 12). 
40 See Kornblith (2006, pp. 12-13). 
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gorization intuitions they give rise to clearly play a vital role. Moreo-
ver, depending on the extent to which ‘F’ is ambiguous or imprecise, 
this process of identification may be more or less time-consuming. 
Regardless, the purpose of identification is to pave the way for the 
more substantial and straightforwardly empirical aggregation of the 
characteristics that are found in Fs, in order to reach a satisfactory 
answer to the question that initiated inquiry in the first place: “What is 
(it to be) F?”41 
Against the background of this distinction, I would like to 
characterize Kornblith’s notion of analysis as follows: 
 
Factual Analysis (FA) 
Identification:  For any ‘F,’ Identify a set Q, containing a selec-
tion of what we take to be paradigmatic in-
stances of ‘F.’ 
Aggregation:  Against the background of an empirical 
investigation into the elements found in Q, 
aggregate a set of characteristics that specify 
what actually constitutes (being) F. 
 
Is FA an empirical analysis? In so far as aggregation goes, the answer 
would have to be yes. As stated, however, it remains to be established 
whether the same goes for identification. We saw in the previous 
chapter that the use of categorization intuitions are best understood 
as yielding a posteriori warranted beliefs by way of either an empirical 
(third-person approach) or a non-empirical method (first-person 
approach). Furthermore, and in light of the previous two chapters, it 
seems reasonable to assume that either of the following two claims 
would have to be true: (a) identification calls for an extensive investi-
gation, in which case an empirical method will be desirable due to a 
                                                           
41 This distinction between identification and aggregation is borrowed from 
Amartya Sen’s (1981) excellent treatment of the issue of poverty. 
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superior methodological rigor,42 or (b) identification does not call for 
an extensive investigation, in which case a non-empirical method 
would not compromise the claim that epistemological investigation—
if understood along the lines of FA—is still a substantially empirical 
investigation. 
We have to keep in mind, however, that Kornblith does not 
only commit himself to the idea that FA is a viable method of episte-
mological analysis, but to the stronger claim that FA provides a com-
plete method, i.e., that there are no other aspects to epistemological 
investigation over and above identification and aggregation, as spelled 
out above. This brings us to (D) and the external objection that con-
ceptual analysis is largely unnecessary. More specifically, if FA is all 
there is to epistemological analysis, there is no need for a thorough 
understanding of our epistemic concepts—as in: an understanding 
that goes beyond whatever semantic investigation is needed for identi-
fication—since the main component of epistemological analysis will 
consist in a purely empirical investigation into the epistemic phenom-
ena picked out. In other words, if FA provides a complete methodol-
ogy, we should accept (D). 
But why should we take FA to provide a complete methodol-
ogy? Suppose that it proves possible to successfully conduct a series 
of factual analyses, providing an account of what constitutes (being) F 
for every epistemic concept ‘F.’ This would, undoubtedly, be an im-
pressive accomplishment. But would it mark the end of epistemologi-
cal investigation? Considering the picture of epistemology as the 
pursuit of an apt epistemic vocabulary, the question may be reformu-
lated as follows: Would such a set of analyses necessarily yield a fully 
apt epistemic vocabulary? Considering what was said above in relation 
                                                           
42 I would assume that a more straightforwardly empirical investigation also 
would be desirable since it would enable us to sidestep a lot of philosophical 
intuition mongering, in favor of straightforward empirical investigation, 
especially in light of the plethora of problems for traditional conceptual analy-
sis that has been discussed in the literature. See DePaul and Ramsey (1998) 
for a good selection of essays discussing these problems. 
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to conceptual refinement, it might be tempting to answer the question 
in the positive, under the assumption that a more apt set of concepts 
simply is a more accurate set of concepts. In other words, the answer 
would be yes if the following principle can be shown to hold: 
 
The AC principle 
The pursuit of a more apt set of concepts reduces to that of 
providing a more accurate set of concepts. 
 
In other words, we have established the following chain of depend-
ency: If the AC Principle holds, it is reasonable to assume that FA yields 
not only accurate but apt concepts and, hence, provides a complete 
epistemological methodology. Furthermore, if FA provides a com-
plete epistemology methodology, then it is reasonable to assume that 
(D) holds. However, if the AC Principle does not hold, (D) remains 
unwarranted since FA, thereby, might yield accurate but not necessar-
ily apt concepts. More specifically, I will argue that 
 
Problem 2 
unless the AC Principle holds, FA fails to acknowledge episte-
mology’s role in the particular kind of conceptual improve-
ment involved in conceptual reconstruction.  
 
In the following section, I will (a) spell out this methodological com-
ponent of conceptual reconstruction, (b) provide two examples of 
cases in which the need for it indicates that increased accuracy does 
not imply increased aptness, even if we assume content externalism for 
the corresponding concepts, and (c) conclude that the AC Principle is 
an unviable epistemological assumption and (D), hence, is without 
warrant. 
 
 
3.6. CONCEPTUAL APTNESS IN SCIENCE AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
A strong motivation for content externalism about natural kind terms 
is that it provides us with a straightforward and intuitive explanation 
 112 
of disagreement in the natural sciences.43 That is, given content exter-
nalism, successful reference is completely compatible with inaccurate 
concepts and theories on the part of the person referring. Hence, 
despite radically different (and, in some cases, incorrect) theories, 
Dalton, Rutherford, and modern physicists were and are essentially 
talking about the same phenomenon, i.e., the atom. Indeed, only if we 
say that can we make the further claim that they disagree about the 
latter’s constitution and that contemporary theories of the atom con-
stitute improved and more accurate theories when compared to the ear-
lier theories of Dalton and Rutherford, in line with the overall pro-
gress of science. 
Does this rather neat picture of scientific disagreement and 
improvement carry over to epistemology? One of the major reasons 
for doubting that it does is that (a) we have reason to believe that the 
majority of epistemological objects are artifactual rather than natural 
kinds, that (b) it is still to be established that content externalism pro-
vides the correct semantics for artifactual kind terms, and that (c) it is 
not obvious that explaining epistemological disagreement requires 
assuming referential continuity, rather than that our epistemological 
project is continuous with that of our epistemological predecessors 
(e.g., in the sense that we are all concerned with the search for an apt 
epistemic vocabulary). However, being able to explain disagreement 
is, clearly, only one motivation for content externalism and there 
might very well be independent reasons for wanting to defend such 
externalism in epistemology. For this reason, I will now consider a 
dialectically more robust strategy by showing that the AC principle does 
not even hold under content externalism. The strategy will first be 
demonstrated on an abstract level and then, in the next section, illus-
trated by way of two examples. 
So, first consider how referents get assigned to concepts on an 
externalist story and let us, for dialectical purposes, assume the 
strongest form of externalism, i.e., Causal Externalism. On Causal Ex-
ternalism, a concept gets assigned a referent by way of an initial act of 
                                                           
43 See, e.g., Putnam (1975b). 
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baptism. In other words, the referent of a concept is fixed by the 
(mere) fact that the baptizer stands in a certain causal relation to it. As 
we have already seen, such a semantic story is perfectly compatible 
with successful reference in spite of considerable ignorance on part of 
the speaker, which leaves room for extensive conceptual refinement. 
Hence, it was suggested above that there is a connection between 
refinement and aptness.  
This, furthermore, provides at least part of a rationale for the 
conceptual refinement of purely descriptive concepts in science, un-
derstood as concepts, the mere (or at least most central) purpose of 
which is to categorize without thereby providing a normative evalua-
tion of whether something is good or bad in relation to a specified set 
of goals. Hence, H2O may constitute a refinement of WATER, as far as 
chemistry goes, and MEAN MOLECULAR KINETIC ENERGY a refine-
ment of TEMPERATURE, as far as kinetic theory goes. Similarly, 
Goldman has argued that psychology may refine the descriptive re-
sources of epistemology, for example as it pertains to the concept 
BELIEF.44 
However, to fully understand what constitutes an apt epistemic 
vocabulary, we need to keep in mind that epistemic concepts typically 
are normative concepts. As we saw in chapter 2, epistemic concepts, 
qua normative concepts, are tools by which we evaluate the conduct 
of fellow epistemic inquirers—that is, categorize their conduct as 
being an instance of knowledge, justification, rationality, etc.—but 
where we, merely by virtue of such a categorization, also make an 
explicitly normative judgment about the extent to which their conduct 
is good from an epistemic point of view. This suggests that the pur-
poses of epistemic concepts may be understood in relation to the 
norms in which they figure and the goals that these norms are designed 
to meet. Furthermore, it prompts the following question: Is there any 
guarantee that the referent that was originally attached to an epistemic 
concept or term in an initial act of baptism, in fact, provides the best 
route to our epistemic goals? 
                                                           
44 See Goldman (1986, pp. 199-226). 
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The answer is no. In analogy with what was argued in relation 
to Epistemic Romanticism above, it might, indeed, be possible to con-
struct an argument to the effect that whatever we are referring to with 
our epistemic concepts does not provide a completely useless route to 
our epistemic goals, given that having true belief is an integral part of 
attaining many of our practical goals (and that the latter is something 
that we tend to do). However, it is hard to see why the referents ini-
tially determined necessarily provide the best paths to our epistemic 
goals. For this reason, epistemology has to consider the possibility 
that alternative referents may present a better route to our epistemic 
goals than our present referents. Hence, it makes sense to not only 
investigate the question of to what extent our concepts provide accu-
rate pictures of their referents—a referent that need not provide the 
best route to our epistemic goal—but also whether there are any 
alternative referents that might present a better route. Such an inquiry, 
however, has to take into account not only the causal structure of the 
world (as revealed through straightforward empirical inquiry) but also 
the purposes of the original concepts and, in particular, the norms in 
which they typically figure and the goals these norms are meant to 
attain, since nothing short of such an investigation will enable us to 
specify what would constitute a better route to our goals and, conse-
quently, a more apt concept. 
 
 
3.7. WHEN ACCURACY DOES NOT INCREASE APTNESS 
To illustrate this point, I will now present two hypothetical scenarios 
in which increased accuracy does not increase aptness, since the refer-
ents in question—determined in accordance with Causal Externalism—
do not present optimal routes to our epistemic goals. I will argue that 
the proper epistemological strategy in those cases is not refinement 
but a more substantive conceptual improvement in light of the larger 
context of norms and goals in which the concept figures. I will refer 
to such conceptual improvement as conceptual reconstruction, to a first 
approximation understood as an ameliorative activity located further 
out on a continuum of increasingly radical conceptual revision.  
 115 
A helpful metaphor here is home improvement. When redo-
ing, say, a kitchen, you start out with a certain pre-existing material, 
i.e., the kitchen that is to be redone. Let us call this kitchen K1. The 
kitchen that results from the reconstruction—let us call it K2—might 
look nothing like K1. Nevertheless, K2 will (if everything goes as 
planned) serve a certain set of purposes better than K1 did. Perhaps K2 
is more spacious, has more up-to-date appliances, has a more attrac-
tive design, etc., than K1. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that the 
intention to realize those properties provided the very reason for 
redoing the kitchen. Similarly, conceptual reconstruction starts out 
with a pre-existing concept, C1. The reconstructed concept, C2, might, 
in the end, look nothing like the original concept. Still, the very point 
of reconstruction is that C2 serves a set of purposes better than C1. In 
the case of epistemic concepts, these purposes will be understood in 
relation to our epistemic goals—goals that will be spelled out in more 
detail below but that, to a first approximation, may be understood in 
terms of true belief in significant matters. 
However, this raises some questions about the identity condi-
tions for concepts. Is the concept that results from reconstruction 
“the same concept” as the concept that we started out with? I find 
this question about as puzzling (and interesting) as the question 
whether my kitchen remains “the same” over the course of a redeco-
ration. Clearly, many of its properties will change—some vanish, 
some arise—and the redecorated kitchen will not be identical to the 
old one. (If it were, we would want our money back.) At the same 
time, it is still my kitchen and it will still serve the same purposes—
indeed, it will, hopefully, serve some of the same purposes better than 
my old kitchen. Analogously, I will say that a reconstructed concept 
C2 is “the same” concept as an original concept C1 to the extent that 
they both figure in relation to the same set of purposes. At the same 
time, however, C2 will, clearly, also be different form C1 in the sense 
that it has different properties and, due to this very fact, serves the 
purposes in question to a greater degree. 
Against the background of a distinction between conceptual 
refinement and reconstruction, say that we perform a factual analysis 
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of JUSTIFICATION and let us, for simplicity’s sake, refer to this concept 
as our concept of justification.45 Assume, furthermore, that we, in the 
process of identification, find that the properties by which we typi-
cally individuate degree of justification pertain to the fulfillment of 
epistemic duties. In fact, this would make complete sense, given what 
we know about the etymology of the term “justification.” As noted by 
William Alston, the term “has been imported into epistemology from 
talk about voluntary action,” which “explains the strong tendency to 
think of the justification of belief in deontological terms, in terms of 
being permitted to believe that p (not being to blame for doing so, 
being ‘in the clear’ in so believing).”46 What does this tell us about the 
way that JUSTIFICATION was originally endowed with a referent? For 
one thing, it lends some support to the dual claim that (a) JUSTIFICA-
TION—or rather “justification—was originally introduced as applying 
to the formation of belief, and that (b) it has traditionally been pre-
supposed that we can form or refrain from forming beliefs by willed 
action—on pain of denying that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Finally, assume 
that we, in the process of aggregation and empirical investigation of 
the phenomenon actually picked out by our concepts, find that we 
have no voluntary control over the formation of beliefs.47 
                                                           
45 It does not matter so much for present purposes whether there is such a 
thing as our concept of justification or rather a rich multiplicity, since all that 
the following line of reasoning requires is that we are talking in terms of a 
specific concept—be it a widely shared one or not. 
46 Alston (1993, pp. 532 and 533, respectively). See also Plantinga (1990) and 
Alston (2005). 
47 The kind of voluntary control at issue here is what Alston (2005, p. 62) 
refers to as basic voluntary control. This is not the only kind of voluntary con-
trol—in fact, Alston distinguishes between three types of (decreasingly exten-
sive) voluntary control as well as different grades of indirect voluntary influence 
(pp. 62-80). However, Alston also provides convincing arguments to the 
effect that, even given increased taxonomical complexity, there does not seem 
to be any voluntary control or influence such that it both (a) applies to the 
psychology of common epistemic inquirers, and (b) is sufficiently extensive to 
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If this turned out to be the case, we seem to have uncovered 
reason to believe that our concept of justification is off the mark, in 
that it pertains to something that we, as a matter of fact cannot have, 
namely epistemic duties. What would be a proper epistemological 
response? Two responses are available. On the first response, we 
reject voluntarism as a mistaken view about the way our mind works, 
but retain the idea that justification applies to belief-formation. This 
would correspond to a simple refinement and the most promising 
candidate for fleshing it out would probably be some form of process 
reliabilism.48 However, as it stands, this response suffers from a sig-
nificant problem: It takes for granted that the referent inherited from 
our deontological predecessors does, in fact, provide the optimal 
route to our epistemic goals. While this certainly cannot be ruled out, 
nor can it be assumed, for reasons brought out in the previous sec-
tion.  
This leads us to the second response, on which we engage in 
an inquiry best described as a continuation of aggregation, with the 
crucial qualification that it is preceded and guided by an investigation 
into the intended purpose of the original concept, in an empirical 
search for properties that may serve that purpose better, given a rele-
vant set of epistemic norms and goals. For example, if such an inves-
tigation were to demonstrate that the purpose of JUSTIFICATION is to 
flag certain voluntary acts (previously identified as acts of belief-
formation) as appropriate sources of information, and the appropri-
ateness in question is typically understood in relation to a goal of 
attaining and maintaining true belief in significant matters, one possi-
ble route for empirical inquiry would be to identify a kind of volun-
tary act that tends to yield and support true belief, thereby providing 
material for a reconstructed concept. The resulting view would retain 
voluntarism but reject the idea that justification should apply to belief-
formation. This would correspond not to a refinement but a recon-
                                                                                                               
warrant talking in terms of genuine duties. This matter will be attended to 
closely in chapter 5. 
48 See, e.g., Goldman (1986). 
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struction, where justification gets “re-baptized,” so to speak, and 
JUSTIFICATION, thereby, gets assigned a new referent. 
This brings us to the second scenario and the traditionally 
most influential candidate for such a voluntary act: introspection. More 
specifically, say that we, in the process of identification, find that we 
tend to determine degree of justification by reference to an introspec-
tive evaluation of reasons on part of the allegedly justified (or unjusti-
fied) subject. Let us, furthermore, assume that this particular concept 
originally entered into the discourse of evaluating epistemic subjects 
some four hundred years ago by way of Descartes’ ideas about what 
one perceives clearly and distinctly by means of introspection.49 What 
does this tell us about the way in which JUSTIFICATION was originally 
endowed with a referent? At the very least, it lends some support to 
the dual claim that (a) JUSTIFICATION—or rather: “justification”—was 
originally introduced as applying to acts of introspection, and that (b) 
it has traditionally been presupposed that such acts provide a power-
ful and reliable access to the grounds for our beliefs. However, sup-
pose that we also find that, as a matter of empirical fact (say, facts 
uncovered by cognitive psychology), we seldom have access to the 
epistemic qualities of the processes by which we form beliefs and, 
furthermore, that the stories (consciously or unconsciously) recon-
structed by us regarding the epistemic etiology of our beliefs are often 
quite inaccurate.50 
If that turned out to be the case, what would be a proper epis-
temological response? Again, two responses are available. On the first 
response, we would try to identify conditions under which we do have 
reliable access to our reasons and, then, refine our concept accord-
ingly. However, the very same research hinted at in the previous para-
graph gives us reason to think that such conditions are quite hard to 
come by. Hence, the second response: Conduct an investigation into 
the purpose of our (supposedly inapt) concept, let the result of such 
an investigation guide further empirical aggregation of candidate 
                                                           
49 See Descartes (1988b, p. 103; AT VII 59-60). 
50 See Wilson (2002) for some evidence to this effect. 
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properties that may figure in a reconstructed concept that fills the 
same (or close to the same) purpose, without being committed to the 
idea that we have a reliable introspective access to the epistemic quali-
ties of our belief-forming processes.  
In short, if an investigation into the purpose of our concept of 
justification were to reveal that its purpose is to flag certain voluntary 
acts (previously identified as acts of introspection) as appropriate 
sources of information, and the appropriateness is (again) typically 
understood in relation to a goal of attaining and maintaining true 
belief in significant matters, one way for empirical inquiry to proceed 
would be to identify an alternative kind of voluntary act (one candi-
date being certain acts of reasoning) that tends to yield and support 
true belief. An empirical aggregation preceded and guided by an inves-
tigation into the purpose of our concept would, thereby, provide 
material for a reconstructed concept. 
These scenarios and the corresponding responses will be dis-
cussed at length in the second part of this study. In fact, I will there 
argue that something like the story sketched above might just provide 
a plausible theory about the evolution (as well as the future) of JUSTI-
FICATION. However, as far as present purposes go, nothing hinges on 
whether that turns out to be the case. Even if considered as hypo-
thetical, the mere possibility of the above scenarios serves to highlight 
two points with a direct bearing on (D) and the issue of accuracy and 
aptness: First, there are possible cases in which merely attending to 
the referents of our current concepts would not enable us to complete 
the task of identifying a more apt concept, since those referents pro-
vide sub-optimal routes to our epistemic goals. For this reason, an 
epistemological investigation need to attend not only to the referents 
of our concepts but also to other properties that are not in any obvi-
ous way implicated by our current concepts but that may, neverthe-
less, figure in a more apt vocabulary. Second, this empirical investiga-
tion needs to be preceded and guided by an investigation into the 
purposes of the original concepts, providing the empirical inquiry in 
question with a direction in the form of an understanding of what 
properties to look for. For this reason, the substantially empirical 
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method in no way eliminates the need for an understanding of our 
epistemic concepts and, in particular, the particular purposes for 
which we employ them. On the contrary, such an understanding plays 
a vital role in the search for a more apt epistemic vocabulary. 
Again, unless it can, somehow, be shown that scenarios like 
the two just considered are impossible (which is different from argu-
ing that they are not actual), we have to leave room for the possibility 
of conceptual reconstruction when providing a methodological 
framework for epistemology. More specifically: Some instances of 
conceptual improvement in epistemology might indeed flow from a 
straightforward conceptual refinement. However, given that episte-
mology is concerned with explicitly normative concepts, some cases of 
improvement must take into account not only (a) facts about the 
referent but also (b) facts about the intended purpose of the concept in 
question, so as to guide empirical aggregation in the search for (c) 
properties that might not be implied by the original concept, nor 
present themselves in any straightforward way through an uncondi-
tional empirical investigation into the referent, but that might never-
theless furnish a reconstructed concept with an increased aptness, 
given the norms and goals that the original concept was supposed to 
(but failed to) meet. Hence, even if substantially empirical, a proper 
epistemological methodology needs to leave room for attending to 
our concepts, and in particular to the purpose for which we employ 
the epistemic concepts that we do.  
More specifically, epistemological analysis can plausibly be 
taken to involve not only Identification and Aggregation but also the 
following methodological component: 
 
Improvement:  To the extent that ‘F’ could be refined or recon-
structed so as to fulfill its purpose to a greater 
degree, refine or reconstruct ‘F’ accordingly.  
 
This is why epistemic concepts—contra the decrees of FA—do not 
drop out of the epistemological picture as soon as we move beyond 
the initial stage of delimiting a set of paradigmatic examples, and why 
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Kornblith’s external objection to conceptual analysis misses the target. 
We need to investigate the purposes of the concepts at issue by in-
corporating an account of the norms and goals that these concepts are 
associated with in order to determine what would constitute a concept 
that served us better. As such, however, the kind of conceptual analy-
sis called for is substantially different from the one usually assumed in 
the literature. Or so I will now argue. 
 
 
3.8. CONCLUSION 
The present chapter has established two conclusions. The first con-
clusion is that the claim that epistemology is a substantially empirical 
investigation is not contingent upon the admittedly controversial idea 
that all objects of epistemological investigation are natural kinds, 
under the plausible assumption that conceptual refinement plays an 
important role in epistemological theorizing. In fact, this can be 
shown to be plausible even under the dual assumption that (a) all 
objects of epistemological investigation are artifactual kinds, and (b) 
what I have referred to as Strong Internalism provides the correct se-
mantics for artifactual kind terms. The second conclusion is that 
concepts are not only relevant to identification, i.e., to the fixing of a 
(non-exhaustive) set of (what we take to be) paradigmatic examples of 
the phenomenon under investigation. An insight into the purposes of 
our epistemic concepts is, in some cases of conceptual reconstruction, 
also a prerequisite for knowing how to direct the process of aggrega-
tion in the improvement of our conceptual apparatus and, hence, 
answering a question that ought to lie at the heart of any epistemology 
interested in not only describing but also improving on epistemic 
inquiry, namely “Given our epistemic goals, what would be a set of 
epistemic concepts that served us better?” 
 122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. 
Constructive Analysis 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that epistemology is, indeed, substan-
tially empirical, but that epistemic concepts, nevertheless, matter to 
epistemology in that they provide material for what I have referred to 
as Identification and Improvement. In the present chapter, I aim to identify 
what I take to be two plausible methodological candidates for playing 
these roles in a way compatible not only with the empirical findings 
that posed a problem for DCA, but also the methodological worries 
about exhaustiveness that surfaced in relation to PCA. In doing this, I 
will also elaborate further on the element of improvement identified 
in the previous chapter and, in particular, on how it suggests that we 
need to transcend the previously surveyed analyses by incorporating 
not only a descriptive but also an ameliorative component, in what I 
will refer to as Constructive Analysis. This is also the kind of analysis 
that I will implement in the second part of this study. But first, let us 
look closer at the aforementioned methodological components. 
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4.1. THE DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENT 
In line with what was argued in the previous chapter, the first com-
ponent of epistemological methodology consists in the two-fold de-
scriptive task of (a) identifying the subject matter through an elucidation 
of the relevant epistemic concepts and (b) aggregating a characterization 
of the phenomenon referred to via these concepts. Starting with the 
process of identification, two comments are at place. First, the set of 
relevant epistemic concepts needs to be specified. Contra Goldman1, 
who takes the proper starting point of epistemological analysis to be 
our commonsense epistemic folk concepts, and in light of Weinberg et 
al.’s study2 and Kornblith’s3 point about the potentially beneficial 
influence of background theory, I will focus on the concepts not of 
the folk but of epistemologists, as brought out through their episte-
mological theories. That is, identification—the providing of the basic 
material for epistemological investigation in the form of a set of para-
digmatic examples—should proceed by way of the categorizations 
made by experts, not by the folk. Construing identification thus will 
not only free me from the worry of assuming that there is such a 
thing as “our” concept of this-or-that epistemic phenomenon—over 
and above relevant philosophical theories—but also limit the concep-
tual analytic data to central epistemological texts. 
There is a potential worry that needs to be addressed here, 
however. If there is no guarantee that the concepts, thereby, investi-
gated—i.e., the concepts provided by epistemologists—are identical 
to those of the folk, what guarantee is there that our inquiry will be 
relevant to the folk, qua epistemic inquirers?4 The answer to this is two-
fold. First, it should be pointed out that there is no such guarantee—
at least not as far as the analysandum goes. Since there is no guarantee 
that the goals of the experts coincide with those of the folk, and apt-
ness depends on the goals relevant to the concepts used, there is no 
                                                           
1 See Goldman (2007, 1992a). 
2 See Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001). 
3 See Kornblith (2007). 
4 Thanks to Anders Tolland for calling my attention to this issue. 
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guarantee that the concepts of the experts will be apt in relation to the 
goals of the folk. However, if there is any truth to what was argued in 
the previous two chapters, there is not even a guarantee that the con-
cepts of the folk will be particularly apt.  
At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that experts’ con-
cepts are more accurate than the concepts of the folk, since the for-
mer are the results of a more sophisticated and methodologically 
sensitive interaction with epistemic phenomena. This brings us to the 
second point: As we saw in the previous chapter, accuracy does not 
imply aptness. However, accuracy facilitates Aggregation and Evaluation. 
The more accurate a concept we start with, the easier it will be to 
aggregate the relevant characteristics. And the more relevant charac-
teristics we have aggregated, the easier it will be to evaluate whether a 
concept serves its purpose and its referent provides a promising route 
to our epistemic goals. This is why the concepts of the experts pro-
vide better basic material for analysis than the concepts of the folk; 
they are, in all likelihood, more accurate than those of the folk. Fur-
thermore, and since a further task of analysis is the Improvement of 
concepts to the extent that they do not speak to the epistemic goals of 
the folk, we do not need an initial guarantee that the analysandum is 
apt, merely that it is as accurate as possible. And while starting with 
the concepts of the experts ensures that the analysandum is as accu-
rate as possible, analyzing the analysandum constructively ensures that 
the analysans will be as apt as possible in relation to the goals of the 
folk. 
Having mitigated that worry, we need to develop a non-
traditional form of conceptual analysis that may serve the role of 
Identification but that, unlike DCA, is not committed to an implausible 
view of concepts. In chapter 2, we considered the extent to which 
PCA presented an option and I ventured to suggest that Exhaustiveness 
was not a desideratum for conceptual analysis. This point may now be 
put in somewhat clearer terms: The point of Identification is not to 
provide an exhaustive account of our conceptual apparatus, but just 
to identify a set of reasonably paradigmatic examples that may direct 
further empirical investigation into the characteristics of the phe-
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nomenon referred to. In other words, our conceptual apparatus is, at 
this point, of no interest in itself, but only in so far as it serves to direct 
further investigation thus. For this purpose, we need a more manage-
able notion of meaning and the analysis thereof, incorporated into 
what we, to a first approximation, may refer to as a PCA light, satisfy-
ing the dual desideratum of being (a) based on psychological research 
so as to not foster an inaccurate picture of concepts, while, at the 
same time, being (b) sufficiently translucent so as to be incorporable 
into a useful epistemological methodology that does not yield unnec-
essarily convoluted outputs. 
In identifying such a notion of meaning, I will start out with 
Hilary Putnam’s notion of a stereotype.5 Putnam originally introduced 
the notion of a stereotype in an attempt to rectify what he considered 
a wide-spread mistake: that of modeling natural kind terms on such 
words as “bachelor” that, at least on the face of it, can be character-
ized in terms of fairly neat conditions. What Putnam noticed was that 
natural kind terms do not lend themselves to such a characterization. 
In the case of natural kinds terms, there is no property or list of prop-
erties that captures the meaning of natural kind terms, barring such 
uninteresting properties as the property of being F. Instead, Putnam ar-
gued that the meaning of natural kind terms should be understood in 
terms of simplified and possibly inaccurate theories (not to be con-
fused with any actual and usually very complex theories) about the 
characteristics of normal members.6  
For instance, the stereotype for lemon would incorporate 
claims to the effect that typical lemons have yellow and fairly thick 
skin and a tart taste. Interestingly enough, these are probably also the 
very features we would cite if someone asked us what LEMON—or 
“lemon”—means. In other words, while neither (necessarily) provid-
ing an accurate picture of the phenomenon referred to, nor determin-
ing the corresponding term’s reference (since we may refer to lemons 
with our word “lemon,” even if lemons turned out to be small, blue 
                                                           
5 See Putnam (1975a, 1975b). 
6 See Putnam (1975a, p. 148). 
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animals, who turned yellow every time humans approached), stereo-
types play a non-trivial role in understanding and communication. 
In particular, stereotypes can be expected to provide cognitive 
pathways to external phenomena. That is, while not providing any-
thing like conditions that determine reference—especially not across 
possible worlds—stereotypes incorporate substantial information 
about how to identify or fix the reference in the actual world. For 
example, although it is certainly possible (although highly unlikely) 
that lemons might turn out to not actually have many of the proper-
ties that we typically ascribe to lemons, a conceptual stereotype incor-
porating such predicates as “tart,” “yellow,” “fairly thick skin,” etc., is, 
undoubtedly, extremely helpful in the identification of lemons, as they 
tend to appear in the actual world.7 
Now, in accordance with the fall of the Classical Theory of 
Concepts discussed in chapter 1, we have reason to believe that natu-
ral kinds are far from unique in not lending themselves to a charac-
terization in terms of neat conditions. And Putnam does, indeed, 
consider stereotypes instances of a more general phenomenon that he 
refers to as “core facts”: 
 
[…] there are, in connection with almost any word (not just 
‘natural kind’ words), certain core facts such that (1) one can-
not convey the normal use of the word (to the satisfaction of 
native speakers) without conveying those core facts, and (2) in 
the case of many words and many speakers, conveying those 
core facts is sufficient to convey at least an approximation to 
the normal use.8 
 
Putnam’s taxonomy is slightly misleading here. Talking in terms of 
core facts (rather than in terms of stereotypes) leads one to think that 
we are getting at the (non-semantic) fact that Fs are thus-and-so, 
rather than the (semantic) fact that “F” is used in a way that reveals a 
                                                           
7 See Kripke (1980, pp. 55, 57, and 96). 
8 Putnam (1975a, p 148). 
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theory according to which Fs are thus-and-so—and only the latter 
kind of fact leaves room for the possibility that Fs are not thus-and-so. 
This latter possibility has to be acknowledged by any theory of mean-
ing that is to be compatible with the highly plausible claim (discussed 
in the previous chapter) that, at least in the case of natural and artifac-
tual kinds, having an accurate concept is not a requisite for successful 
reference. For this reason, I will simply stick to talking about stereo-
types also in the general case, i.e., where Putnam uses the term core 
facts. 
By way of conclusion: While stereotypes do not necessarily re-
flect accurate theories of the entities referred to, nor serve to deter-
mine the reference of the corresponding concepts, stereotypes do, 
however, convey the meaning of the terms expressing those concepts, 
by providing information that we use a certain term “F” so as to 
mean something that typically has a particular set of characteristics—
characteristics that, furthermore, may serve to fix the reference in the 
actual world. More than this, it is reasonable to assume that, to the 
extent that stereotypes expose central meaning components—as in, 
components central to communication and understanding—they latch 
on to the very prototypical features mentioned in relation to PCA.  
As it happens, Putnam’s theory about stereotypes not only fits 
well with the research on prototype theory (that was just about to get 
underway as his work was being published), but also anticipates the 
so-called “theory” theory about concepts. As hinted in chapter 1 
above, this theory has come to improve and supersede prototype 
theory by incorporating data indicating that the kind of similarity 
invoked by prototype theorists needs to be heavily constrained in 
order to predict categorization. In short, some similarities are more 
important than others and the evidence suggests that the kind of 
similarities that matter are the ones that play a central role in people’s 
theories (in a broad sense) about the world (hence, “theory” theory). 
For this reason, similarity with respect to age or weight are in most 
cases deemed largely irrelevant in relation to whether or not some-
thing is an instance of HORSE, unlike having an udder, solid hoofs, 
and a mane. These kinds of observations have inspired research on 
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the extent to which concepts are intimately intertwined with our gen-
eral theories about the world, which is the reason why the “theory” 
theory also has come to be known under the less misleading name the 
knowledge view.9 
By (a) invoking lists of stereotypical features rather than neat 
conditions, (b) being compatible with the possibility that the compo-
nent features are intimately connected with our knowledge about the 
world, and (c) opting for Simplicity rather than Exhaustiveness, stereo-
types are good candidates for figuring in a refurbished conceptual 
analysis. To avoid confusion, however, it might be desirable to use a 
more neutral term. I suggest meaning analysis, or MA for short.10 Con-
sider the following: 
 
Meaning Analysis (MA) 
For any concept ‘F,’ identify the stereotype for ‘F,’ such that 
(a) one cannot convey the normal use of the corresponding 
term “F” without conveying that stereotype and (b) conveying 
that stereotype is sufficient to communicate at least the ap-
proximate use of “F.” 
 
Since the meaning is not conveyed via anything like a neat condition, 
MA is not committed to the traditional (and problematic) view of 
concepts associated with DCA. Instead, it has, as just noted, more in 
common with the prototype view, discussed in relation to PCA, or the 
knowledge view, with the crucial difference that it invokes a less com-
plex notion of meaning through forsaking Exhaustiveness for Simplicity 
and, thereby, giving priority to simplicity of characterization through 
approximate accounts of meaning, over the capturing of all intuitive 
                                                           
9 See, e.g., Murphy (2002), Carey (1999), Keil (1989), and Murphy and Medin 
(1985). 
10 Ernest Sosa uses the same term when he writes that some accounts of 
justification flow from a kind of analysis, “which leads to conclusions that no 
one could possibly reject without failing to understand one or another of the 
constitutive concepts” (BonJour and Sosa, 2003, p. 158). 
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judgments through strict (and excruciatingly complicated) definitions 
or exhaustive lists of prototypical features. Would it yield anything like 
analytical sentences? Not in any controversial sense. More specifically, 
it is reasonable to assume that MA, at most, yields analytical sentences 
in a very modest sense, namely in the sense that correct MAs (at least) 
convey approximations of the normal use of terms and that, con-
strued thus, MAs should be obviously true to competent users of the 
terms. However, given the prevalence of worries regarding analyticity 
and analysis it might be worth considering the matter somewhat more 
in depth.  
Although chapter 1 stressed a series of analogies between Pla-
tonic and contemporary analysis, an important disanalogy between the 
analyses in Plato’s dialogues and modern philosophy is that the latter 
has been more explicitly concerned with concepts as they relate to 
meanings rather than to essences. However, this very move from 
essences to meanings is also the reason why many might consider 
conceptual analysis a futile inquiry, in light of W. V. O. Quine’s now 
more than fifty year old attack on the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic statements in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”11  
The reason is this: In the words of C. H. Langford, “the analy-
sis […] states an appropriate relation of equivalence between the 
analysandum and the analysans,”12 a relation that, within traditional 
analytical philosophy, came to be construed in terms of analyticity. 
More specifically, the very output of conceptual analysis, i.e., the 
resulting definition, is typically construed as an analytic statement, i.e., 
to a first approximation, a statement that could only come out false if 
the meaning of the constituent terms were to change since it, as 
Quine puts it, is “true by virtue of meanings and independently of 
fact.”13 Let us follow Paul Boghossian in referring to this particular 
notion of analyticity as the metaphysical notion of analyticity.14 
                                                           
11 See Quine (1951). 
12 Langford (1942, p. 323). 
13 Quine (1951, p. 20). 
14 See Boghossian (1996). 
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Now, Quine criticized this notion by way of the general strat-
egy of scrutinizing several possible ways to clarify the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements and arguing that all candi-
date explanantia are in as much need of explanation as the distinction 
itself. Hence, Quine argued, we should reject the distinction. After 
Quine, many philosophers have sided with Peter Strawson and Paul 
Grice15 in considering Quine’s rejection somewhat uncalled for—does 
no clear distinction really imply no distinction?—and with Hilary Put-
nam when he says that 
 
[…] there is as gross a distinction between ‘All bachelors are 
unmarried’ and ‘There is a book on this table’ as between any 
two things in the world, or, at any rate, between any two lin-
guistic expressions in the world; and no matter how long I 
might fail in trying to clarify the distinction, I should not be 
persuaded that it does not exist. In fact, I do not understand 
what it would mean to say that a distinction between two 
things that different does not exist.16 
 
However, in understanding Quine’s challenge to make sense of the 
distinction—a challenge that, despite the allegedly obvious character 
of the distinction, is still to be met—and in order to see to what ex-
tent it pertains to conceptual analysis, it is vital to acknowledge the 
particular employments of the distinction that Quine set out to dis-
credit. In “Two Dogmas,” the targets of Quine’s critique were two 
positivistic projects. The first project sought to provide an explana-
tion of necessary truth in terms of linguistic necessity, ultimately rest-
ing on conventional decisions concerning the meaning of terms. That 
is, every necessary truth may be stated in the form of an analytic state-
ment, the truthmaker of which is a conventional decision about 
meaning, completely independent of non-semantic fact. However, as 
Quine pointed out, it is reasonable to assume that “truth in general 
                                                           
15 Strawson and Grice (1956). 
16 Putnam (1975c, p. 36; emphasis in original). 
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depends on both language and extralinguistic fact.”17 In the somewhat 
clearer words of Boghossian: 
 
What could it possibly mean to say that the truth of a state-
ment is fixed exclusively by its meaning and not by the facts? 
Isn’t it in general true—indeed, isn’t it in general a truism—
that for any statement S, 
 
S is true iff for some p, S means that p and p? 
 
How could the mere fact that S means that p make it the case 
that S is true? Doesn’t it also have to be the case that p?18 
 
In other words, the prospect for a (purely) linguistic theory of neces-
sary truth does not look too promising. However, Boghossian argues 
that it is far from clear that the second project, corresponding to the 
search for an account of a priori knowledge in metaphysically respect-
able terms (i.e., without reference to a faculty of rational insight), 
depends on this metaphysical notion of analyticity. Central to this 
project, he claims, is rather the idea that a statement is analytic pro-
vided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its 
truth—a notion he refers to as the epistemological notion of analyticity.19 
One explanation of how such a notion could explain a priori knowl-
edge and justification may be extracted from Frege’s characterization 
of analyticity in terms of sentences transformable into logical truths 
by the substitution of synonyms for synonyms, because given that 
both synonymy and logical truths are subject to a priori knowledge, the 
same goes for analytical statements thus understood.20 
However, even granted these admittedly substantial assump-
tions, the challenge remains since, at least according to Quine, there is 
                                                           
17 See Quine (1951, p. 34). 
18 Boghossian (1996, p. 364). 
19 See Boghossian (1996, p. 363). 
20 See Frege (1953). 
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no way to account for synonymy without presupposing either a no-
tion of analyticity or other notions (such as definition, intension, 
possibility, and contradiction) that are in as dire need of explanation 
as synonymy itself. And this is exactly where Quine’s challenge be-
comes relevant to conceptual analysis. Necessary truth and a priori 
knowledge aside, it seems that the traditional practice of conceptual 
analysis, at the very least, presupposes a relation of synonymy between 
analysandum and analysans. However, as should be obvious from the 
above discussion, MA does not presuppose anything like a strong 
notion of synonymy or analyticity. 
It might be interesting to note that Frank Jackson has sug-
gested that Quine’s own notion of a paraphrase, i.e., an “approximate 
fulfillment of likely purposes of the original sentences,”21 is sufficient 
to ground the practice of conceptual analysis.22 Furthermore, what is 
interesting about this suggestion is that it is clear, at least from Jack-
son’s treatment of this notion, that conceptual analyses incorporating 
paraphrases involve an element of potential reconstruction of con-
cepts—or a “limited change of subject,”23 as Jackson puts it—in light 
of reflection. Consequently, paraphrase analysis would have to give up 
the Exhaustiveness requirement, i.e., the idea that a correct conceptual 
analysis admits no (genuine) intuitive counterexamples, which 
amounts to a move not too different from mine. 
However, it needs to be stressed that giving up Exhaustiveness 
in favor of Simplicity has direct implications for methodology, in the 
sense that the dialectical framework discussed in chapter 1, where 
philosophical analyses are supported and refuted exclusively by refer-
ence to intuitive judgments about hypothetical situations, has to be re-
evaluated. As soon as Exhaustiveness is given up, and, with it, the ambi-
tion to do justice to all categorization intuitions, it becomes less clear 
how different candidate analyses are to be assessed.  
                                                           
21 Quine (1960, §46). 
22 See Jackson (1998, p. 45). 
23 Jackson (1998, p. 45). 
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At this point, however, it is vital that we see for what purpose 
we are at all characterizing concepts, which brings us to the second 
aspect of the descriptive component of epistemological methodology, 
namely that of aggregating a set of features characterizing not the 
concept at issue but the phenomenon that the concept is a concept 
of—which is, supposedly, what we set out to understand in the first 
place.24 I will not have a lot to say about this aspect here since it 
should be fairly straightforwardly in line with how the corresponding 
kind of phenomenon is investigated in the empirical sciences. So, at 
this point, the analysis has to rely heavily on the kind of science rele-
vant to the phenomenon at issue—be it psychology, physics, political 
science or whatever—and the fact that I will not dwell on this aspect 
of analysis here is not to indicate that it is in any way negligible or 
unimportant but rather that there is, at this point, not anything par-
ticularly philosophical about it. 
In conclusion, the following sums up the descriptive compo-
nent: 
 
                                                           
24 I am here glossing over a subtlety to the effect that there might be cases 
(especially to the extent that content externalist applies) where a concept can 
not in any straightforward way be said to pick out a—as in a single and 
unique—phenomenon. More specifically, it might be the case that there is no 
fact of the matter as to what phenomenon a concept picks out among a series 
of candidates. See, e.g., Field (1973) for a discussion of such cases in relation 
to theory change. And while such problematic situations may arise within the 
descriptive component, I take it that they are properly solved within the ame-
liorative component, discussed below. In short, refinement and reconstruc-
tion should, in cases of referential indeterminacy, be guided by the purposes 
associated with the concept, motivating refinement in so far as a particular 
referent provides a plausible candidate given the purposes of the (inaccurate) 
concept, and motivating reconstruction in so far as it does not. However, 
these question will be discussed further in §4.2 as well as in the second part of 
the present study. 
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The Descriptive Component 
Identification:  For any ‘F,’ identify the stereotype for the cor-
responding term “F” via Meaning Analysis, as a 
means to pick out a selection Q of what we take 
to be paradigmatic instances of ‘F.’ 
Aggregation:  Against the background of an empirical 
investigation into the elements in Q, aggregate a 
set of characteristics that specify what actually 
constitutes (an) F. 
 
As should be fairly obvious from the treatment of the issue in the 
previous chapter in relation to Improvement, the modest role of concep-
tual analysis in Identification or the incorporation of the explicitly em-
pirical Aggregation in no way serves to make philosophy redundant. 
When the investigations into the (extra-mental) phenomenon in ques-
tion is under way, and a set of characteristics specifying what consti-
tutes it is being aggregated, an important philosophical task remains: 
that of specifying what would (if anything) constitute a more apt con-
cept of the phenomenon at issue, against the background of not only 
what we have found out about its actual constitution but also the 
norms in which the corresponding concept typically figure and the 
goals that we desire to attain. This brings us to the second compo-
nent. 
 
 
4.2. THE AMELIORATIVE COMPONENT 
Analytic philosophy—in so far as it has been concerned with con-
cepts—has tended to focus on attributional questions regarding the 
correct application conditions of concepts, i.e., that we categorize the 
world in a particular way. What this approach leaves out are the fur-
ther teleological questions pertaining to why we categorize the world in 
the way that we do. As Weinberg has argued, failure to address these 
questions hinders a deeper understanding of the functions of our 
conceptual apparatuses in the specific sense that it fails to put our 
concepts into context, in merely treating them as abstract conditions 
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on the world, rather than as potentially dynamic tools that are used 
for certain purposes and that, thereby, co-exist with certain norms 
and goals.25 
This point was elaborated on in the previous chapter, where it 
was argued that the reason it is important that we focus not only on 
the structure of concepts but also their purposes is to leave methodo-
logical room for their improvement. It was granted that the extent to 
which a concept fulfills its purpose, in many situations, might just be a 
question of accuracy and that a mere refinement requires no more than 
an account of the ways in which the concept at issue fails to give an 
accurate story of its referent. At the same time, it was argued that we 
cannot, on strictly methodological grounds, rule out scenarios in 
which the referent itself provides a suboptimal route to our epistemic 
goals, in which case the inquiry called for is not a refinement but a 
reconstruction of the concept at issue. However, such a reconstruction 
needs to be preceded by an account of the corresponding concept’s 
purpose, guiding further empirical aggregation in the search for proper-
ties the predicates of which may figure in an improved concept that 
better fulfills the intended purpose. 
Luckily, however, the methodological (re)considerations called 
for in providing such accounts are not unprecedented. In his Knowledge 
and the State of Nature, Edward Craig writes: 
 
Let us suppose, however optimistically, that the problem of 
the analysis of the everyday meaning of ‘know’ had both been 
shown to exist and subsequently solved, so that agreed neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the ascription of knowledge 
were now on the table. That would be a considerable technical 
achievement, and no doubt a long round of hearty applause 
would be in order, but I hope that philosophers would not re-
gard it as a terminus, as many writers make one feel they 
would. I should like it to be seen as a prolegomenon to a fur-
ther inquiry: why has a concept demarcated by those condi-
                                                           
25 See Weinberg (2006). 
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tions enjoyed such widespread use? There seems to be no 
known language in which sentences using ‘know’ do not find a 
comfortable and colloquial equivalent. The implication is that 
it answers to some very general needs of human life and 
thought, and it would surely be interesting to know which and 
how.26 
 
According to Craig, an analysis that (unlike traditional conceptual 
analysis) takes into account the needs to which KNOWLEDGE answers 
brings out “the point of this concept, what it does for us, the role it 
plays in our lives.”27 More specifically, Craig suggests: 
 
Instead of beginning with ordinary usage, we begin with an 
ordinary situation. We take some prima facie plausible hy-
pothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us, 
what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept 
having that role would be like, what conditions would govern 
its application.28 
 
Such a “practical explication,” as Craig calls it, is not concerned with 
application conditions or conceptual extensions. Rather, through not 
only asking what concepts are, in fact, employed but also why and, 
thereby, for what purposes they are employed in ordinary situations, I 
take it that the practical explication may help us gain insight into the 
role which these concepts are supposed to play in epistemic inquiry 
and how they may or may not fit into different epistemic architec-
tures. This also connects well with the idea that few (if any) epistemic 
terms correspond to natural rather than artifactual kinds, answering 
primarily to human intentions rather than categories independent of 
human thought. Put differently, we impose rather than discover a grid 
of epistemic categories on the world for particular epistemic purposes. 
                                                           
26 Craig (1990, p. 2). 
27 Craig (1990, p. 3). 
28 Craig (1990, p. 2). 
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However, given that there is no guarantee that the terms within that 
grid play a role that serves our epistemic purposes in an optimal way, 
we need to leave room for the epistemic improvement of suboptimal 
architectures. 
In light of Craig’s suggestion, I take it that the following pro-
vides the first step in such an improvement: 
 
Conceptual Purpose Analysis (CPA) 
For any ‘F,’ identify a set of paradigm situations in which ‘F’ is 
utilized, and scrutinize these situations so as to identify the 
norms in which ‘F’ typically figures and the goals these norms 
typically are meant to attain, in order to specify the purpose for 
which we employ ‘F.’ 
 
In line with what was argued in the previous chapter, the point of 
conducting such an analysis is to evaluate the extent to which the 
concept in question—as unveiled through MA—meshes with the 
norms in which it figures and facilitates the attainment of the goals at 
which these norms are aiming.29 In so far as it does not, something 
has to go. I will assume that the components of architectures make up 
a natural hierarchy, corresponding to a decreasing appropriateness of 
revision. More specifically, I will assume that the kind of evaluation at 
issue should take the set of goals as a fixed starting-point, not open to 
revision, and that the proper objects of revision are concepts, an 
alteration of which, indirectly, gives rise to an alteration of the corre-
sponding norms. This assumption is to mirror the plausible idea that, 
in light of a failure to attain our goals, a re-evaluation of the goals 
rather than the tools devised in attempting to attain them should be 
the last resort—not the first. 
                                                           
29 Within epistemological analysis, this component bears some similarity to 
the more general project within the study of reason that Samuels, Stich, and 
Faucher (2004) refer to as the evaluative project, concerned with the extent to 
which human reasoning accords with appropriate standards, given some 
criterion of what constitutes good reasoning. 
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So, what are the goals relevant to the evaluation of epistemic 
concepts? In answering this question, I would like to make a distinc-
tion between domain general and concept specific goals. The former kind of 
goals pertains to concepts just by virtue of the general domain in 
which the concept is employed. For example, there are certain epis-
temic goals relevant to concepts just by virtue of the fact that they are 
epistemic concepts and, in particular, certain goals pertaining to truth—
or so I will argue.30 Over and above these goals, however, there are 
also certain concept specific goals that are more or less directly related 
to these general goals, and that serve to specify the more fine-grained 
roles that different concepts play within epistemic architectures at 
large. Consequently, while both knowledge, justification, and under-
standing may, in part, be specifiable with reference to the epistemic 
goal of truth, they each play different (although potentially inter-
related) roles by virtue of their respective concept specific goals—say, 
pertaining to warrant in the case of knowledge, reliability in the case 
of justification, and quality of explanation in the case of understand-
ing—that are more or less directly related the domain general epis-
temic goal of attaining truth. 
Since this chapter concerns general epistemological methodol-
ogy, it will focus exclusively on domain general goals. A treatment of 
concept specific goals will have to wait until the second part of this 
study (§7.2, to be exact), which will be concerned with the particular 
concept of epistemic justification. In accordance with the taxonomy 
introduced above in relation to epistemic normativity, the methodol-
ogy to be defended will be working with sets of epistemic desiderata, 
specifying that which constitutes or is a means to a epistemic goals. 
Furthermore, under the assumption that goals and their satisfaction 
give rise to values, we may say that a desideratum of an endeavor is a 
specification of something that is valuable in relation to the goals of 
                                                           
30 See Stich (1991) for a series of arguments again the idea that epistemic 
goals should be construed in terms of truth and Kornblith (2002) for a critical 
discussion and, to my mind, a rebuttal. 
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that endeavor.31 Hence, all properties that satisfy desiderata are valu-
able in relation to the inquiry to which those desiderata pertain. As for 
the source of particularly epistemic desiderata, I will take it that a 
pivotal point has to be the cognitive goal pertaining to the desire that 
“our beliefs correctly and accurately depict the world,” to quote Laur-
ence BonJour.32 This goal defines what Alston has referred to as “the 
epistemic point of view”33 from which epistemic evaluation is under-
taken, and may to a first approximation be characterized in terms of 
the synchronic epistemic desideratum that 
 
(D1) it is now the case that our beliefs are true. 
 
Against the background of this desideratum, truth is, clearly, of epis-
temic value. Furthermore, everything that is conducive to truth is of 
(instrumental) epistemic value.  
However, (D1) is not the sole desideratum of epistemic in-
quiry. For one thing, any strict skeptic would satisfy (D1) by not be-
lieving anything. One way to counteract this is to acknowledge the 
diachronic aspect of our cognitive goal, pertaining to the way in which 
we want our belief set to evolve dynamically—an aspect arising out of 
the fact that epistemic inquiry is an inquiry stretching over time. This 
aspect may be characterized in terms of the diachronic epistemic 
desideratum that 
 
(D2) we attain and maintain true beliefs.34 
 
                                                           
31 This is certainly not to say that goals are the only source of value. The way I 
will talk about value in the following is completely compatible with there 
being values completely independent of goals and the meeting thereof. 
32 BonJour (1985, pp. 7-8). See also Moser (1985, p. 4) and Alston (2005, p. 
30). 
33 Alston (1989, p. 83). 
34 Cf. Weinberg (2006, p. 36) on diachronic reliability as an epistemic desidera-
tum. 
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In other words, we do not only want our beliefs to be true now—a 
desire brought out through the synchronic desideratum (D1)—but 
also for it to be the case that our belief set expands and contracts over 
time so as to (a) attain true belief about that which we currently have 
false or no beliefs about, and (b) maintain true beliefs about that which 
we currently have true beliefs about. Differently put, we want it to be 
the case that our belief set fluctuates in the particular sense of tracking 
the truth.35 
Three things should be noted about these desiderata. First, I 
do not wish to claim that they are the only epistemic desiderata. Nev-
ertheless, I take them to be sufficiently central to epistemic inquiry to 
provide a not too distorted basis of evaluation. This centrality is also 
to be expected if we consider why we not only do but also should (as in: 
have reason to) value truth. To see this, first consider the connection 
between true belief and successful action, spelled out by Goldman 
thus: 
 
The pragmatic utility of true belief is best seen by focusing on 
a certain subclass of beliefs, viz., beliefs about one’s own plans 
of action. Clearly, true beliefs about which courses of action 
would accomplish one’s ends will help secure these ends better 
than false beliefs. Let proposition P = “Plan N will accomplish 
my ends” and proposition P’ = “Plan N’ will accomplish my 
ends”. If P is true and P’ is false, I am best off believing the 
former and not believing the latter. My belief will guide my 
choice of a plan, and belief in the true proposition (but not the 
                                                           
35 The intended notion of truth tracking is not identical to the one utilized by 
Nozick (1981) in his counter-factual condition on knowledge (stating that if 
one knows that p, then (a) if it were not the case that p, one would not believe 
that p, and (b) if it were the case that p, one would believe that p). Truth track-
ing, as I understand it here, is not a modal but a probabilistic notion, applying 
to belief sets in so far as they are likely to fluctuate with changes in the world. 
Construed thus, the set of belief sets that track the truth in Nozick’s sense is a 
subset of the belief sets that track the truth in my sense. 
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false one) will lead me to choose a plan that will accomplish 
my ends.36 
 
In other words, accurate beliefs about plans for action increase the 
chances of accomplishing one’s ends. If so, however, we all seem to 
have reason to value truth. Hence, Kornblith: 
 
It seems that someone who cares about acting in a way that 
furthers the things he cares about, and that includes all of us, 
has pragmatic reasons to favor a cognitive system that is effec-
tive in generating truths, whether he otherwise cares about the 
truth or not.37 
 
The reason is that, in the course of pursuing what we desire, we need 
to make evaluations of alternative actions. And whatever it is that we 
happen to desire, we have reasons to want such evaluations to be 
done accurately. Alternatively put, we have reasons to want whatever 
cognitive system we employ in our pursuit of that which we happen 
to value, to be one that, at the very least, tends to generate truths.38 
This relation between truth and the satisfaction of desires 
brings us to the second point: As they stand, (D1) and (D2) figure at a 
level of abstraction that makes them unfit for the prediction of actual 
human behavior. This is because (D1) and (D2) are purely epistemic 
desiderata, while we, as human beings, are not purely epistemic be-
ings. In other words, (D1) and (D2) capture but an aspect of human 
inquiry, namely an epistemic aspect and this aspect may be neutralized 
in more naturalistic and less abstract settings. However, as Marian 
David points out:  
 
We have various goals. In some cases different goals come 
into conflict and ‘loses out.’ […] This does not show that we 
                                                           
36 Goldman (1992b, p. 164). 
37 Kornblith (2002, p. 156). 
38 See Alston (2005, p. 31) for a similar argument. 
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don’t have the beaten or neutralized goal; it merely shows that 
the goal is not an absolute one.39 
 
Still, in understanding the interplay between different aspects of hu-
man inquiry, and between epistemic and non-epistemic inquiry in 
particular, we need to take into account that our reasons for truth are 
intertwined with varying sets of desires, some of which are not purely 
epistemic in nature. More specifically, “our desire for truth is largely 
coordinate with our desire for answers to our various questions,” to 
quote Ernest Sosa.40 In other words, we do not value truth as such, nor 
do we necessarily have reason to do so. If we did, “we could not better 
spend our time than by memorizing telephone directories,”41 as Wil-
liam Alston points out. This point generalizes to all purely epistemic 
desiderata and calls for a qualification of (D1) and (D2). 
Furthermore, this particular point has methodological implica-
tions. Needless to say, evaluating our epistemic concepts along an 
exclusively epistemic dimension via purely epistemic desiderata en-
ables us to pinpoint and characterize a very particular aspect of hu-
man life concerned with the pursuit of truth. However, as we just 
argued, this is just one aspect and an aspect that, in real life settings, is 
intimately intertwined with non-epistemic desires and desiderata. 
Hence, an epistemology that focused exclusively on this epistemic 
aspect would do a terribly bad job of addressing the epistemological 
questions pertaining to the guidance or improvement of actual epis-
temic inquiry for the simple reason that it would not take into account 
the naturalistic settings in which such pursuits of truth actually take 
place. Consequently, it would fail miserably on the third and ameliora-
tive task, pertaining to that it is reasonable to ask of the epistemologist 
to improve on relevant epistemic concepts to make for a better fit 
with the goals and desiderata found in not just any epistemic architec-
tures but the very ones that figure in actual truth seeking situations. 
                                                           
39 David (2005, p. 299). 
40 Sosa (2003, p. 157). 
41 Alston (2005, p. 32). 
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Following Kitcher as well as Michael Bishop and J. D. Trout, I 
will approach this question in terms of significance.42 To a first ap-
proximation: Since our interest in truth is contingent upon our wants 
and desires, and the latter may very well vary between persons and 
cultures, some questions, and the truths they pertain to, are deemed 
more important than others, even though they may all be equally 
significant from a narrowly epistemic (and glaringly abstract) perspec-
tive. In discussing the particular epistemic inquiry of science, Kitcher 
makes an illustrative analogy with maps.43 The accuracy of maps is, 
clearly, dependent on (although not determined by) the interests of 
whoever makes use of the maps. By the same token, Kitcher claims 
that “the aim of the sciences is to address the issues that are signifi-
cant for people at a particular stage in the evolution of human cul-
ture” and that scientific languages “are fashioned to draw those dis-
tinctions that are most helpful in carrying out the lines of investiga-
tions those people want to pursue.”44 Kitcher extends this analogy a 
step further: 
 
Like maps, scientific theories and hypotheses must be true or 
accurate (or, at least, approximately true or roughly accurate) 
to be good. But there is more to goodness in both instances. 
Beyond the necessary condition is a requirement of signifi-
cance that cannot be understood in terms of some projected 
ideal—completed science, a Theory of Everything, or an ideal 
atlas. Recognizing that the ideal atlas is a myth, I hope to have 
provoked concerns about the analogue for inquiry generally. A 
rival vision proposes that what counts as significant science 
must be understood in the context of a particular group with 
particular practical interests and with a particular history.45, 46 
                                                           
42 See Kitcher (2001) and Bishop and Trout (2005). 
43 Cf. Giere (1999). 
44 Kitcher (2001, p. 59). 
45 Kitcher (2001, p. 61). 
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Kitcher proceeds to give an account of the source of significance 
through a discussion of (a) the mechanisms by which we deem certain 
items—such as questions, answers, claims, hypotheses, apparatuses, 
methods, etc.—as significant and (b) how significance, furthermore, 
may flow via the interconnections of such items. He suggests that the 
best way to illustrate the workings of these mechanisms is through 
significance graphs, where the items are represented as nodes connected 
by arrows, signifying the inheritance of significance.47 Such signifi-
cance graphs thus provide a sketch of the interdependence of differ-
ent items for a specified field of inquiry with regard to their signifi-
cance. However, an important question remains: Is there any room 
for not only talking about what people do find significant—as brought 
out through such graphs—but also what they should find significant? 
To answer this question we need to look into not only how 
desires and interests serve to mark certain items as significant, but also 
how certain items may deserve that mark better than others. Focusing 
on the significance of problems and questions, the latter issue has 
been addressed lately by Bishop and Trout in the form of what they 
                                                                                                               
46 Similarly, J. L. Borges (1999) writes, in his one-paragraph short story titled 
“Of the Exactitude of Science,” about a fictional empire in which “the Art of 
Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occu-
pied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Prov-
ince. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartog-
raphers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Em-
pire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, 
who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had 
been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness 
was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the 
Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhab-
ited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the 
Disciplines of Geography.” 
47 See Kitcher (2001, p. 78). 
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refer to as “the thin-thick problem.”48 This problem arises out of the 
challenge to identify a notion of significance that is thick enough to 
exclude the “significance” resulting from powerful but clearly deviant 
desires to answer certain questions (say, pertaining to the measure-
ment of one’s thumbnail every five seconds), yet thin enough to allow 
for substantial interpersonal differences. Focusing on the significance 
of problems, they suggest that 
 
[…] the significance of a problem for S is a function of the 
weight of the objective reasons S has for devoting resources to 
solving that problem.49 
 
As for the specific nature of such objective reasons, Bishop and Trout 
claim that some reasons (for example the ones arising out of basic 
moral obligations) simply are universal, while others (such as those 
arising out of one’s social or professional obligations), clearly, may 
vary from person to person. The ultimate determining factor of sig-
nificance, however, is conduciveness to human well-being, where both 
well-being and the conditions that are conducive to it are open to 
empirical investigation. More specifically, I interpret them as claiming 
that 
 
the objective weight of S’s epistemic reasons is, ultimately, a 
function of the extent to which solving the problem is condu-
cive to S’s well-being.50 
 
Before drawing out the implications for the discussion at hand, let us 
recapitulate: We have established that we value truth (which is not to 
say that we value all truths equally) and, moreover, have reason to do 
so given that we have any desires at all, since true belief happens to be 
                                                           
48 See Bishop and Trout (2005). 
49 Bishop and Trout (2005, p. 95; emphasis removed from all words but one). 
50 This is my formulation/reconstruction, not a quote. See Bishop and Trout 
(2005, p. 99).  
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a good means to satisfy our desires and needs. This, furthermore, 
seems to be mirrored in the fact that we value truths to the extent that 
they pertain to questions we want to answer, issues we want to ad-
dress, etc. And since the latter may very well vary between persons, 
cultures, etc., only a particular subset of truths (and, consequently, 
questions, answers, issues, etc.) is deemed significant—i.e., worthy of 
our pursuit given limited time and resources. Given that some basic 
desires and needs are constant across persons and cultures, however, 
we have reason to expect that there will be an overlap between such 
sets, although there will, most likely, also be some quite substantial 
inter-personal differences, since some desires and needs, clearly, arise 
out of—and, hence, are dependent upon—highly contextual factors 
(such as who you are, where you are, what you are doing, etc.). 
This is exactly what gave rise to the thin-thick problem and I 
am sympathetic to Bishop and Trout’s attempt to tackle it by recourse 
to objective reasons. I am also sympathetic to their idea that a phi-
losophical theory of significance, when considered in isolation, must 
be incomplete since it needs to incorporate direct empirical investiga-
tion of what people desire and what is conducive to satisfying these 
desires, as well as the extent to which people’s predictions of the 
impact of future events on the satisfaction of their desires are accu-
rate.51  
However, I am more skeptical as to their attempt to construct 
a normative notion of significance by invoking human well-being. As 
Bishop and Trout rightly notes, there is quite strong evidence indicat-
ing that what ultimately contributes to the well-being and happiness 
of people are such things as health, deep social attachments, personal 
security, and the pursuit of meaningful projects,52 and, furthermore, 
that certain economic, social and political institutions have a system-
atic and adjustable effect on the creation of happy people.53 And this 
is relevant to epistemic inquiry and epistemology to the extent that any 
                                                           
51 See, e.g., Gilbert et al. (2002). 
52 See, e.g., Diener and Seligman (2002). 
53 See Diener (2000), Diener and Oishi 2000), and Frey and Stutzer (2002). 
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intellectual inquiry reasonably should strive to facilitate—or at the 
very least not counteract—the creation of conditions under which well-
being is maximized. 
My skepticism about the posited connection between signifi-
cance and human well-being can be summed up in two points: (a) 
Considerations regarding human well-being does not seem to track 
very well the issues we should consider significant, and (b) there is a 
more straightforward way to solve the problem that does not rob 
perfectly notable issues of their significance. As for the first point: 
The truths that we should consider significant and the truths the 
knowing of which is conducive to human well-being are not as inti-
mately connected as Bishop and Trout seem to assume. In particular, 
I take it that there are substantial sets of truths, questions, problems, 
etc., that are, at best, connected to the promotion of human well-
being in a very indirect way, but that still seem to be perfectly signifi-
cant. Several good examples may be found among the truths, ques-
tions, and problems pertaining to certain foundational issues in 
mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics. Is it always possible to 
find, somewhere in the infinity of integers, a progression of any length 
of equally spaced prime numbers? Are there three, four or eleven 
dimensions to our universe? Are there non-physical substances? Does 
space and time consist of gunky or continuous, extensionless points? 
It is not clear to me that any of these questions may be related to 
questions of human-well being, nor why that ought to imply that they 
should not be considered significant. 
This brings us to my second point: There is an alternative way 
to solve the thin-thick problem that does not rob what seem to be 
perfectly notable problems and questions of their significance. Con-
sider the following slightly altered version of Bishop and Trout’s 
suggestion: 
 
The epistemic significance of a problem for S is a function of the 
weight of the objective epistemic reasons S has for devoting re-
sources to solving that problem, where the objective weight of 
S’s epistemic reasons is a function of the extent to which solv-
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ing the problem is conducive to addressing S’s interests and 
satisfying her desires. 
 
The fact that the objective weights are tied to and vary with S’s con-
tingent interests and desires serves to make our notion of significance 
thin enough to both allow for inter-personal differences and acknowl-
edge the fact that epistemic significance is intimately connected to 
practical ends and needs as well as social setting. However, it is, as it 
stands, not thick enough to rule out clearly deviant interests and de-
sires as fully legitimate sources of significance. Unlike Bishop and 
Trout, however, I will not thicken the suggestion by reference to what 
people ought or ought not to do in relation to the production of 
conditions conducive to human well-being, but rather with reference 
to what people, as a matter of empirical fact, tend to do. Hence, 
Kitcher, when discussing how significance enters into significance 
graphs in the first place, or what he calls the “ultimate source of sig-
nificance”: 
 
Partly as the result of our having the capacities we do, partly 
because of the cultures in which we develop, some aspects of 
nature strike us as particularly salient or surprising. In conse-
quence we pose broad questions, and epistemic significance 
flows into the sciences from these. 54  
 
Kitcher continues: 
 
Human beings vary, of course, with respect to the ways in 
which they express surprise and curiosity. Some are disposed 
to ask more, others less. Typically, we respond to the diversity 
with tolerance, explaining some of the variation in terms of 
difference in cultural or educational context. But tolerance has 
its limits, and we do count some of our fellows as pathological, 
either because they obsess about trifles or because they are 
                                                           
54 Kitcher (2001, p. 81). 
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completely dull. In claiming that the sciences ultimately obtain 
their epistemic significance from the broad questions that ex-
press natural human curiosity, I am drawing on this practice of 
limited tolerance, on our conception of “healthy curiosity” and 
the commonplace thought that most of us, given minimal ex-
planation, would find interesting the global questions that 
stand at the peripheries of significance graphs.55 
 
So, in short, the claim is that most people are subject to a healthy 
curiosity and, hence, desire to know certain truths (address certain 
questions, solve certain problems, etc.) rather than others. Further-
more, this picture of man as subject to a healthy curiosity suggests 
that there, as a matter of empirical fact, is a non-negligible overlap 
when it comes to what people take to be significant, and that certain 
truths are (at least at a fairly basic level) quite consistently deemed 
significant. This serves as a contingent restriction not upon what 
people can consider significant (which, as far as the definition above is 
concerned, may vary without constraint), but upon what people actu-
ally do consider epistemically significant, as a result of the healthy 
curiosity that most of us are subject to and that drives us towards 
certain questions, truths and issues rather than others—be it within 
ornithology, public policy, or foundational natural science. 
This, however, does not imply that there is no room for 
normative judgments on the part of the epistemologist as to the 
extent to which subjects assign proper weights to their reasons for 
deeming something significant. Since such weights, on this account, 
are directly tied to interests and desires, the extent to which solving 
certain problems actually are conducive to the addressing of interests 
or satisfaction of desires is perfectly open to empirical investigation. 
At this level of analysis, however, the objective is not to deliver 
hands-on prescriptive advice but rather to provide a framework in 
which such prescription can be made in a coherent and productive 
way, all in the service of facilitating our various pursuits. This brings 
us back to where we started: Apart from describing and evaluating 
                                                           
55 Kitcher (2001, p. 81). 
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where we started: Apart from describing and evaluating epistemic 
concepts from an abstract epistemic perspective, epistemology should 
also involve an ameliorative component, corresponding to the task of 
actively improving epistemic concepts as they figure in epistemic 
norms, in an effort to promote the satisfaction of epistemic desiderata 
pertaining to the naturalistic settings of real-world truth-seeking in-
quiry. Furthermore, and if there is any truth to what has just been 
argued, the following reformulated desiderata should play a pivotal 
role in this potentially revisionary task: 
 
(D1*)  As far as significant truths go, it is now the case that our 
beliefs are true. 
 
(D2*)  We attain and maintain true beliefs about significant 
matters. 
 
To recapitulate, my disagreement with Bishop and Trout regarding 
the proper way to construe significance is over whether significance 
ultimately should be tied to human well-being or to whatever we 
happen to find interesting, as a result of our contingent wants and 
desires. Against the background of Kitcher’s notion of healthy curios-
ity, and the underlying empirical assumption that there is a substantial 
overlap in wants, desires and, as a result, the issues that we tend to 
find significant, I opted for the latter alternative. The virtue of this 
approach is that it enables us to solve the thin-thick problem by al-
lowing for interpersonal differences as well as normative evaluation 
and rectification to the extent to which something, as a matter of fact, 
is not conducive to satisfying our interests and desires, without having 
to rob what seems to be perfectly notable issues—e.g., foundational 
issues in mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics—of their 
significance just because they may turn out to be unrelated to issues 
of human well-being. 
Having thus spelled out the notions of CPA, significance, as 
well as a relevant set of epistemic desiderata, the following sums up 
the ameliorative component of epistemological methodology: 
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The Ameliorative Component 
Evaluation:  For any ‘F,’ identify the purpose of ‘F’ via CPA, 
including the specific role that ‘F’ is supposed 
to play in relation to the domain general desid-
erata (D1*) and (D2*). Then, evaluate the ex-
tent to which ‘F’—as unveiled through Meaning 
Analysis—could be refined or reconstructed so 
as to fulfill its purpose to a greater degree. 
Improvement:  To the extent that ‘F’ could be refined or recon-
structed so as to fulfill its purpose to a greater 
degree, refine or reconstruct ‘F’ accordingly. 
 
Due to its commitment to such an emendation-oriented approach, I 
will refer to the kind of analysis worked out here—that is, the descrip-
tive and ameliorative components taken together—as constructive analy-
sis. The term is chosen because of the dual fact that constructive 
analysis is designed to (a) enable not only the refinement but also the 
reconstruction of epistemic concepts to the extent that they do not mesh 
with the relevant desiderata, as well as to, thereby, (b) serve a useful 
purpose for actual epistemic inquiry in naturalistic settings.56 
 
 
4.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that epistemological methodology is best 
viewed as consisting of two components: a descriptive and an amelio-
rative. The former comprises two sub-components and resembles 
DCA in that it starts out with conceptual elucidation, and PCA in not 
working with neat conditions, but differs from both in not being 
aimed at providing exhaustive accounts of our epistemic concepts. 
Instead, the conceptual elucidation merely serves to facilitates the 
identification of a set of paradigmatic instances through what I called 
                                                           
56 In these respects, constructive analysis bears some similarity to Rudolph 
Carnap’s notion of explication. See Carnap (1950). 
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Meaning Analysis, providing the material for the second sub-
component: an empirical aggregation of the properties characterizing 
the referent. 
As we saw in chapter 3, this can not be all there is to episte-
mological analysis, which brings us to the second and ameliorative 
component, concerned with an evaluation of the extent to which our 
conceptual apparatus serves the purposes implicit in the norms and 
goals in relation to which it figures, and an improvement of it to the 
extent that it does not. I ventured to suggest that what I call Concep-
tual Purpose Analysis would do a better job than traditional concep-
tual analysis here, by focusing not so much on the exact make up of 
concepts as on the situations in which those concepts are used and, in 
particular, what such situations and use reveal about the purposes of 
our concepts and how they could be improved to serve their purposes 
better.57 
Taken together, I referred to these two methodological com-
ponents—the descriptive and the ameliorative—as constructive analysis, 
a term alluding to the idea that such analysis will not only enable us to 
refine as well as (re)construct new concepts that serve us better, but 
also serve a useful purpose for actual epistemic inquiry. Still, the proof 
is in the pudding. So, in order to fill in the gaps of this still quite ab-
stract framework, as well as demonstrate it in action, I will now turn 
to a constructive analysis of an epistemic concept that has received a 
lot of attention within epistemology of late: epistemic justification. 
                                                           
57 See Weinberg (2006) and Craig (1990). 
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Chapter 5. 
Justification and Epistemic Duties 
 
 
 
We now have a framework for constructive analysis and the task of 
this part of the study is to put this framework to work. Starting with 
this chapter, I will implement it in an analysis of epistemic justification—a 
phenomenon that has been subject to a lot of epistemological scrutiny 
ever since the publication of Gettier’s critique of the classical tripartite 
analysis of knowledge.1 However, for reasons discussed in chapter 3, I 
will not assume that there is such a thing as “our” concept of justifica-
tion. Instead, I will focus on the rich variety of analyses that have 
been delivered over the years and, in an attempt to identify our sub-
ject matter, start by pulling out two inter-related themes. The first 
one, which will be discussed in this chapter, pertains to deontologism, 
i.e., the idea that to be justified consists in having fulfilled one’s epis-
temic duties and obligations. The second one—a view I will refer to 
as introspection-based access internalism and that will be discussed in the 
next chapter—pertains to the idea that to be justified consists in hav-
ing paid due attention to one’s reasons by way of introspection. 
                                                           
1 See Gettier (1963). 
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When turning to the process of aggregation, i.e., the spelling 
out of the actual ontological commitments and empirical conse-
quences of these two views, both suggestions will be shown to be 
problematic in rendering the corresponding concept of justification 
largely ineffective in the pursuit of our epistemic goals. More specifi-
cally, deontologism fails due to an implausible commitment to the 
idea that we have voluntary control over the formation of our beliefs, 
while introspection-based access internalism fails because of an 
overtly optimistic view of our introspective capabilities.  
 
 
5.1. DEONTOLOGISM AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL GUIDANCE 
Epistemological deontologism is the idea that epistemic terms are best 
understood in terms of epistemic duties and obligations (I will use 
two interchangeably). As it happens, Alvin Plantinga has persuasively 
argued that epistemologists have traditionally thought about justifica-
tion in deontological terms—at least if we let the tradition be defined 
by such philosophers as John Locke and René Descartes.2 Hence, we 
find Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding talking about 
our “duty as a rational creature” and saying that 
 
He that believes, without having any reason for believing, may 
be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he 
ought, nor pays the obedience due his maker, who would have 
him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep 
him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best 
of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the 
right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of 
the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This 
at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever 
mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light and 
faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth, by those 
helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as 
                                                           
2 See Plantinga (1990). See also Alston (2005). 
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a rational creature, that though he should miss truth, he will not miss the 
reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and places it as he 
should, who in any case or matter whatsoever, believes or dis-
believes, according as reason directs him. He that does other-
wise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those fac-
ulties, which were given him […]3 
 
In other words, a sincere pursuer of truth, who makes responsible use 
of the epistemic faculties that God has endowed her with, is not to 
blame if she does not get at the truth. A person who believes without 
reasons, however, and that does not pursue truth in the responsible 
way God intended her to, may come upon the truth by accident ever 
so often, but is nevertheless accountable for her epistemically indolent 
ways. 
No more than 50 years back in time from Locke’s publication 
of Essay, we find another founding father of western epistemology, 
René Descartes, and his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes claims 
that God has bestowed us with a free will, but since “the scope of the 
will is wider than that of the intellect”4 it is possible for us, as finite 
human beings, to go intellectually astray. However, God is not to 
blame for this. It is, as Descartes puts it, “undoubtedly an imperfec-
tion in me to misuse [my] freedom and make judgments about mat-
ters which I do not fully understand.”5 Although Descartes is not as 
explicit as Locke about the element of duty here, he writes: 
 
If […] I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases 
where I do not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and 
distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and 
avoiding error. But if in such cases I either affirm or deny, 
then I am not using my free will correctly. If I go for the alter-
native which is false, then obviously I shall be in error; if I take 
                                                           
3 Locke (1996, book IV, chapter xvii, 24; my emphasis). 
4 Descartes (1988b, p. 102; AT VII 58). 
5 Descartes (1988b, p. 104; AT VII 61). 
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the other side, then it is by pure chance that I arrive at the 
truth, and I shall still be at fault [alternative translation: and I do 
not escape the blame of misusing my freedom] since it is clear 
by the natural light that the perception of the intellect should 
always precede the determination of the will. In this incorrect 
use of free will may be found the privation which constitutes 
the essence of error.6 
 
More recently, we find Roderick Chisholm—one of the 20th century’s 
most prominent epistemologists—defining justification in terms of 
the relation “more reasonable than,” and suggesting that 
 
We may assume that every person is subject to a purely intel-
lectual requirement—that of trying his best to bring it about 
that for every proposition h that he considers, he accepts h if 
and only if h is true. One might say that this is the person’s re-
sponsibility or duty qua intellectual being […] One way, then, 
of re-expressing the locution ‘p is more reasonable than q for S 
at t’ [where ‘p’ and ‘q’ range over doxastic attitudes, not propo-
sitions] is to say this: ‘S is so situated at t that his intellectual 
requirement, his responsibility as an intellectual being, is better 
fulfilled by p than by q.”7  
 
So, the common denominator in the works of Locke, Descartes, and 
Chisholm is an idea that justification pertains to the fulfillment of 
epistemic duties—an idea that we, in the language of Meaning Analy-
sis, may sum up in the following stereotype: 
 
Epistemological Deontologism 
That S is epistemically justified in believing that p means that S 
has fulfilled her epistemic duties in forming her belief that p. 
                                                           
6 Descartes (1988b, p. 103; AT VII 59-60). Alternative translation from Des-
cartes (1955, p. 176) 
7 Chisholm (1977, p. 14). 
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Henceforth, I will often leave the qualifier “epistemic” implicit when 
talking about epistemic duties.  
Now, as has been noted by Alvin Goldman, this conception of 
justification has, historically, been paired with an idea to the effect 
that “one central aim of epistemology is to guide or direct our intel-
lectual conduct.”8 Or, as Kornblith has put the point more recently: 
 
[…] a historically important motivation for engaging in epis-
temological theorizing, and, indeed, more than this, a philoso-
phically important motivation for engaging in epistemological 
theorizing, is the idea that an adequate epistemological theory 
would guide the concerned epistemic agent in the conduct of 
inquiry. We are interested in epistemology precisely because 
we desire to improve our epistemic performance; an adequate 
epistemology ought to tell us how to achieve such improve-
ment.9 
 
More specifically, we are dealing with what I will refer to as the Guid-
ance Conception of Epistemology, an idea that may be summed up in the 
following thesis: 
 
The Guidance Conception of Epistemology (GC) 
The main epistemological desideratum is to guide epistemic in-
quiry, in providing means for epistemic inquirers to fulfill their 
desiderata. 
 
As above, a desideratum is a specification of conditions constitutive 
or conducive to a certain goal (or set of goals). Hence, an epistemological 
desideratum is a specification of conditions under which a certain 
epistemological goal is met. On the guidance conception, one central and 
important goal for epistemology is to guide epistemic inquirers—an 
                                                           
8 Goldman (1999, p. 272). 
9 Kornblith (2001, pp. 242-243). 
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approach in the tradition of Descartes and his Rules for the Direction of 
our Native Intelligence.10 Hence, anything constitutive or conducive to 
that goal (such as, say, formulating plausible action-guiding norms for 
epistemic agents to follow) is an epistemological desideratum.  
Not surprisingly, a commitment to GC has implications for 
the kind of epistemological work that is taken to be worthwhile, per-
haps even for what is taken to be legitimate instances of epistemology. 
Returning to the issue of justification, we find Mark Kaplan arguing 
against “a vision of a pure theory of justification, separated from all 
that would make it methodologically potent, cleansed of the concerns 
proper to the realm of the ordinary.”11 He continues: 
 
The problem is that a theory of justification thus purified, a 
theory of justification deprived of any role in methodology or 
the conduct of inquiry and criticism, is a theory that divorces 
epistemology from the very practices that furnish it with its 
only source of intuitive constraint. It is epistemology on holi-
day.12 
 
In light of what was argued in the previous part of this study, Kap-
lan’s talk about “intuitive constraint” is potentially misleading. It is 
important that we separate the issue of the role of categorization 
intuitions in the construction of philosophical theories of justification 
from that of grounding epistemology in actual epistemic practice. We 
are here concerned with the latter. According to Kaplan, epistemology 
removed from regulative concerns reduces to “an exercise in pure 
stipulation.”13 Even though he does not explicitly say that “episte-
mology on holiday” is illegitimate, it is fairly clear that he considers it 
to be less legitimate than the kind of epistemology—according to 
Kaplan, stemming from “a noble tradition […] exemplified in the 
                                                           
10 See Descartes (1988a; AT X 359-435). 
11 Kaplan (1991, p. 154). 
12 Kaplan (1991, p. 154). 
13 Kaplan (1991, p. 148). 
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seventeenth century by Descartes [and] in the first half of our own 
century by the authors of logical empiricism”—that remains at work 
and “seeks to clarify, to criticize, to improve the conduct of inquiry 
and criticism,” and constructs theories that “confront deep methodo-
logical issues and evaluate the way in which inquiry is properly to be 
conducted.”14 
This idea of epistemology as an essentially guidance directed 
endeavor may be linked up with Deontologism in such a way that, if 
Deontologism holds and justification is (merely) a matter of fulfilling 
certain epistemic duties, then a central desideratum for epistemic 
inquiry is to answer the following question: 
 
(Q1) How do I, qua epistemic agent, act in accordance with my 
epistemic duties? 
 
However, in order to answer (Q1), we first need to know what our 
epistemic duties are. Consequently, attempts to spell what our epis-
temic duties consist in—be it to believe in accordance with one’s 
evidence, God’s will, or whatever the relevant factor turns out to be—
will serve to guide our epistemic pursuits. Hence, the connection 
between Deontologism and GC. 
Before at all attempting to spell out what these duties consist 
in, however, we need to get clearer on what it is to have a duty in the 
first place. As will be demonstrated below, the duties of Deontolo-
gism is best understood in terms of the following ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ 
principle: 
 
(OC)  You can only have an epistemic duty to believe some-
thing if you have the ability to chose voluntarily 
whether or not to form a belief in accordance with that 
duty. 
 
                                                           
14 Kaplan (1991, p. 154). 
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As I will now show (while not claiming that I am the first to do so), 
Deontologism construed along the lines of (OC), or what I will refer 
to as Strong Deontologism, constitutes an untenable position. In §5.4 I 
will also discuss and reject an attempt to defend what I will refer to as 
Weak Deontologism—a position that tries to evade the problems of 
Strong Deontologism by relinquishing (OC). I will thus reject both takes 
on Deontologism and, in want of a more plausible construal, con-
clude that justification should not be understood in terms of epis-
temic duties. 
 
 
5.2. STRONG DEONTOLOGISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VOLUNTARISM 
What is fundamentally puzzling about understanding justification 
along deontological lines is that such talk seems to imply that what is 
being evaluated is subject to voluntary control. Hence, Kornblith: 
 
If I can’t be heard in the back of the room when I’m present-
ing a paper at a conference, then I may be criticized for not 
having spoken louder: I should have spoken louder, it will be 
said, and rightly so. I am criticizable here, it seems, because I 
could have spoken louder but didn’t; how loud I speak is sub-
ject to my voluntary control. But […] believing surely seems 
different here. I don’t have voluntary control over my beliefs. 
Although I can simply decide to speak louder, I can’t simply 
decide to believe or disbelieve.15 
 
More specifically, the main objection to spelling out JUSTIFICATION in 
deontological terms is that doing so commits us to an implausible 
form of doxastic voluntarism—a thesis according to which we have 
voluntary control over our belief-forming processes in the specific 
sense that we may decide their outputs.16 Roderick Chisholm—who, 
as we saw above, defends a deontological construal of justification—
                                                           
15 Kornblith (2001, p. 231). 
16 See, e.g., Alston (2005), for a recent statement of this objection. 
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does, indeed, frequently talk about accepting, disbelieving, suspend-
ing, and withholding judgment on propositions.17 However, it is sim-
ply false, the objection goes, for a large and important class of be-
liefs—most pertinently perceptual beliefs—that we are able to exert 
such an influence on which beliefs we form.18 Hence, since most of 
us are inclined to think that at least some of our perceptual beliefs are 
justified (or, at the very least, can be justified), we conclude, by way of 
a reductio, that justification does not pertain to epistemic duties—i.e., 
we reject the deontological construal of justification.  
Let us look at this argument in more detail and start with the 
deontological claim from the previous section: 
 
(5.2.1)  That S is epistemically justified in believing that p is 
(only) a matter of fulfilling certain epistemic duties in 
forming her belief that p. 
 
Now, consider the following. Sitting in bed, looking to the right at my 
fiancé working by her computer, I simply cannot help believing that 
she is sitting right there, typing away. It is, in a sense, not up to me 
whether or not to subscribe to the belief in question—it almost seems 
to force itself upon me. This becomes even more obvious if we con-
sider a more dramatic scenario where I am about to get hit by a bus: I 
certainly do not decide to believe that there is a bus coming danger-
ously close to me. The belief is just there, regardless of whether I 
want it to be or not. And even though this vivid and unyielding char-
acter certainly is no unique mark for perceptual beliefs—surely, my 
memory based belief that there is a street outside my window and a 
car in the driveway may strike me as almost as hard to voluntarily 
form or give up—these qualities are, undoubtedly, the most obvious 
in the case of perceptual beliefs. 
                                                           
17 See, e.g., Chisholm (1977, p. 6). 
18 In the following, I will focus on the forming of beliefs and leave out the 
maintaining of beliefs since the reader easily can draw out the analogues 
herself. 
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In other words, it seems to be the case that, 
 
(5.2.2)  as a matter of empirical fact, we do not have the abil-
ity to voluntarily form or refrain from forming the 
perceptual beliefs we, in fact, form. 
 
Again, it might be that the same goes for other, non-perceptual kinds 
of belief too but let us focus on perceptual beliefs for now and, in 
particular, the consequence that 
 
(5.2.3)  we are not able to choose whether or not to form be-
liefs in accordance with the epistemic duties that 
(presumably) pertain to perceptual beliefs. 
 
Now, consider the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle introduced above: 
 
(OC) You can only have an epistemic duty to believe some-
thing if you have the ability to chose voluntarily 
whether or not to form a belief in accordance with that 
duty.19 
 
The reasons to assume (OC) in the present context are best brought 
out by comparing it to a slightly weaker version:  
 
                                                           
19 This kind of principle is sometimes referred to as a principle of alternate possi-
bilities. If the reader is worried by Harry Frankfurt’s (1969) counter-
examples—launched at the classical principle of alternate possibility in eth-
ics—in terms of circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid 
performing an action, without those circumstances in any way bringing about 
that he performs that action, she may use the following formulation instead: 
You can only have an epistemic duty to believe something if it is not the case 
that you believe that something because you could not have believed otherwise. 
Using this formulation would not alter any of the points I will be making. 
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(OC*) You can only have an epistemic duty to believe some-
thing if you have the ability to chose voluntarily to 
form a belief in accordance with that duty. 
 
As it turns out, (OC*) is too weak and for the following reason: On 
(OC*), every belief you, in fact, end up with—regardless of whether 
you did it as a result of compulsion or the exercise of will—will be let 
into the dimension of deontological evaluation for the trivial reason 
that you always have the “ability” to believe what you, in fact, end up 
believing. However, it might be reasonably argued that having an 
epistemic duty does not merely involve having the ability to believe 
(or not believe) what we, in fact, end up believing (or not believing), 
but also the ability to believe otherwise. That is, if we are to evaluate 
beliefs epistemically along a deontological dimension, it must be the 
case that we actually could have chosen to believe other propositions than 
the ones we, in fact, ended up believing—which is captured by (OC) 
but not by (OC*). 
To see this point clearer, consider the following example: As-
sume that we have a duty to never believe a falsehood. (This is clearly 
too demanding and unrealistic a requirement but it will still serve to 
prove the point.) How could one fulfill this requirement? One way to 
do it would be to not believe anything. Another way would be to only 
believe propositions that are proved to be true. While the former is 
clearly undesirable, the latter is absurdly unrealistic (and both proba-
bly even empirically impossible) but let us disregard this and instead 
focus on the question: Under what conditions could an epistemic 
agent at all be said to be subject to such a duty? 
A not too unreasonable idea here is that an epistemic agent 
could only be subject to such a duty if she could, in fact, either (a) 
abstain from believing anything at all, or (b) chose to believe not only 
what she is able to prove but also to believe otherwise, even in light of 
such proofs. The qualification in terms of “even in light of such 
proofs” is important here since we do not want it to be the case that 
proofs would automatically lead her to believe the proved proposition 
(in which case she would merely satisfy the necessary condition stated 
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in (OC*)) but that the decision to believe what is proved is just that—
a decision. I take it that this very idea is properly mirrored by (OC). 
Returning the argument, we may infer the following from 
(5.2.3) and (OC): 
 
(5.2.4) We do not have any duties in forming perceptual be-
liefs. 
 
So, if (5.2.1) holds and JUSTIFICATION, indeed, is a deontological 
notion, our conclusion will have to be that 
 
(5.2.5)  our concept of justification is inapplicable to perceptual 
beliefs. 
 
Note that JUSTIFICATION being inapplicable to perceptual beliefs does 
not imply that our perceptual beliefs are unjustified—only that they are 
non-justified. A belief is unjustified if it could have been justified but is 
not, while a belief is non-justified if the concept of justification does 
not apply to it in the way that the concept of righteousness or pride 
does not apply to a hat or a wooden box. That is, it is not just that the 
objects in question happen to not fall within the extension of the con-
cept in this particular instance—they could not fall within its extension 
(barring metaphorical extension or substantial conceptual reconstruc-
tion).  
So, what are we to make of this argument? One way to look at 
it is as a reductio, and since most epistemologists take (OC) to be a 
plausible principle and do not want to deny that our perceptual beliefs 
can be justified, (5.2.1)—i.e., the very idea that justification should be 
construed in deontological terms—is usually considered the odd man 
out. At this point, it is, of course, possible for the deontologist to 
simply bite the bullet, accept (5.2.5), and deny that talk about being 
justified applies to perceptual beliefs. However, as has been argued by 
Alston (among others), perceptual beliefs are in no way unique in not 
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being subject to any voluntary control on part of the believer.20 Other 
examples that come to mind are beliefs resulting from memory and 
introspection. In fact, Alston goes so far as to claim that “no one ever 
acquires a belief at will”21 and challenges the reader to try for herself: 
 
Can you, at this moment, start to believe that the Roman Em-
pire is still in control of Western Europe, just by deciding to 
do so? If you find it incredible that you should be sufficiently 
motivated to even try to believe this, suppose that someone 
offers you $500 million to believe it, and that you are much 
more interested in the money than in believing the truth. 
Could you do what it takes to get that reward? Remember that 
we are speaking of believing at will. No doubt, there are things 
you could do that would increase the probability of your be-
lieving this [but] [c]an you switch propositional attitudes to-
ward that proposition just by deciding to do so? It seems clear 
to me that I have no such power. Volitions, decision, or 
choosings don’t hook up with propositional attitude inaugura-
tions, just as they don’t hook up with the secretion of gastric 
juices or with metabolism.22 
 
In other words, it seems plausible to assume that an argument analo-
gous to (5.2.1) through (5.2.5) may be constructed for other, non-
perceptual beliefs, mutatis mutandis, with the consequence that the 
domain of beliefs that may be held justifiably on a deontological con-
strual keeps shrinking to the point where Strong Deontologism becomes 
nothing short of implausible. 
 
 
                                                           
20 See Alston (2005). 
21 Alston (2005, p. 67). 
22 Alston (2005, p. 63). 
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5.3. INDIRECT CONTROL OVER BELIEF 
At this point, the deontologist may object that the aforementioned 
argument presupposes a far too strong reading of “voluntary control,” 
and that it is possible to defend deontologism about justification by 
recourse to a more plausible and realistic reading. More specifically, it 
might be objected that we have been assuming that deontologism 
requires direct control over our belief-forming processes, while it is, in 
fact, sufficient that we have indirect control or influence over the be-
liefs that we form.  
Before evaluating the plausibility of such a claim, we need to 
get clearer on the taxonomy. Having direct voluntary control implies being 
able to bring about the object of control by a mere act of will, inten-
tion or volition. This is the kind of control we might have over mental 
imagery—i.e., our ability to bring about mental pictures—but that the 
previous section denied that we have over our belief-forming proc-
esses. However, there are other forms of control, most pertinently 
various forms of indirect voluntary control, located on a continuum of 
decreasingly direct control. For example, certain things may be 
brought about not by a direct act of will, but by way of a chain of 
events, making up a single, uninterrupted act. This is the sense in 
which the opening of my door or the adjustment of the temperature 
in my office is within my voluntary control; while I may not be able to 
open the door or alter the temperature merely by an act of will, the 
opening of the door and altering of the temperature is nevertheless 
within my (indirect) voluntary control, by virtue of the fact that I can 
bring about the necessary chain of events by walking across the room 
and opening the door, or turning the knob on the thermostat. 
Even further out on the continuum of indirect voluntary con-
trol are the kinds of acts that may not constitute single, uninterrupted 
acts, like walking over and opening a door or turning a knob, but 
rather a series of inter-related actions spread out over an extended 
period of time. This is the sense in which looking for more evidence, 
taking steps to engage in more thorough consideration and weighing 
of evidence, and deliberating over how to direct my inquiry in a more 
strategic manner is within my (long-range) voluntary control. This is 
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also the kind of control Chisholm seems to be getting at in the follow-
ing passage: 
 
If self-control is what is essential to activity, some of our be-
liefs, our believings, would seem to be acts. When a man de-
liberates and comes finally to a conclusion, his decision is as 
much within his control as is any other deed we attribute to 
him. If his conclusion was unreasonable, a conclusion he 
should not have accepted, we may plead with him: “But you 
needn’t have supposed that so-and-so was true. Why didn’t 
you take account of these other facts?” We assume that his de-
cision is one he could have avoided and that, had he only cho-
sen to do so, he could have made a more reasonable inference. 
Or, if his conclusion is not the result of a deliberate inference, 
we may say, “But if you had only stopped to think”, implying 
that, had he chosen, he could have stopped to think. We sup-
pose, as we do whenever we apply our ethical or moral predi-
cates, that there was something else the agent could have done 
instead.23  
 
As pointed out by Alston, however, this attempt to frame doxastic 
voluntarism in terms of indirect voluntary control suffers from a 
problem, namely that of failing to acknowledge the distinction be-
tween doing C to voluntarily bring about an E, and doing C to volun-
tarily bring about a definite E. Clearly, while whether or not I look out 
my window to see if it is sunny may be within my voluntary control, 
whether or not I believe what I see when I look out is not. The same 
goes for looking for evidence, and other inquiry related activities: 
 
In order that the phenomenon of looking for more evidence 
would show that we have voluntary control over propositional 
attitudes, it would have to be the case that the search for evi-
dence was undertaken with the intention of taking up a certain 
                                                           
23 Chisholm (1968, p. 224). 
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attitude toward a specific proposition. For only in that case 
would it have any tendency to show that we have exercised 
voluntary control over what proposition attitude we come to 
have.24 
 
In other words, the fact that we do have voluntary control over many 
of our actions that might give rise to beliefs, does not show that we 
have voluntary control over what beliefs we form as a result of those 
actions. The same goes for various forms of indirect voluntary influence—
a kind of influence even further out on the continuum of decreasing 
directness—where we may take steps that either bring to bear on (a) 
candidates for belief or (b) our general belief-forming habits and ten-
dencies. Indeed, as the final chapter of the present study argues, there 
are quite a few things we may do to alter our belief-forming habits in 
ways that that would improve our chances to reason successfully, i.e., 
to reason in a way that will tend to give us true beliefs in significant 
matters. However, this does not show that doxastic voluntarism is true, 
i.e., that we may voluntarily choose what to believe, as in what specific 
proposition to believe, anymore than our ability to open our eyes and 
look out a window on a sunny day shows that we may choose 
whether or not to believe that the sun is shining. 
 
 
5.4. WEAK DEONTOLOGISM AND ROLE OUGHTS 
In light of this, the most natural response available to the deontologist 
is to deny (OC). I will now argue that material for such a move can be 
found in two papers by Richard Feldman, although it should be 
pointed out that Feldman merely sets out to defend the claim that 
deontological judgments are sometimes true, without committing 
himself to the idea that justification should be understood in deon-
tological terms.25 Nevertheless, a defense of what I will refer to as 
Weak Deontologism—i.e., a reading of Deontologism that relinquishes 
                                                           
24 Alston (2005, p. 70; emphasis in original). 
25 See Feldman (2000, 2001). 
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(OC)—may utilize some of his arguments, and it is the purpose of 
this section to evaluate the prospects of doing so. 
Now, the argument Feldman sets out to address is the follow-
ing: 
 
(5.4.1)  If deontological judgments about beliefs are true, 
then people have voluntary control over their beliefs. 
(5.4.2)  People do not have voluntary control over their be-
liefs, hence 
(5.4.3)  Deontological judgments about beliefs are not true. 
 
If the applicability of deontological judgments is understood in rela-
tion to (OC), the argument goes through—at least if what was argued 
in the previous section is correct. So, an obvious alternative strategy is 
to investigate whether there is an alternative reading of ‘deontological 
judgment’ such that (5.4.1) comes out false. 
This is also the route taken by Feldman, who suggests that de-
ontological judgments are to be understood in relation to “role 
oughts”: 
 
There are oughts that result from one’s playing a certain role 
or having a certain position. Teachers ought to explain things 
clearly. Parents ought to take care of their kids. Cyclists ought 
to move in various ways. Incompetent teachers, incapable par-
ents, and untrained cyclists may be unable to do what they 
ought to do. Similarly, I’d say, forming beliefs is something 
people do. That is, we form beliefs in response to our experi-
ences in the world. Anyone engaged in this activity ought to 
do it right. […] I suggest that epistemic oughts are of this 
sort—they describe the right way to play a certain role.26 
 
For our purposes, it does not matter so much that the role of a be-
liever and that of a cyclist, parent or teacher are different in that the 
                                                           
26 Feldman (2000, p. 676). 
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latter are optional in a sense that the first one is not. Supposedly, 
while being a cyclist, parent or teacher are (largely social) roles that we 
may take or give up more or less as we please, there is no way we can 
opt out of the role as a believer. As was stressed in the previous sec-
tions, we do not choose to believe. In fact, it might even be argued 
that our tendency to form beliefs (i.e., our tendency to at all form 
beliefs—not what particular beliefs we form) is a hard-wired feature of 
our biological make up. However, this merely implies that the scope 
of the roles are different—indeed, that some roles are all-
encompassing in a way that other roles are not—and is completely 
irrelevant as for the general implication from playing certain roles to 
having certain duties, which is what concerns us here. 
Now, in a more recent paper, Feldman spells out what deter-
mines the right way to play a role, and how it relates not to what is 
normal or expected but rather to good performance: 
 
What counts as good performance in a role, and thus deter-
mines how a role ought to be carried out, may be dependent in 
certain ways on what people are generally able to do. Consider, 
for example, the claim that teachers ought to explain things 
clearly. Arguably, what counts as a clear explanation is de-
pendent at least in part on what people are able to say and 
what people are able to understand. One could imagine stan-
dards for clear explanation that are so demanding that no one 
could ever meet them. It is not true that teachers ought to ex-
plain things that clearly. Similarly, the standards of good par-
enting or good cycling that apply to us are not at super-human 
levels. It’s not true that parents or cyclists ought to do things 
that would require them to exceed the sorts of capacities peo-
ple have. It is consistent with this, however, that an individual 
ought to do things that he or she is not able to do. An inarticu-
late teacher may simply be unable to explain things as clearly 
as he ought, and he may not have the capability of learning to 
explain things clearly. Thus, even if the standards for good 
performance in a role are in some way limited by the capacities 
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of those who fill the role, it is not the case that the existence of 
those standards implies that individuals must have basic or 
nonbasic control over that behavior that is judged by those 
standards.27 
 
By identifying a middle-ground for deontological judgments between 
the ideal of good performance and the actualities of (often highly 
imperfect) human capabilities, the kind of oughts that flow from 
inhabiting roles do not require voluntary control over the behavior 
evaluated. Hence, Feldman’s suggestion to understand deontology in 
terms of role oughts, undoubtedly, carries some promise for the de-
ontologist that wishes to hold on to her thesis by rejecting (OC). 
However, as I will now argue, the suggestion does not take her all the 
way to a viable notion of duty, at least not as far as justification is 
concerned. 
To see this, consider the following scheme, characterizing 
what it is to have a duty on Feldman’s account:  
 
From Roles to Duties 
If S, qua ϕ-er, plays the role of someone ϕ-ing, and ϕ-ers typi-
cally are able to ϕ in a Q manner and, thereby, meet the stan-
dard of good ϕ-ing, then S ought to (i.e., has a duty to) ϕ in a 
Q manner. 
 
By way of example: 
 
If S, qua teacher, plays the role of someone teaching, and 
teachers typically are able to explain things in a pedagogical 
manner and, thereby, meet the standards of good teaching, 
then S ought to (i.e., has a duty to) explain things in a peda-
gogical manner.  
 
                                                           
27 Feldman (2001, p. 88). 
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Now, as noted above, Feldman does not wish to commit himself to 
the deontological thesis that justification should be understood in 
terms of epistemic duties. Nevertheless, consider the following in-
stance of the above schema, in terms of the biological role of believ-
ers: 
 
If S, qua believer, plays the role of someone believing, and be-
lievers typically are able to believe in a Q manner and, thereby, 
meet the standards of good believing, then S ought to (i.e., has 
a duty to) believe in a Q manner. 
 
In order to get the kind of deontologism we are after, however, what 
it is to believe in a Q manner here has to be spelled out in terms of 
justification. That is, if being justified consists in fulfilling one’s epis-
temic duties, the following would have to be the case: 
 
If S, qua believer, plays the role of someone believing, and be-
lievers typically are able to believe justifiably and, thereby, 
meet the standards of good believing, then S ought to (i.e., has 
a duty to) believe justifiably.28 
 
The problem with this move, however, is that the notion of duty 
generated by such a schema is too weak to deserve being associated 
with genuine duties, in that it is too far removed from questions of 
praise and blame. To see this, consider the following instances of the 
From Roles to Duties Scheme, in terms of yet another biological role:29 
 
If S, qua green plant, plays the role of a photosynthesizer, and 
green plants typically are able to use sunlight to synthesize 
                                                           
28 Note that this does not imply that to fulfill one’s duties consists in being 
justified. The present formulation is perfectly compatible with justification 
being but one aspect of fulfilling one’s epistemic duties. 
29 I owe the following examples to Jeff Sebo, who makes essentially the same 
point in his “Is a Real Ethics of Belief Possible?” (2006). 
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foods from carbon dioxide and water in such a way as to meet 
the standards of good photosynthesis, then S ought to (i.e., has 
a duty to) synthesize foods from carbon dioxide and water in 
such a way that it meets the standards for good photosynthe-
sis. 
 
If this example seems unconvincing, consider another example: 
 
If S, qua food digester, plays the role of someone digesting 
food, and food-digesters typically are able to break down food 
by mechanical and enzymatic action into substances that can 
be used by the body in such a way as to meet the standards for 
good food digestion, then S ought to (i.e., has a duty to) digest 
food in such a way that she meets the standards for good food 
digestion. 
 
What these two examples illustrate is how far removed the oughts 
generated by the From Roles to Duties scheme are from what we think 
about as duties, namely as something intimately connected to praise 
and blame. We would never think of reproaching a plant with failing 
to photosynthesize in a satisfactory way, or a person with not being 
able to digest properly (although we might blame her for having vol-
untarily acted so as to impair her digestive abilities, but that is quite 
another issue). Or better said: If we were to do such a thing, we 
would be speaking metaphorically, not literally. 
For this reason, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
oughts generated by the From Roles to Duties scheme are not deon-
tological in that they do not specify duties, in any interesting sense of 
those words. They do, however, specify what is good in relation to the 
role occupied. In the terminology of chapter 2, the schema, thereby, 
specifies general norms. In the case of justification, this is due to the fact 
that, quite independently of whether or not we might have a duty to 
believe justifiably, it might still be the case that it is something good to 
believe justifiably, just like it might be good for a green plant to photo-
synthesize in one way rather than another, quite independently of 
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whether or not a plant can have a duty to photosynthesize thus. And 
as we have seen: In so far as such duties were to pertain to the forma-
tion of belief, the implausibility of doxastic voluntarism makes it 
reasonable to think that no such duties exist. 
 
 
5.5. THE MORAL: REFINEMENT OR RECONSTRUCTION? 
What is the moral of the above discussion? So far, we have been 
concerned with evaluating the viability of deontologism as a theory of 
justification, as brought out through a certain stereotype inherited 
from Locke and Descartes and defended in more recent years by 
Chisholm. This stereotype does not necessarily provide a fully accu-
rate story about the phenomena referred to by the corresponding 
concept. Nevertheless, a plausible story about the origin and evolu-
tion of the stereotype may still provide substantial hints as for the 
kind of situation in which the phenomenon in question was baptized 
and—especially given what we might have found out about the world 
since the term was originally introduced. 
We started out this chapter with one such story, involving 
Locke and Descartes’ emphasis on how justification pertains to the 
fulfillment of epistemic duties—an idea that we came to dub Strong 
Deontologism. Furthermore, we saw that (a) subsequent research pro-
vides good reason to think that such deontologism does not provide 
an accurate story of its referent, in assuming that belief-formation is 
under our voluntary control, and that (b) the most promising non-
voluntarist reformulation of the theory, or what we referred to as 
Weak Deontologism, does not yield a substantial enough notion of epis-
temic duty. 
In accordance with the methodology introduced in the first 
part of this study, two epistemological routes are now open: On the 
one hand, we may refine JUSTIFICATION by rejecting voluntarism as a 
false assumption about the phenomenon referred to, while retaining 
the idea that justification pertains to belief-forming processes. The 
most promising candidate for fleshing out such a refinement would 
most likely be process reliabilism, according to which a person’s degree 
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of justification in holding a belief to be true is a function of the reli-
ability of the belief-forming processes that are casually responsible for 
the belief in question.30 However, while reliabilism will turn out to 
play an important role later on in this study, we need to note that 
opting for such view already at this point would have to rest on an 
unwarranted assumption, namely that the referent inherited from our 
deontological predecessors does, in fact, provide the most promising 
means to achieve our epistemic goal of attaining and maintaining true 
belief in significant matter. 
For this reason, the next chapter will look into an alternative 
route, attempting to retain voluntarism while identifying a more plau-
sible candidate for voluntary control and, thereby, reconstruct JUSTIFI-
CATION to fit better with what we now know about the involuntary 
character of belief-formation. The suggestion in question is far from 
new, however, and may be traced back to Descartes’ ideas about 
justification as pertaining to what we may see clearly and distinctly on 
introspection. The suggestion will eventually be rejected due to an overly 
optimistic picture of our introspective access to the grounds for our 
beliefs, which, in chapter 7, will motivate an alternative reconstruc-
tion, more closely related to reliabilism than to either Deontologism 
or what I will call introspection-based access internalism. Still, a thor-
ough inquiry into the suggestion as well as the reasons for its failure 
will provide us with valuable information about what would have to 
constitute a concept that serves us better. 
 
 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
In the present chapter it was argued that proponents of so-called 
Strong Deontologism about justification have to face up to the dilemma 
of either radically restricting the scope of JUSTIFICATION in face of 
involuntarism or giving up their position in favor of Weak Deontolo-
gism. The latter, however, is at the cost of leaving behind the discourse 
of epistemic praise and blame—a discourse that, arguably, provides 
                                                           
30 See, e.g., Goldman (1986). 
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the reasons for sympathizing with Deontologism about justification in 
the first place. In the next chapter, we will look into and eventually 
reject an account that, in the spirit of deontologism, seeks to spell out 
JUSTIFICATION in terms of factors within our voluntary control but 
that, contra doxastic voluntarism, does not locate the proper object of 
epistemic evaluation in the holding of beliefs but rather in certain 
voluntary actions pertaining to the mind’s awareness of itself via acts 
of introspection. 
 178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6. 
Introspection-Based Access Internalism 
 
 
 
In the present chapter, I will consider a construal—or a reconstruc-
tion, if you will—to the effect that (a) cognitive accessibility should be 
equated with introspective accessibility, and (b) justification is a matter 
of having paid due attention to what is thus accessible via acts of 
introspection. I will then go on to review some results within cogni-
tive psychology that give us reason to believe that our faculty of intro-
spection is not a very reliable guide to the etiology of our beliefs. As 
such the construal not only fails to delimit an epistemically relevant 
notion of cognitive accessibility, but also falls short of presenting a 
viable concept of justification. 
 
 
6.1. ON GUIDANCE AND ACCESSIBILITY 
There is an important sense in which the Guidance Conception of 
Epistemology discussed above is perfectly divorceable from Deon-
tologism. Or so I will now argue. 
First, remember what GC said: 
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The Guidance Conception of Epistemology (GC) 
The main epistemological desideratum is to guide epistemic in-
quiry, in providing means for epistemic inquirers to fulfill their 
desiderata. 
 
In want of epistemic duties, and consequently any plausible desiderata 
pertaining to the fulfillment of such duties, what are the relevant 
epistemic desiderata that epistemologists are to address? Traditionally, 
a desideratum deemed central and important to epistemological in-
quiry, quite independently of the issue of epistemic duties, has been to 
provide means for the epistemic inquirer to answer the following 
question: 
 
(Q2) Do I, qua epistemic agent, have any good reasons to 
believe that any of my beliefs about the world are true? 
 
This is the question facing the epistemic agent deliberating about what 
to believe from a first-person point of view, and the challenge posed 
by it is, according to John Pollock, “the fundamental problem of 
epistemology.”1 As the reader surely notes, one prima facie plausible 
rationale for this being so is GC, i.e., the very the idea that epistemol-
ogy should guide epistemic conduct. 
More than this, many epistemologists take GC and (Q2) to be 
linked to a particular kind of internalism. I take the line of reasoning to 
be the following: If a central task of epistemology should be to facili-
tate the epistemic life of epistemic inquirers by providing means to 
answer (Q2)—supposedly an important desideratum for epistemic 
inquirers—these means better be usable for such inquirers. Hence, 
the following plausible, minimal constraint on analyses of epistemic 
justification: 
 
                                                           
1 Pollock (1986, p. 10). 
 180 
The Accessibility Constraint (AC) 
Only cognitively accessible factors are relevant to degree of 
justification. 
 
Consequently, we find Laurence BonJour claiming that “the justifying 
reason for a basic belief, or indeed for any belief, must somehow be 
cognitively available to the believer himself, within his cognitive grasp or 
ken,” because it makes no sense that “a reason that is unavailable to 
[a] person be even relevant to the epistemic justification of his belief.”2 
However, it remains to be specified exactly what kinds of fac-
tors are cognitively accessible. Here, epistemological discussion has 
been conducted against the background of a substantial (but rarely 
motivated) assumption, summed up in the following thesis: 
 
The Cognitive-Introspective Thesis (CIT) 
As far as the analysis of justification goes, the epistemologi-
cally relevant sense of cognitive accessibility is that of introspec-
tive accessibility.  
 
This connection between cognitive accessibility and introspective 
accessibility is brought out nicely in Sven Bernecker’s recent defini-
tion of internalism: 
 
In its broadest formulation, internalism about justification (or 
access internalism) is the view that all of the factors required 
for a belief to be justified must be cognitively accessible to the 
subject and thus internal to his mind. Something is internal to 
one’s mind so long as one is aware of it or could be aware of it 
merely by reflecting.3 
 
                                                           
2 BonJour and Sosa (2003, pp. 24-25; first emphasis mine, second emphasis in 
original). 
3 Bernecker (2006, p. 81). 
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Hence, we find Earl Conee spelling out his particular brand of eviden-
tialism by claiming that a person “has a justified belief only if the 
person has reflective access to evidence that the belief is true.”4 Simi-
larly, Robert Audi claims that “justification is grounded entirely in 
what is internal to the mind, in a sense implying that it is accessible to 
introspection or reflection.”5 Putting the point in slightly different but 
recently more popular terms, John Gibbons defines internalism as a 
supervenience thesis, to the effect that “justification supervenes on 
introspectively accessible properties of the believer.”6 
A similar idea can be found in Richard Foley’s theory of ra-
tionality, reconstructed by Alston as follows:  
 
It is epistemically rational for a person to believe that p at t iff S 
would believe, on sufficiently careful reflection, that believing p at t is 
an effective way of realizing the goal of now believing those 
propositions that are true and now not believing those propo-
sitions that are false.7  
 
In Foley’s own words, that analysans will be satisfied if and only if S  
 
[…] has an uncontroversial argument for p, an argument that 
he would regard as likely to be truth preserving were he to be ap-
propriately reflective, and an argument whose premises he would un-
cover no good reasons to be suspicious of were he to be appropriately reflec-
tive.8 
 
It should be noted that Foley’s analysis is slightly different from the 
aforementioned internalist analyses, in that it is explicitly formulated 
in hypothetical terms. Nevertheless, the only way to reflect on the 
                                                           
4 Conee (1988, p. 398). 
5 Audi (1998, p. 233-4). 
6 Gibbons (2006, p. 20). 
7 Alston (2005, p. 14; my emphasis). 
8 Foley (1987, p. 66; my emphasis). 
 182 
extent to which believing something is an effective way of realizing 
this or that goal is to first find out what you believe and, supposedly, 
the best way to do this is through introspection. The same goes for 
the identification of your arguments and their truth preserving quali-
ties, mutatis mutandis. And, even though Foley does not take actual 
introspection to be a necessary condition for justification, he is still 
committed to the possibility of introspecting beliefs, arguments, and 
reasons.9 
In other words, the claim is that (a) only cognitively accessible 
factors are relevant to justification (i.e., AC), (b) only introspectively 
accessible factors are cognitively accessible (empirical assumption) 
and, hence, (c) only introspectively accessible factors are relevant to 
justification (i.e., CIT). So, by combining AC and CIT, and assuming 
that only introspectively accessible factors are cognitively accessible, 
we get the idea that, in order to be justified, a subject must have intro-
spective access to the way in which (or at least that) her reasons endow 
her beliefs with good reason. 
 
 
6.2. INTROSPECTION-BASED ACCESS INTERNALISM 
More specifically, and against the background of these suggestions, I 
propose the following by way of a characterization of the stereotype 
pertaining to the particular kind of internalism at issue, which I will 
refer to as Introspection-Based Access Internalism: 
 
Introspection-Based Access Internalism (IBAI) 
That S is epistemically justified in believing that p means that S  
(a) has good reason for taking p to be true; and 
(b) is introspectively aware of the way in which (or at least aware 
that) her reasons endow her belief that p with good reason (if 
                                                           
9 This might be brought out by way of an analogy: A person that never moves 
quickly may still be quick, as long as she has the ability to move quickly. 
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only in the Foleyan sense of a hypothetical awareness or reflec-
tion).10 
 
As was noted by Bernecker above, IBAI is sometimes referred to as 
Access Internalism.11 However, in order to stress the commitment not 
only to the access thesis AC, but also to the introspection reading of 
such access in terms of CIT, I have settled for the name Introspection-
Based Access Internalism. 
As for (a), I will understand the term “reason” as designating 
either a doxastic state or process (i.e., a belief or a belief-forming 
process) or a non-doxastic state or process (e.g., a perceptual state or 
process). Furthermore, I will take it to refer to an actual reason (epis-
temically neutral in the sense that it need not be a good reason) mean-
ing that which gives rise to or sustains the belief in question or, differ-
ently put, that which is causally responsible for its formation or suste-
                                                           
10 As has been stressed by Alston (1985, p. 85), we need to appreciate the 
distinction between being justified in believing that p, in the sense of, say, 
certain justificatory relations obtaining between the belief that p and related 
propositions, or the belief having been produced by mental processes that are 
appropriate (in a, so far, unspecified sense), and justifying your belief that p, in 
the sense of doing something to demonstrate that p, say, actually introspecting 
such justificatory qualities. However, I will in the present chapter not consider 
the following thesis: In order to be justified, it is sufficient that certain facts 
about what you believe and the justificatory relations between them obtain, 
without there being, even in principle, a way of introspecting such justificatory 
qualities of your beliefs and their inter-relations. Indeed, I will in chapter 7 
defend a version of this thesis in terms of the justificatory qualities of heuris-
tics, but I will, contra Alston (1985, p. 79), not consider it a brand of internalism 
about justification, since it is clearly incompatible with the claim that all factors 
relevant to justification are available on introspection—a claim central to the 
kind of internalism I will be concerned with here. 
11 See, e.g., Alston (1986). 
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nance.12 This is not to deny the possibility of merely potential reasons—
e.g., unutilized ways of justifiably coming to believe something—but 
merely to narrow in on a more exact vocabulary. 
In other words, the general assumption here is that reasons are 
a kind of cause.13 The virtue of understanding reasons thus may be 
brought out as follows. First, we may note that a powerful way to 
explain events is with reference to their causes, because knowing the 
causes of events facilitates prediction and, thereby, interaction—two 
of the prime goals of explanation. If I know that flipping the switch 
will cause the light to go on, I may not only predict that, if I flip the 
switch, the light will go on, as well as explain the light going on with 
reference to that someone flipped the switch, but I can also flip the 
switch whenever I desire that the room be lit up.  
Similarly, one important way to explain the behavior of inten-
tional agents is with reference to their reasons, because knowing a 
person’s reasons facilitates not only the prediction of behavior but 
also successful interaction. For example, if I know that people tend to 
approve of certain kinds of behavior because they take it to exhibit 
certain traits characteristic of a good character—say, honesty and 
bravery—I can not only predict certain situations in which behavior 
will be approved of and explain certain acts of approval with refer-
ence to honesty and bravery, but also see too it that I am considered 
as being of a good character, by acting in an honest and brave man-
ner. 
However, the only condition under which explaining the ac-
tions of intentional agents in terms of their reasons is a powerful 
predictive and explanatory tool is if our concept of a reason actually 
                                                           
12 This is not to deny that a belief may have several reasons, in the sense that 
there are several factors, each of which contributes to the belief arising or being 
sustained. The points I will make could be made just as well within the 
framework of a more complicated picture, where a belief is held or sustained 
by way of a multitude of reasons. However, for simplicity’s sake, I have cho-
sen to focus on the simple case in which a belief has merely one reason. 
13 See, e.g., Dretske (1988). 
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tracks causes for behavior. For example, if the real cause of people’s 
approval of certain kinds of behavior was not that the kind of behavior 
in question was (taken to be) brave and honest, but that it just hap-
pened to be the kind of behavior that always took place on a Monday, 
an explanation of people’s dispositions to approve that was formu-
lated in terms of honest and brave behavior would, clearly, be of little 
use, as far as prediction and facilitation of interaction goes. However, 
to the extent that our concept of a reason really does track causes—as 
in the actual causes for behavior—it will provide an invaluable cogni-
tive tool. 
This lesson carries over to epistemology, where particularly 
epistemic reasons may be construed as the doxastic or non-doxastic 
states or processes that give rise to (i.e., cause) and sustain belief, as 
was suggested above. For example, say that Paul believes that the 
Chrysler building is taller than 40 Wall Street, and that the cause of his 
belief is having been in an perceptual state that is him reading a book 
on New York City landmarks. What reason does Paul have for his 
belief? The most plausible answer would dovetail the most plausible 
and straightforward causal explanation: he read it in a book on New 
York City landmarks. In other words, the cause of his belief is the 
reason for his belief. 
The same goes for doxastic reasons. Say that Paul also believes 
that the Empire State building is taller than the Chrysler building. 
Pondering the matter—say, if asked to list the three tallest buildings in 
New York City—he will, most likely, connect the inferential dots and 
infer that the Empire State Building is taller than 40 Wall Street. What 
is his reason for believing this? As above, the most plausible answer 
would dovetail the most plausible and straightforward causal explana-
tion: he believes that (a) the Empire State building is taller than the 
Chrysler building, and that (b) the Chrysler building is taller than 40 
Wall Street, as well as something to the effect that, (c) for any x, y, and 
z, if x is taller than y, and y is taller than z, then x is taller than z. 
Two important qualifications are at place, however. First, it 
should be noted that, while all reasons are causes, not all causes are 
reasons. As introduced above, only the causes that give rise to or 
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sustain belief are epistemic reasons. More needs to be said, however. 
If I come to believe something as a result of, say, a chemical imbal-
ance in my brain, then, although this is a cause of my belief, it is—
arguably—not a reason for it; not even a bad reason. In other words, 
not just anything that causes a belief counts as a reason for it. And, in 
this sense, causality does not do the whole job. One plausible way to 
amend the present account is to add the following constraint: For a 
cause to constitute a reason, it is not sufficient that the cause is caus-
ally responsible for the formation or sustenance of the belief; it also 
has to be the case that the epistemic agents, if sensible, would recog-
nize the cause as a reason, were she to become aware of it. This con-
straint rules out deviant causes (such as chemical imbalances), while 
allowing for non-deviant causes to be identified as reasons (such as 
perceptual mechanisms, cognitive tendencies, etc.)14 
Note, however—and this brings me to my second qualifica-
tion—that the requirement that a person has to recognize her reason 
as a reason, were she to become aware of it, in no way implies that a 
subject’s reasons always are introspectively accessible to her. Hence, a 
person’s actual reason may not always coincide with what she, if 
prompted, would take to be her reasons (although the above con-
straint would require that, if informed about her actual reasons, she 
would, at the very least, recognize them as reasons, granted that she is 
sensible). As we shall see below, it is a well-known fact within cogni-
tive psychology that people are not always the best judges of why they 
hold the beliefs that they do. Nevertheless, within the bounds of the 
above constraint, the best explanation of our beliefs will consist in the 
citing of what actually causes us to believe what we, in fact, believe—
                                                           
14 Thanks to Helge Malmgren and Hilary Kornblith for calling my attention 
to this issue. It should be noted that, invoking this constraint in a definition of 
reason, would make that definition circular (since the constraint talks about 
what a person would recognize as a reason). However, it may still be a con-
straint on the concept of a reason at issue, and that is exactly how I intend to 
use it. 
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quite independently of what we take to be our reasons. This point will 
be further exemplified and elaborated on below. 
Having thus clarified what it is for something to be a reason, 
we may turn to (b) and say something about how we should under-
stand the term “introspection.” In its most general sense, the term 
designates the mind’s awareness of itself. However, I will use the term 
in a somewhat restricted sense to designate the mind’s awareness of 
its own propositional attitudes (i.e., that something is believed), pro-
positional content (i.e., what is believed), and perceptual states and 
processes. Furthermore, introspection is, in some sense, inner, in that 
it is not identical to any of the perceptual processes that give us in-
formation about the external world. Hence, as noted already in the 
above, introspection is best characterized as a non-empirical pathway to 
knowledge or justification (which, as we also saw, does not imply that 
it yields a priori warrant). Lastly, it should be noted that introspection 
might be but one pathway to objects of knowledge or justification. In 
other words, the present characterization of introspection is compati-
ble with the possibility that we may come to know things through 
introspection that we might, just as well, have come to know through 
non-introspective methods. 
Now, consider the following degrees of introspective transpar-
ency: 
 
(i)  The agent has introspective access to what she believes, 
i.e., to the propositional content of her beliefs. 
(ii)  The agent has introspective access to her own proposi-
tional attitudes, i.e., to that she believes this or that.15 
(iii)  The agent has introspective access to the reasons for her 
beliefs, i.e., to why she holds the beliefs that she does.16 
                                                           
15 That a person has access to the (first-order) propositional content of her 
belief that p does not imply that she has access to the (second-order) proposi-
tional attitude in question, i.e., to the fact that she believes that p. Hence, (i) 
does not imply (ii). 
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(iv)  The agent has introspective access to the justificatory quali-
ties of her reasons, i.e., to whether and to what extent her rea-
sons actually justify her beliefs. 
 
IBAI assumes that we are capable of all four degrees of introspection 
and, furthermore, that this capability of ours is constitutive of epis-
temic justification. If the latter is to be the case, and as has been 
pointed out by Goldman, it is reasonable to assume that the intro-
spective accessibility in question must be reliable and powerful.17 If not, 
it would, clearly, be useless as a means to ascertaining whether you are 
fulfilling the requirements set upon you as an epistemic being. So, let 
us posit two requirements on the kind of introspective access that 
IBAI would be committed to, to the effect that it typically would have 
to be the case that, 
 
Introspective power 
when the subject reflects about the justificatory qualities of her 
reasons by way of introspection, a belief about the presence, 
absence or degree of justification is generated, and 
 
Introspective reliability 
when such a belief is generated, it is usually true.18  
 
In the following, I will refer to the combination of introspective 
power and reliability as introspective effectiveness, the lack of such effec-
tiveness as introspective frailty, and argue that if we, following Korn-
blith, take into account recent research in cognitive psychology, we 
might just have to reject the idea that we tend to have effective intro-
spective access of type (iii) and (iv).19 This suggests that ICT is not a 
                                                                                                               
16 Note that (iii) only collapses into (i) and (ii) under the assumption that all 
reasons are doxastic. As made clear above, no such assumption is made here. 
17 See Goldman (1999). 
18 See Goldman (1999, p. 275). 
19 See Kornblith (2002). 
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plausible way to construe cognitive accessibility and shows that IBAI, 
consequently, does not provide a viable way to construe justification. 
Or so I will now argue. 
The argument will proceed in two phases. In §6.3, we will re-
view evidence to the effect that, in many cases, our reasons for belief 
simply are not introspectively accessible, nor, consequently, are their 
epistemic merits. In §6.4, we will look into some further results from 
cognitive psychology suggesting that, in many cases where our rea-
sons can, in fact, be expected to be introspectively accessible, we 
systematically take ourselves (and our ways of reasoning) to be pass-
ing any reasonable epistemic test with flying colors. More than this, 
not even in cases where we are well aware of the preponderance of 
such bias are we very prone to take measures to attenuate our epis-
temic ways, since we tend to think of ourselves as far less susceptible 
to bias than everyone else. I will conclude that, albeit occasionally 
powerful, introspection is a fairly unreliable pathway to our epistemic 
reasons. 
 
 
6.3. INTROSPECTION AND COGNITIVE INACCESSIBILITY 
Given that the above characterization of IBAI can be said to reveal a 
prevalent stereotype for justification, it is now time to delve into the 
actual qualities of the mechanisms that it posits and, in particular, that 
of a supposed effective introspective access to reasons. First off, we 
need to note that, according to our best psychological theories, a large 
part of our cognitive life takes place within the so-called adaptive 
unconscious and is, therefore, not within our introspective reach. So, 
what is the adaptive unconscious?  
Actually, it is slightly misleading to talk about the adaptive un-
conscious since it is more a diverse collection of more or less inde-
pendent processes and modules. Under this seemingly unitary head-
ing, we find such different processes as those responsible for detect-
ing patterns in our environment; attention-directing mechanisms; 
many instances of learning; the automatic production of feelings, 
preferences, and goals; the proprioceptive feedback signaling the 
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position of our body and limbs; as well as basic language comprehen-
sion and processes responsible for the initiation of some actions. The 
common characteristic of all these processes, however, is that they are 
all unconscious in the specific sense of being introspectively inaccessible. 
Nevertheless, they influence judgments, feelings, and behavior. Fur-
thermore, talking about an adaptive unconscious is meant to convey 
that we are dealing with an evolutionary adaptation. Being endowed 
with an adaptive unconscious information processor, running parallel 
to a conscious system is a tremendous evolutionary advantage. We 
take in something in the order of 11,000,000 pieces of information 
per second by way of our five senses, of which we can process around 
40 consciously. Hence, it goes without saying that the mind works 
more efficiently by delegating a great proportion of the information 
processing to the unconscious.20 
Considering that a great majority of our mental life, hence, is 
out of our conscious reach, it is to be expected that there are many 
cases in which introspection yields no immediate output and simply 
has to give way for inference. In other words, if what we are trying to 
get at by way of introspection is simply not thus accessible, we have 
to infer it from other, non-introspective data. In fact, as Wilson notes, 
introspection (construed realistically) is in many cases a process that 
involves (or better said: has to be completed by) the construction of a 
narrative: 
 
I may not be thinking of my dentist’s name right now or how I 
feel about root canals, but with a little introspection I can 
bring these thoughts and feelings to mind. No amount of in-
trospection, however, can illuminate the content of the adap-
tive unconscious, no matter how hard I try. Trying to access 
unconscious goals and motives results not in a direct pipeline 
to these states, but in a constructive process whereby the conscious self 
infers the nature of these states.21 
                                                           
20 See Wilson (2002). 
21 Wilson (2002, p. 163; my emphasis). 
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The major risk with such a constructive process is, naturally, fabrica-
tion. For example, it is quite common for people to overlook situ-
ational influences on their actions (for example in the form of subtle 
pressure and manipulation) and infer that they acted simply on the 
basis of their own internal states (that is, that they really wanted to do 
whatever they were, in fact, pressured to do)—a phenomenon dubbed 
the fundamental attribution error. Similarly, if the situational influences get 
too strong, people make a different but related attribution error, at-
tributing their actions completely to the situation (say, the fact that 
they got paid a large sum of money to play in concert), and underes-
timating the extent to which they wanted to perform the behavior in 
the first place (e.g., that they actually really enjoy playing in concert).22 
Such fabrication is, of course, to some extent avoidable and in 
many cases we are able to construct fully accurate narratives about 
what we want and why we act the way we do. Furthermore, a claim to 
the effect that there are cases in which aspects of our mental life are 
not accessible to us does not warrant the general claim that introspec-
tion is unreliable. More than this, it remains to be established that 
there is a problem of unreliable introspection in relation to particu-
larly epistemic reasons, i.e., to the factors causing and sustaining belief. 
To warrant the latter claim, we need more empirical evidence.  
However, as it turns out, contemporary cognitive psychology 
provides a substantial amount of evidence to this effect—evidence 
that recently has led Kornblith to mount a strong case against the idea 
that introspection provides a dependable route to the epistemic quali-
ties of reasons.23 One psychological phenomenon discussed by Korn-
blith is from a classic study by Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson.24 
In the study, subjects were asked to examine and rate the quality of an 
array of consumer goods (four nightgowns in one case, four identical 
                                                           
22 See Wilson (2002, pp. 207-208). 
23 See Kornblith (2002). See also Weinberg (2006, p. 40). 
24 See Nisbett and Wilson (1977). 
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nylon pantyhose in another). In the words of Nisbett and Lee Ross, 
the study showed that there was 
 
[…] a pronounced position effect on evaluations, such that the 
right-most garments were heavily preferred to the left-most 
garments. When questioned about the effect of the garments’ 
position on their choices, virtually all subjects denied such an 
influence (usually with a tone of annoyance or of concern for 
the experimenter’s sanity).25 
 
In other words, the people involved in the study not only tended to 
(a) form a belief to the effect that the right-most garment was the best 
one, but also (b) be completely unaware of the influence of the relative 
position of the garments—i.e., of the actual reasons for their belief—
and even (c) deny its influence when asked about it. And as noted by 
Kornblith, asking the subjects to introspect her reasons more carefully 
would hardly help, since few probably would have been able to at all 
pin-point the actual reason of their belief (i.e., the relative positions of 
the garments). If anything, introspection might even have made the 
(supposedly annoyed) subjects even surer that they were reasoning 
correctly: 
 
Far from helping in the process of self-correction, introspec-
tion here merely results in a more confident, though no less 
misguided agent […] What the experiment tells us is that he 
will take himself to have objectively good reasons for his be-
lief; he will take himself to have noticed features of the night-
gown on the right that make it the best of the lot […] Intro-
spection here is powerless to detect the error made, and when 
called into service as a source of epistemic improvement it 
merely serves to certify a misguided process of belief acquisi-
tion.26 
                                                           
25 Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 207). 
26 Kornblith (2002, p. 112-113). 
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It is important, however, to be clear on what Nisbett and Wilson’s 
experiment does not show. As pointed out by Wilson in his later book 
Strangers to Ourselves, the moral of the experiment is not that we never 
have introspective access to the true reasons behind our actions and 
evaluations.27 Rather, the position effect is an instance of the more 
general fact that, to the extent that people’s beliefs are caused by the 
adaptive unconscious, we might very well have access to the results 
(e.g., the belief that one pantyhose is better than another) but not 
always the causes (e.g., that one pantyhose was positioned in a particu-
lar way in relation to the others)—or at least not qua cases. In other 
words, as far as the adaptive unconsciousness goes, the claim is that 
we are capable of introspection of type (i) and probably also (ii), but 
not (iii) nor, consequently, (iv). In many cases, Wilson argues, our 
reasons are simply not introspectively accessible and must therefore 
be inferred. We will return to this claim in a minute. 
But first we need to note two things, namely that (a) our rea-
sons often pertain to the adaptive unconsciousness, and, (b) although 
the adaptive unconscious might be ever so valuable in many situations 
(and sometimes even necessary for our survival), it is not always to 
the point. In fact, studies like the one by Nisbett and Wilson indicate 
that it sometimes leads us astray. Another classic study discussed by 
Kornblith, is one by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, revealing 
a so-called anchoring effect.28 In the study, subjects were asked for the 
percentage of African members of the United Nations. As the ques-
tion was posed, a roulette wheel was spun and the subjects were then 
asked if the number that turned up was too high or too low. What 
Tversky and Kahneman found was that, in cases where the roulette 
wheel provided an anchor of 10, the mean estimate was 25, and in 
cases where it provided an anchor of 65, the mean estimate was 45.  
In other words, the result of the roulette wheel clearly influ-
enced the judgments of the subjects. The reason for the subjects’ 
                                                           
27 See Wilson (2002). 
28 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
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beliefs about the percentage of African members in the UN, were, in 
part and unbeknownst to the subjects, constituted by the fact that the 
roulette wheel provided a certain anchor. According to Tversky and 
Kahneman, however, none of the subjects showed any awareness of 
the influence of the anchor provided by the roulette wheel and a fair 
guess is that they would simply react to a suggestion that it affected 
their approximation with denial or even annoyance.  
These kinds of results are in no way scarce. Similar anchoring 
effects have since also been found in people’s risk assessments, where 
people’s estimations are thoroughly influenced by the first datum that 
they are provided with (say, the 50,000 annual deaths from motor 
vehicle accidents or the 1,000 annual deaths from electrocution),29 
price estimations, even in cases where subjects are provided with 
preposterously extreme anchor values (“Is the average price of a col-
lege textbook more or less than $7,128?”),30 as well as in civil tort 
lawsuit situations, where the amount of money requested by the plain-
tiff has been shown to anchor mock juror’s decisions to such an ex-
tent that the researchers studying them came to title their report “The 
More You Ask For, The More You Get.”31 Finally, Stacey Swain, 
Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan Weinberg have found evidence to the 
effect that people’s intuitive categorization judgments in response to 
hypothetical examples, of the sort typically employed by philosophers 
in evaluating philosophical theories, vary according to whether and 
what other thought experiments are considered first.32  
In sum, the common characteristic of all of these studies is the 
presence of factors that (a) either are irrelevant for uncontroversial 
reasons (the number provided by a roulette wheel, the first datum or 
hypothetical example presented, the preposterous anchor value pre-
                                                           
29 See Fischoff (2002, pp. 737-738). 
30 See Quattrone et al. (manuscript), discussed in Hastie and Dawes (2001, p. 
103).  
31 See Chapman and Bornstein (1996). See also Hastie, Schkade, and Payne 
(1999). 
32 See Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg (manuscript). 
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sented in a question) or should be deemed largely irrelevant for pru-
dential reasons (the amount of money requested by the plaintiff), but 
that, nevertheless, (b) have a clear influence on subject’s judgment in a 
way that the subject is systematically unaware of—even on introspec-
tion.  
Considering what we today know about the adaptive uncon-
scious, and the integral although inaccessible role it plays in our cogni-
tive life, this should come as no surprise: In many cases, the relevant 
factors simply are not introspectively accessible. And since they are 
not introspectively accessible, the subject, clearly, can not be expected 
to scrutinize them so as to determine their epistemic merits (or lack 
thereof), in the way that the IBAI theorists wants her to do. 
 
 
6.4. INTROSPECTION AND COGNITIVE BIAS 
Clearly, it would be preposterous to claim that we never have intro-
spective access to the reasons for our beliefs—it is beyond doubt that 
we sometimes do. However, this does not let the IBAI theorist off the 
hook. In many cases where our reasons might be ever so accessible, 
we nevertheless fail to evaluate them correctly, not due to simple 
performance errors or oversight, but due to systematic cognitive bias.  
To see this, let us turn to studies of hypothesis testing, of 
which Kornblith discusses two cases. In the first case—due to a study 
by Peter Wason—subjects were provided with a sequence of three 
numbers and told that it conformed to a general rule. Subjects were 
then asked to produce three sequences that, they would be told, either 
conformed or did not conform to this rule.33 Almost invariably, sub-
jects had a rule in mind that they tried, but only examined confirming 
instances of it. In other words, say that the sequence provided was “2, 
5, 8.” What Wason found was that people tended to (a) have a hy-
pothesis about the general rule in mind—say, “add three to the previ-
ous number”—but (b) only examine confirming instances of the rule, 
such as “11, 14, 17”, but virtually never any falsifying sequences, such 
                                                           
33 See Wason (1960). 
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as “5, 8, 12” (the latter consistent with the rule “add three if the pre-
vious number is a prime; otherwise, add four”). More than this, they 
(c) tended to hold on to the rule they originally had in mind, even when 
told that it was incorrect. Kornblith writes: 
 
When a number of confirming instances were piled up, they 
would announce that they had found the rule governing the 
initial sequence. Strangely, when subjects were told that they 
had not discovered the rule, in more than half the cases the 
next sequence tested was an instance of the very rule they had 
just been told was incorrect.34 
 
A similar kind of confirmation bias has been studied within the realm 
of social psychology by Lord, Ross, and Lepper.35 In their study, two 
groups of subjects were recruited, one consisting of people who be-
lieved that capital punishment has deterrent effects, and one consist-
ing of people who believed that it does not. The groups then got to 
read two studies, one that supported the claim that capital punish-
ment has deterrent effects, and one that supported the opposite claim. 
What the researchers found was that subjects from the first group 
considered the first study to be well conducted and convincing but 
the latter highly flawed, while the second group took the second study 
to be well conducted and convincing but the first one to be highly 
flawed. In general, the studies that ran contrary to the subjects’ views 
had a minor effect on them, while the studies that supported their 
views only served to strengthen them further. As noted by Nisbett 
and Ross, this result provides a quite interesting perspective on the 
influence of scientific studies on public opinion: 
 
Before the advent of modern social science, many questions, 
like the issue of the deterrent value of capital punishment, 
were ones for which there really was no empirical evidence 
                                                           
34 Kornblith (2002, p. 117). 
35 See Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979). 
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one way or the other […] One might expect, though, that once 
genuine empirical evidence for such questions became avail-
able, that evidence would sway opinion to whichever side it 
supported or, if the evidence were mixed, that it would serve 
to moderate opposing views. Instead, the effect of introducing 
mixed evidence may be to polarize public opinion, with propo-
nents of each side picking and choosing from the evidence so 
as to bolster their initial opinions.36 
 
It should be noted, however, that this and similar “polarization bi-
ases” are in no way impossible to overcome. In a study by Puccio and 
Ross, it was found that a particularly efficient way to attenuate polari-
zation was to invite people to present what they considered being the 
best argument for a position that was incompatible with their on 
stance on an issue.37 It is a problem in this context, however, that 
most people tend to radically underestimate the extent to which they 
(as opposed to everyone else) might suffer from cognitive bias. 
Pronin, Lin, and Ross asked a group of Stanford students to what 
extent they and the “average American” displayed a series of inferen-
tial and judgmental biases, including biased assimilation of informa-
tion to preexisting beliefs or preconditions.38 The students invariably 
took themselves to display each of the biases to a lesser degree than 
the average American. To rule out that this was not just an indication 
of a particularly arrogant Stanford student population, the researchers 
conducted a similar study at the San Francisco Airport (the only dif-
ference being that they included some additional biases) only to find 
their earlier results replicated.39 
Let us recapitulate. First, and as for introspective access of 
type (iii) and (iv), we reviewed some cognitive psychological studies 
indicating that processes pertaining to the adaptive unconscious are 
                                                           
36 Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 171). 
37 Manuscript discussed in Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002). 
38 See Pronin, Lin, and Ross (2002). 
39 See also Armor (1998) for similar results. 
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very rarely—if ever—introspectively accessible, but, nevertheless, not 
only influence our beliefs and judgments in substantive ways but, in 
many cases, are responsible for the actual reasons for our beliefs. 
Second, the studies on confirmation biases just discussed give us 
reason to believe that we, in general, are not very prone to take in 
evidence that runs contrary to what we believe. As Kornblith has put 
the point, the mechanisms involved in introspective reflection some-
times act as “sub-personal cognitive yes-men.”40 In other words, not 
even if we did have complete type (iii) and (iv) access to the processes 
pertaining to our grounds for beliefs, would we necessarily be particu-
larly prone to revise them in cases where we encountered (potential) 
indications to the effect that our beliefs were not based on good rea-
sons. Third, and finally, the studies on the extent to which we deem 
ourselves to suffer from various sorts of cognitive biases (such as 
confirmation bias) indicated that we, even in cases where we might be 
very well aware of the prevalence of cognitive bias, tend to take our-
selves to be exceptions to the rule and, hence, see no reason to take 
precautionary measures. 
When pondering the implications for IBAI, it is important to 
remember what we are concerned with here. In the context of, say, a 
researcher working with introspective data, all phenomena discussed 
so far may be taken into account in the evaluation of the introspective 
reports and dealt with through a series of coping strategies (only using 
phenomenologically trained subjects, getting clearer on dissociations 
between experience and report, weighing the introspective reports 
against other, non-introspective sources of data, etc.). Not so in the 
kind of non-lab environment that the defenders of IBAI typically 
wants us to introspectively scrutinize the reasons for our beliefs—an 
environment often void of any substantial methodological precau-
tions. Remember that justification, according to IBAI, essentially 
consists in the (actual or hypothetical) introspection of reasons and 
their soundness, thereby presupposing an effective type (iii) and (iv) 
access to the reasons for our beliefs.  
                                                           
40 See Kornblith (forthcoming b). 
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However, the surveyed experimental results warrant the con-
clusion that introspection does not provide a very effective route to 
epistemic self-evaluation and improvement, contrary to what the 
proponents of IBAI assume. And given what we have found out 
about our sometimes powerful but often quite unreliable grasp of the 
processes associated with reasons for belief, it seems implausible that 
introspective accessibility of reasons should be constitutive of some-
thing as truth-directed as epistemic justification. Quite often, we sim-
ply do not have an accurate idea of the etiology of our beliefs and, in 
many of the cases where we do, we would simply not identify our 
reasons as anything but sound.  
 
 
6.5. A CARTESIAN LEGACY? 
It is time to diagnose what is going on here and draw out the general 
implications for epistemology. Let us do this by first contrasting the 
picture drawn of the adaptive unconscious above with Descartes’ idea 
of the mind. Antonio Damasio has dubbed Descartes’ strict separa-
tion of the mind from the body “Descartes’ error.”41 As pointed out 
by Wilson, however, Descartes made a related error in that he, fur-
thermore, restricted the mental to the conscious. For Descartes, there 
was nothing in the mind that was not, in principle, accessible to the 
thinking subject and, consequently, he rejected the very idea of an 
unconscious—an error that Arthur Koestler has referred to as the 
“Cartesian catastrophe” that led to “an impoverishment of psychol-
ogy that it took three centuries to remedy.”42 
Is it plausible to assume that IBAI is a mark of this very Carte-
sian legacy—a legacy that has remained unchallenged within large 
parts of modern epistemology (unlike its analogue within the theory 
of mind), perhaps not explicitly, but by way of its influence on the 
way contemporary epistemologists construe justification? I think so. 
For one thing, it would explain not only the emergence but also the 
                                                           
41 See Damasio (1994). 
42 See Koestler’s introduction in Whyte (1978). 
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significance of the model of the mind that we find within IBAI, as an 
arena completely transparent to the introspecting epistemic agent, not 
only with respect to the contents of her beliefs but also to the under-
lying reasons. 
However, it does not explain why this view of the mind still 
holds such a prominent office in contemporary epistemology. Why, if 
the picture of the mind as transparent to the epistemic agent drawn by 
IBAI is so implausible, would anyone ever defend such a theory to-
day? One answer is deontology. If justification is a matter of what we 
ought to believe in relation to our epistemic duties, and ought implies 
can, there has to be something we can, in fact, do about our epistemic 
conditions for justification to at all be a live issue. More specifically, 
there has to be something we can do in order to influence the degree 
to which we are justified or not and, in order to do that, the factors 
determining our justification (whatever they may turn out to be) have 
to be accessible (epistemologists have assumed) in the specific sense 
of introspectively accessible. Consequently, we not only need introspec-
tive access of type (iii) but also of type (iv). And, even if the deon-
tological element is somewhat less explicit in modern IBAI, the dual 
Cartesian legacy, providing a picture of the mind as transparent to the 
epistemic agent and justification as a matter of what we ought to 
believe, could, undoubtedly, explain why some philosophers have 
come to embrace a view on introspection that, as it turns out, is com-
pletely at odds with modern cognitive psychological research. 
Where does this leave the defender of IBAI? I take it that 
three routes are open. First, proponents of IBAI might simply bite the 
bullet and claim that, in all cases where subjects either cannot access 
their reasons or fail scrutinize them in an unbiased way, they are sim-
ply unjustified. The main problem with such a strategy, however, is 
that justification becomes a very rare occurrence, given the prepon-
derance of bias and situations in which reasons are introspectively 
inaccessible. This also creates problems for the second route: to at-
tempt to refine JUSTIFICATION by retaining the idea that justification 
pertains to introspective scrutiny and then identify conditions under 
which we do have effective introspective access to the grounds for our 
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beliefs. Unfortunately, the last thirty years of cognitive psychological 
research indicates that such conditions are quite rare. Hence, any 
attempt to construe justification in terms of such conditions would 
(again) imply that justification is a very rare occurrence—an undesir-
able consequence, to say the least.  
This brings us to the third route: that of jettisoning CIT—i.e., 
the idea that cognitive accessibility should be identified with intro-
spective accessibility—and providing a (more plausible) reconstruction 
of justification in terms of a voluntary act that (in contrast to the 
introspection) tends to yield and support true belief by pertaining to 
cognitively (although not necessarily introspectively) accessible fac-
tors, against the background not only of a realistic picture of our 
cognitive apparatus, but also of the particular purpose that JUSTIFICA-
TION actually plays in typical epistemic situations. The next chapter 
attempts such a reconstruction. 
 
 
6.6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we started out with the idea that only cognitively 
accessible factors are relevant to epistemic justification, and then 
considered the proposal that (a) cognitive accessibility should be 
understood in terms of introspective accessibility, and (b) justification 
should be taken to consist in having paid due attention to the justifi-
catory qualities of one’s reason for belief via introspection. We then 
reviewed evidence to the effect that we often lack introspective access 
to the actual reasons underlying our beliefs and, hence, also to the 
justificatory qualities of these reasons. Furthermore, related evidence 
indicates that, even in cases where we can be taken to have introspec-
tive access to our reasons, it seldom constitutes a reliable and power-
ful source of information about the actual etiology of our beliefs. In 
the next chapter, we will consider an alternative way to do justice to 
the desideratum of cognitive accessibility, more in line not only with 
what cognitive psychology teaches us about our mind, but also with 
the truth-directed discourse that we typically associate with epistemic 
justification.
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Chapter 7. 
Reconstructing Justification 
 
 
 
We have just witnessed a second failed attempt to provide an analysis 
of justification that does justice to GC without being committed to 
any implausible assumptions about the world, be it pertaining to an 
implausibly strong voluntary control over our belief formation or an 
overly optimistic view of our introspective abilities. In this chapter, I 
will attempt my own reconstruction of a more apt concept, i.e., a 
concept that not only takes into account what we have found out 
about the qualities that have—for better or worse—been taken to 
pertain to justification, but also the specific purpose that the corre-
sponding concept can reasonably be expected to fill, in light of the 
norms in which it figures and the goals that endow it with normative 
force.  
 
 
7.1. A MINIMAL NOTION OF JUSTIFICATION 
When attempting to diagnose the failure of IBAI, it lies close at hand 
to ask oneself: Maybe the mistake was to at all assume ICT, i.e., the 
thesis equating the cognitively accessible with the introspectively 
accessible? After all, barring skeptical worries, we do have cognitive 
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access to a whole host of things, such as many of the properties of 
extra-mental objects encountered through ordinary sense perception. 
In particular, if we sever the intimate connection between introspec-
tive and cognitive access, we see that there are many ways in which 
the factors relevant to justification may be accessible. More specifi-
cally, consider the following thesis: 
 
The Straightforward Accessibility Thesis (SAT) 
At least as far as the analysis of justification goes, the episte-
mologically relevant sense of cognitive accessibility is that of 
being experientially accessible to the cognizing being through 
introspection, perception, retention, or any other experiental 
pathway to matters of facts. 
 
SAT is in line with what has recently been pointed out by Gibbons, 
namely that the relevant sense of accessibility might not be so much 
that of introspective accessibility as that of a subject being in a position to 
know.1 More than this, SAT is more inclusive than ICT and includes 
introspection as one among many kinds of accessibility. After all, 
there is no reason to rule out introspection as a possible route to rea-
sons, as long as we acknowledge—in accordance with the psychologi-
cal evidence surveyed in the previous chapter—that it plays a far less 
prominent role in the justification of beliefs than epistemologists have 
traditionally assumed. 
However, we need to say something more substantial and in-
formative than this. For one thing, we need to raise the following 
question: Granted that introspectively accessible factors have to take 
the back seat, what factors are relevant to epistemic justification on 
this alternative construal of “accessible”? In answering this question, 
it serves us well to start out with the following quite pervasive (albeit 
vague) idea: 
 
                                                           
1 See Gibbons (2006, p. 36). 
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A Minimal Notion of Justification 
S is epistemically justified in believing that p to the extent that 
she has good reason for taking p to be true. 
 
This widespread stereotype—or better said: stereotypical compo-
nent—will constitute the starting point of my reconstruction and may 
be extracted from a wide variety of analyses, one (as we saw above) 
being IBAI. Consequently, even though we might not be warranted in 
assuming that there is enough conceptual homogeneity to speak about 
“our” concept of justification, it serves us well to start out with this 
widely held idea that justification pertains to good reason.  
Two things should be noted, however. First, this notion of jus-
tification primarily applies to agents, not beliefs. In other words, al-
though we might at times say that a belief is justified, this is to be un-
derstood as short-hand for that a particular agent is justified in holding 
that particular belief to be true. Second, this notion ties justification to 
what many people take to be the most central goal of epistemic in-
quiry, i.e. truth, which is a reasonable idea considering that the most 
plausible way to explain the normative force pertaining to justification 
is in relation to this very goal (or, at least, some qualified version of 
it). The reasons for this were discussed in chapter 2: Normative con-
cepts are endowed with normative force by figuring in norms aimed 
at fulfilling certain goals. Consequently, such concepts as KNOWL-
EDGE and JUSTIFICATION are different from TABLE and DOG, in that 
the former, unlike the latter, are not only associated with a set of 
semantic norms pertaining to proper word use, but also with a set of 
particularly epistemic norms according to which you should know or 
should be justified, since knowing or being justified is (we are assum-
ing) conducive to certain epistemic goals. 
We went some length in chapter 4 to identify the specific de-
tails of these epistemic goals, concluding that they pertain to having, 
attaining, and maintaining true beliefs about epistemically significant 
matters. This, naturally, served to re-locate the question so as to ask: 
What are epistemically significant matters? In an effort to answer this 
question, it was suggested that the epistemic significance for a person 
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S, ultimately, is a function of that which is conducive to addressing S’s 
interests and satisfying her desires. Furthermore, in an attempt to 
address the possibility of quite radical variances in the latter, we fol-
lowed Kitcher in assuming that most people are subject to a healthy 
curiosity and, hence, desire to know certain truths (address certain 
questions, solve certain problems, etc.) rather than others.2 In other 
words, there is, as a matter of empirical fact, a non-negligible overlap 
when it comes to what people take to be significant, which has as a 
consequence that certain truths (questions, problems, etc.) are quite 
consistently deemed more significant than others. This serves as a 
contingent restriction not upon what people can but upon what peo-
ple actually do consider epistemically significant. 
Furthermore, we noted that this does not imply that there is no 
room for normative judgments on part of the epistemologist as for 
the weights subjects assign to their reasons for deeming something 
significant. On the contrary: Since such weights are directly tied to the 
addressing and satisfaction of the contingent interests and desires of 
the subject, the extent to which these interests and desires actually are 
addressed and satisfied is open to empirical investigation and, as such, 
provides feedback material for the acknowledgement, rectification, 
and improvement of the concepts and methods that are—for better 
or worse—employed by the subject in question. 
Now, let us return to the matter at hand, i.e., that of epistemic 
justification, and how we may flesh out the minimal concept in rela-
tion to the concepts reviewed in the previous chapters. First, is there 
is any way in which the concepts reviewed in the previous chapters 
may be improved? Consider refinement: If it had turned out that 
voluntarism was, in fact, a plausible empirical hypothesis, refinement 
would be in place in order to sharpen the concept at hand, so as to 
better serve the purpose of fulfilling our epistemic duties, perhaps by 
invoking a more reliabilist framework of evaluation, in light of the 
desiderata spelled out in chapter 4. But voluntarism did not turn out 
to be a plausible hypothesis. Voluntarism turned out to be false and 
                                                           
2 See Kitcher (2001). 
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epistemic duty (construed thus) is something that we cannot have. 
That is, unless it could have been demonstrated that we have a fairly 
effective introspective access to the epistemic qualities of our reasons, 
in which case JUSTIFICATION could have been easily reconstructed so 
as to pertain to acts of introspection rather than belief.  
However, as it turns out, we often do not have a particularly ef-
fective introspective access to our reasons for belief. This would not 
necessarily have been a problem if there were, at the same time, many 
situations in which we did have such access, in which case a simple 
refinement would be in place, enabling our concept to better track the 
situations in which our introspective access is more rather than less 
effective. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, the best psy-
chological evidence lends little credibility to such optimism. This 
brings us back to our minimal concept and calls for a further attempt 
at reconstruction. 
More specifically, the ameliorative methodological component 
introduced in §4.3 above prompts two questions relevant to the spell-
ing out of the minimal concept by way of a reconstructive improve-
ment of JUSTIFICATION, the first one corresponding to Evaluation and 
the second one to Improvement: 
 
1. What is the specific purpose of JUSTIFICATION in relation to 
the attainment and maintenance of true belief about sig-
nificant matters? 
2. In light of an answer to (1), as well as what we have found 
in the two previous chapters, what would be a more apt 
concept of justification? 
 
I will now address these two questions in turn. 
 
 
7.2. ON THE PURPOSE OF JUSTIFICATION 
As for the first question, I will take the most natural and prevalent 
justificatory discourse to pertain to the various social practices in-
volved in the exchange of information. More specifically—and in 
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analogy with what Craig has argued in the case of KNOWLEDGE—I 
suggest that the purpose of JUSTIFICATION, so far as the minimal 
notion goes, is to flag appropriate sources of information.3 More spe-
cifically, the purpose of JUSTIFICATION is to mark certain sources (and 
the claims that flow from them) as appropriate grounds for belief.  
Given the particularly epistemic character of justificatory dis-
course, and what we have argued above about the goals characteristic 
to epistemic inquiry, the appropriateness of such sources is, to a first 
approximation, to be understood in terms of conduciveness to truth.4 
By marking sources as appropriately calibrated to this goal, JUSTIFI-
CATION serves as an important tool in the planning for action in gen-
eral and the formation of hypotheses in particular, and, thereby, also 
in the multitude of endeavors that properly fall under the heading of 
epistemic inquiry. Let me try to spell this out by considering how 
transmission of justification is usually taken to work within three 
specific contexts: testimonial justification, inferential justification, and 
non-inferential justification. 
First, take the case of testimony. When consulting someone on 
a significant matter, we want that someone to, at the very least, have 
true beliefs about the matter at hand. However, since there might be 
ever so many informants, but only so many good testimonial sources, 
we look for justification as an indication of truth. More specifically, 
given that justification is understood in terms of good reason, and 
good reason to believe that p typically implies that p is more likely 
than not that p (if not, we would be better off guessing) the presence 
of (or even better: the providing of) justification serves to mark an 
appropriate source of testimonial information. This also highlights 
why authorities tend to play an important role in testimonial matters; 
                                                           
3 Cf. Craig (1990, p. 11). 
4 Note that this does not beg the question against the internalist. Any account 
of justification—be it an externalist or an internalist one—takes conducive-
ness to truth to be an important trait of justifying reasons, grounds, or 
sources, at least in so far as the account in question involves a commitment to 
truth being an important epistemic goal. 
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authorities tend to be authorities by virtue of possessing good reasons 
within their field of expertise (and are, in general, deprived of this 
label if it turns out that they do not), which is exactly why reports of 
authorities provide (prima facie) reasons for belief. So, whatever else 
testimonial justification turns out to consist in, it is reasonable to 
assume that it will, at the very least, imply a likelihood of truth. And 
since a subset of all truths—namely, the truths that are, in one way or 
another, significant to us—is what we are aiming for as epistemic 
beings, the corresponding concept is used to flag appropriate sources 
of information. 
Now, consider a second form of justificatory transmission, 
namely transmission through inference. As for deductive inference, 
the case is pretty straightforward: validity together with the truth of 
the premises guarantees a true conclusion (barring performance errors 
on part of the person performing the inference, of course). For this 
very reason, deductive inference is an excellent source of information 
and rightly considered one of the most worthy candidates of justifica-
tion. However, considering the slightly limited scope of genuine de-
ductive inference and, in particular, the pervasiveness of inferences 
that have to be made under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete 
information, we also value inductive and abductive inference (or 
inference to the best explanation, as it is sometimes called). And the 
extent to which we consider such inferences justified is directly pro-
portional to their tendency (in want of a guarantee) to yield true belief. 
In other words, whatever else inferential justification turns out to 
consist in, it is reasonable to assume that it will, at the very least, imply 
a likelihood (or in the deductive case: a guarantee) of truth. And again: 
Since a subset of all truths—namely, the significant truths—is what we 
are aiming for, we, thereby, use the concept of justification to flag an 
appropriate source of information. 
Finally, let us consider non-inferential transmission of justifica-
tion, i.e., the kind of justification that, supposedly, does not rely on an 
inference from other propositions. More specifically, let us consider 
one of the main candidates for non-inferential transmission of justifi-
cation, namely the justification pertaining to our perceptual beliefs. 
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One influential account of perceptual belief as non-inferentially justi-
fied belief is so-called dogmatism, according to which we are prima 
facie justified in our perceptual beliefs just by virtue of undergoing or 
having undergone the corresponding perceptual experience.5 The 
justification in question is prima facie in the sense that it may be overrid-
den by further considerations, for example if we found reason to be-
lieve that we are subject to some kind of illusion. And this carries 
interesting indications as to the kind of role JUSTIFICATION plays in 
relation to perceptual belief since it suggests that we typically assume 
that our perceptual faculties will not lead us astray, unless we have 
positive reason to believe otherwise, in which case we re-evaluate the 
justification transmitted by them. Hence, and as above, whatever else 
perceptual justification turns out to consist in, it is reasonable to as-
sume that it, at the very least, implies a substantial likelihood of truth, 
since it is exactly in the cases where we find reason to believe that 
there is no such likelihood that we withhold the term “justified.” 
Hence, I conclude that the purpose of JUSTIFICATION is to flag 
appropriate sources of information, as in sources that tend to produce 
true beliefs. However, as is highlighted by Craig’s related inquiry into 
the purpose of KNOWLEDGE, what has been said so far fails to pro-
vide an interesting distinction between the two concepts. This, how-
ever, does not show that what has been said so far is mistaken, but 
merely that there is more to be said. For this reason, I will now turn 
to the question of how we may fill in the details of this concept of 
justification.  
If what was argued in chapter 5 is correct, Deontologism does 
not provide a viable candidate, since it is committed to the implausible 
idea that we have voluntary control over our belief-formation. This 
suggests either of two mistakes: (a) justification does not pertain to 
duties (and, hence, does not require voluntarism), or (b) justification 
pertains to a domain that we do, as a matter of fact, have voluntary 
control over. In chapter 6, we considered a strategy along the latter 
lines, where justification was tied to acts of introspection, in accor-
                                                           
5 See, e.g., Pryor (2000). 
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dance with IBAI. However, the suggestion turned out to be highly 
problematic since we seldom have such introspective access to our 
reasons. So, how are we to spell out the minimal notion? 
 
 
7.3. JUSTIFICATION AND HEURISTICS 
My suggestion is the following: There are roughly two kinds of proc-
esses that endow agents with justification in taking some things to be 
true rather than others, corresponding to two extremes on a contin-
uum. The first one corresponds to a particular kind of acts, namely 
acts of reasoning. The second corresponds to unconscious belief-
forming processes. I will take it that the workings of the former may 
be properly modeled as conscious heuristics or reasoning strategies—or 
“thinking about how we may better think about the world,” as Mi-
chael Bishop and J. D. Trout has put it recently6—and the latter as 
unconscious heuristics. 
Considering what has just been argued about JUSTIFICATION 
playing the role of flagging appropriate sources of information, and 
that the appropriateness in question is most plausibly understood in 
relation to what we strive for as epistemic beings, namely (epistemi-
cally significant) true beliefs, the following presents a natural first 
approximation of a framework of justificatory evaluation: 
 
S is justified in believing that p to the extent that p is produced 
by heuristics that tend to produce true belief. 
 
Several qualifications are called for (four, to be exact). First, given the 
above distinction between unconscious heuristics and reasoning 
strategies (i.e., conscious heuristics), it is possible to distinguish be-
tween two aspects of justification, namely what Goldman has referred 
to as primary and secondary justifiedness.7 The former corresponds to the 
use of unconscious heuristics that tend to produce true belief. The 
                                                           
6 See Bishop and Trout (2005). 
7 See Goldman (1986, p. 93). 
 211 
latter is a slightly more complex condition on reasoning strategies (or 
what Goldman calls methods), requiring that they not only (a) tend to 
produce true belief, but also (b) are acquired by way of other strategies 
or belief-forming processes that tend to produce true belief. I will 
follow Goldman in taking justification to require both primary and 
secondary justifiedness (to the extent that the latter applies, of 
course—not all justification involves the use of reasoning strategies). 
This is supposed to mirror the plausible assumption that it is not only 
desirable to form one’s beliefs by way of reliable belief-forming proc-
esses and use the right reasoning strategies, but also that one is using 
the right strategies for the right reasons. Hence, a person that employs an 
appropriate reasoning strategy might still be unjustified, if employed 
on the mere basis of, say, guesswork or wishful thinking—supposedly, 
two highly unreliable (unconscious) heuristics. In the following, I will 
refer to the belief-forming processes or strategies involved in the 
(conscious or unconscious) selection of (other) strategies as strategy 
determining heuristics. 
Second, in the taxonomy introduced in chapter 2, all norms 
invoking JUSTIFICATION are generally normative, since they all (attempt 
to) designate something that is conducive to one of our main epis-
temic goals, i.e., truth. However, only the norms invoking JUSTIFICA-
TION on the level of reasoning strategies are endowed with action-
guiding normativity. In other words, the distinction between general 
and action-guiding normativity enables us to say not only why certain 
unconscious heuristics are epistemically good—they are conducive to 
truth, which is one of our main epistemic goals—but also in what way 
the general form of normativity that, thereby, applies to norms in-
volving JUSTIFICATION in terms of appropriate unconscious heuristics 
differs from the kind of action-guiding normativity that applies to 
norms that cite reasoning strategies; while both kinds of heuristics 
may be epistemically good, only one of them designates factors that 
we may adopt, reject or revise (more or less) voluntarily. This distinc-
tion will be particularly crucial in the next chapter, where we consider 
different attempts to improve our epistemic outlooks by developing 
sound reasoning strategies. 
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7.4. RELIABILITY, POWER, AND EPISTEMICALLY RELEVANT WORLDS 
This brings us to the third qualification: What does it mean that heu-
ristics “tend to produce true beliefs”? To a first approximation, and as 
hinted in previous passages, this may be captured in terms of reliabil-
ity—a notion that we already are familiar with from the discussion of 
introspective access in chapter 6. Here, a perfectly reliable heuristic is a 
heuristic that is safe in that it generates a belief in p only if p is, in fact, 
true, and (imperfectly) reliable to the extent that it approximates this 
ideal. However, while reliability, so construed, might shield us against 
error, it does not combat ignorance. For this reason, epistemologists 
have rightly stressed the importance of invoking a second epistemic 
quality of heuristics, namely power, where a powerful heuristic is one 
that produces a large number of true beliefs.8  
So, considering our epistemic goal, as brought out by (D1*) 
and (D2*), we may explain why we should care about justification: If 
we understand justification in terms of heuristics that are reliable and 
powerful, justification enables us to attain our epistemic goals, since 
reliable and powerful heuristics are such that (a) they generate a lot of 
true belief and (b) the set of beliefs thereby generated will contain a 
majority of true beliefs. In analogy with our discussion of introspec-
tive access, let us refer to heuristics that are both reliable and powerful 
as effective.9 This motivates the following reformulation: 
 
S is justified in believing that p to the extent that p is produced 
by effective heuristics, i.e., heuristics (i) generate a lot of true 
beliefs, and (ii) generate a set of belief that contains a majority 
of true beliefs. 
                                                           
8 See, e.g., Goldman (1986, chapter 6) and Henderson and Horgan (2001, p. 
229). 
9 I will not address the question as to exactly how to individuate beliefs, but 
instead assume that natural science either is or will be able to provide criteria 
for making such individuations. 
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This brings us to the fourth qualification, consisting in a specification 
of the set of possible worlds in which heuristics have to satisfy condi-
tions (i) and (ii) to be properly counted as effective. For example, 
demanding that they are reliable in all possible worlds is obviously too 
strong a requirement, if we also want them to be at all powerful, since 
only more or less non-generating processes are reliable in all possible 
worlds (i.e., under all circumstances). Furthermore, a lot of processes 
that are intuitively reliable, in that they serve our needs perfectly well 
in the actual world, would come out unreliable on this reading only 
because they would be completely useless in distant possible worlds. 
On the other hand, demanding that the processes only need to be 
reliable in the actual world would be too weak a requirement, since it 
would not rule out a lot of processes that are reasonably categorized 
as unreliable in that they would yield falsities if the world was only 
slightly less cooperative. 
For this reason, it is desirable to delimit the set of possible 
worlds that are relevant to the kind of epistemic evaluation at issue. 
More specifically, we want to identify a set of possible worlds that is 
richer than the one containing only the actual world, but still leaves 
out worlds that are simply too bizarre to enter into our epistemic 
evaluations. David Henderson and Terence Horgan have suggested 
that what we are after here are the epistemically relevant possible worlds. 
Henderson and Horgan characterizes these worlds as those that sat-
isfy the dual criteria of being such that the epistemic agents therein (a) 
have appearances of roughly the same character as we do in our (ac-
tual world) everyday experiences, but (b) are not just brains in vats 
governed by evil demons or malevolent scientists who make sure that 
the epistemic agents only receive deceptive inputs.10 
I believe that Henderson and Horgan are on to something 
here but that their particular characterization is somewhat off the 
mark and in need of modification. As for condition (a), the best way 
to understand why we would want to restrict the set of epistemically 
                                                           
10 See Henderson and Horgan (2001, p. 237). 
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relevant worlds to worlds in which agents have appearances of a char-
acter similar to ours is to consider the kind of situations in which we 
typically evaluate epistemic inquirers. Not surprisingly, those situa-
tions are, from the standpoint of what is metaphysically possible (not 
to mention logically possible) quite ordinary. For one thing, they are 
situations in which a certain set of natural laws hold, namely our natu-
ral laws. These natural laws guarantee a certain degree of stability to 
our epistemic conditions—a stability that enables us to interact suc-
cessfully with the world by inductive means. More specifically, given a 
set of natural laws (and note that these laws need not be determinis-
tic), and a set of initial conditions, some phenomena occur with a 
substantially greater likelihood than others. As a consequence, even 
given the realm of all nomologically possible worlds, we tend to find 
ourselves in the subset of the nomologically possible worlds that is 
made up of the worlds that are either determined or more likely to 
become actualized (depending on whether determinism holds or not), 
given the state of what, at the moment, happens to be the actual 
world. 
In other words, there are two factors relevant to the stability 
that enables us to interact successfully with the world by way of in-
ductive reasoning, pertaining to, first, a constant set of natural laws 
and, second, the future events (if determinism is true) or chance dis-
tributions (if determinism is false) that those laws give rise to when 
combined with the initial conditions provided by the state of the 
(actual) world. It is exactly under these conditions that we negotiate 
the world as epistemic inquirers, which should be reflected in our 
epistemic concepts. Consequently, it would not only be pointless but 
probably also contra-productive and costly to devise our epistemic 
concepts and norms for anything but these very conditions. Hence, 
the epistemically relevant worlds are, to a first approximation, a subset 
of the nomologically possible worlds, namely the subset consisting in 
the worlds where the initial conditions are similar to the ones in the 
actual world. Characterized thus, it is, furthermore, reasonable to 
assume that the appearances of agents in epistemically relevant worlds 
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will be of, roughly, the same character as ours, just like Henderson 
and Horgan notes. 
However, nothing said so far rules out the scenarios men-
tioned in (b). To understand why someone would consider that a 
problem we need to get clearer on the way in which such scenarios 
typically are introduced. In short, they are usually introduced within 
the framework of a methodology not too different from DCA and 
under the assumption that the proper role of epistemology is to ex-
haustively elucidate concepts. More specifically, consider the follow-
ing scenario: Alice lives in our world. As far as epistemic conduct 
goes, she is neither better nor worse than most of her fellow inquirers. 
Furthermore, her beliefs are formed in the way beliefs usually are 
formed here, i.e., through sense perception, reasoning on various 
levels of abstraction, etc. As it happens, these ways of forming beliefs 
are reliable in our world, in the sense that they tend to generate an 
epistemic track record with a larger proportion of true than of false 
beliefs. Beth, on the other hand, lives in another possible world. She 
is just as epistemically well behaved as Alice and her beliefs are 
formed through the same kind of cognitive faculties as Alice’s. In fact, 
they can even be considered to be epistemic twins, having qualita-
tively identical cognitive input at all times. Beth, however, happens to 
be subject to a scientific experiment by a group of evil demons, where 
her brain has been hooked up to a computer that feeds her with an 
interactive and perfectly consistent set of appearances in response to 
which she comes to form beliefs that are inadvertently false about the 
external world. Still, many philosophers feel inclined to say that Alice 
and Beth, nevertheless, can be justified to the same extent, and that 
justification, hence, cannot be a question of mere reliability.11 
Arguments like these only go so far, however, and, more im-
portantly for our purposes, they do not go very far at all in this con-
text. To see this, consider the conditions under which arguments like 
the one above would carry some force, namely if we (a) were con-
                                                           
11 See Lehrer and Cohen (1983, pp. 192-193) and BonJour and Sosa (2003, p. 
27) for arguments along these lines. 
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cerned with elucidating a pre-existing concepts, (b) took an armchair 
probing of our categorization intuitions to be a plausible way to do so, 
and, furthermore, (c) were working under the assumption that Exhaus-
tiveness was a plausible desideratum to invoke in such elucidations. As 
it happens, we are doing none of this here. For one thing, we are not 
trying to elucidate a pre-existing concept; we are trying to devise a 
new one that will serve us better than the ones discussed in chapters 5 
and 6. For another, and for reasons discussed in chapters 1 and 2, we 
would not necessarily take armchair probing of categorization intui-
tions to be a very promising way to elucidate such pre-existing con-
cepts if that was at all our mission, considering the far more rigorous 
methods of contemporary cognitive science. Finally, and as we have 
seen in chapter 3 and 4, there is no obvious reason why we, as far as 
the elucidation of concepts go, would need anything but a fairly mod-
est and far from exhaustive accounts of our epistemic concepts—as 
yielded by Meaning Analysis, not traditional conceptual analysis—in 
order to make epistemological progress. That is why the intuitive 
judgments that one might or might not be prone to make in response 
to scenarios of the above kind are largely irrelevant to the issue at 
hand, and why we may simply conclude that the set of epistemically 
relevant worlds is the subset of the nomologically possible worlds 
with initial conditions similar to the ones in the actual world. 
At the same time, it will serve us well to look closer at some of 
the scenarios that are typically taken to be problematic to the kind of 
account that is being defended here, if only to get a better idea of the 
implications of the account at issue. Before doing this, however, we 
need to fully spell out our reconstructed concept. More specifically, in 
light of what has been argued above, I take it that we may reformulate 
our characterization along the following lines: 
 
A Reconstructed Concept of Justification (RC) 
S is justified in believing that p to the extent that p is produced 
by effective heuristics, i.e., heuristics that, in all or a very wide 
sub-set of the epistemically relevant worlds, (i) generate a lot of true 
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beliefs, and (ii) generate a set of belief that will contain a ma-
jority of true beliefs. 
 
It should be noted that RC, unlike IBAI, constitutes the outline of a 
kind of account that actually meets the two important desiderata that 
have been occupying us over the course of the present inquiry, and 
that provided the very standards that served to disqualify IBAI. More 
specifically, RC not only (a) pertains to cognitively accessible factors, such 
as belief outputs, doxastic track-records of belief-forming processes 
and reasoning strategies, etc., but also (b) is intimately connected to 
what is typically considered to be one of the main epistemic goals, 
namely truth. 
 
 
7.5. APPLYING THE RECONSTRUCTED CONCEPT 
Next, let us get a somewhat firmer grip on RC by considering a cou-
ple of applications, especially in relation to the supposedly problem-
atic scenarios alluded to in the above.  
First, testimonial warrant. On RC, a person, S, is justified in 
believing that p as a result of learning that p from U if and only if (a) 
consulting U on issues of the type to which p belongs constitutes an 
effective reasoning strategy, and (b) the unconscious heuristics in-
volved in the formation of the belief that p are efficient, especially in 
so far as they pertain to the strategy determining heuristics at work, 
i.e., the heuristics responsible for S opting for consulting U in the first 
place. For example, say that I want to know whether the Red Sox beat 
the Yankees last weekend. I consult one of my colleagues and learn 
that, yes, the Red Sox did actually beat the Yankees. Is my belief justi-
fied? Yes, to the extent that there is nothing awry with my uncon-
scious belief-forming heuristics, consulting my colleague on baseball 
related issues constitutes an effective reasoning strategy (say, my col-
league would never miss a Red Sox or Yankees game and is, hence, a 
reliable informant when it comes to the outcome of Red Sox or Yan-
kees games), and I chose to consult her as the result of an effective 
heuristic (say, as a result of having had many discussions with her 
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about baseball and always finding her to provide me with accurate 
information, and, hence, coming to trust her judgment, as opposed to 
simply choosing a colleague at random). 
Next, let us consider inferential warrant. On RC, a person, S, 
is justified in believing that p as a result of inferring it from a set of 
other propositions by way of certain inference rule if and only if (a) 
applying the rule in question constitutes an effective reasoning strat-
egy in relation to problems of the type to which p belongs, and (b) the 
unconscious heuristics involved in the formation of the belief that p 
are effective, especially in so far as they pertain to strategy determin-
ing heuristics, i.e., the heuristics involved in S’s choice to opt for the 
rule in the first place. For example, say that I am working as a sales 
clerk and a cash register malfunction forces me to add the prices of 
my costumers’ items with the help of pen, paper, and long addition. 
Are the beliefs that I reach about the totals of my customers’ items 
justified? Yes, to the extent that there is nothing (substantially) wrong 
with my unconscious belief-forming heuristics, using long addition 
constitutes an effective reasoning strategy to add (the relevant kind of) 
numbers, and I opted for long addition as a result of an effective 
heuristic, i.e., not by, say, simply guessing that that was an appropriate 
strategy to use. 
Finally, let us turn to perceptual warrant. A person is justified 
in believing that p as a result of perception if and only if the belief-
forming processes operative in the production of her belief that p 
constitute effective heuristics within the relevant situation. Say, for 
example, that I see a bird in the tree outside my office window and I, 
as a result, come to form a belief that there is a bird on the tree out-
side my office window. Am I justified in my belief? Yes, to the extent 
that forming perceptual beliefs about middle-sized objects under the 
relevant circumstances constitutes an effective heuristic. As the reader 
notes, there is no mentioning of any kind of reasoning strategy in the 
case of perception. One way to bring out the plausibility of describing 
perceptual warrant thus is by considering the case of the reliable clair-
voyant Norman, who, unbeknownst to him, is capable of effectively 
coming to believe things within a specific domain—say, pertaining to 
 219 
the whereabouts of the American President—by way of clairvoyance. 
More than this, Norman has no information whatsoever about the 
reliability or power of his of clairvoyance; his clairvoyant beliefs are 
simply spontaneously formed and seem to Norman to come from 
nowhere. This, some epistemologists feel inclined to say, presents a 
problem for any account of justification essentially defined in terms of 
reliability and power, since such accounts seem to commit us to say-
ing that, due to the effectiveness of Norman’s clairvoyant faculty, the 
resulting beliefs are justified.12 
Before evaluating this claim, however, the example needs to be 
described more in depth. More specifically, it needs to be specified 
which of the following is the case: 
 
(7.5.1)  Norman comes to believe certain things effectively 
by way of his clairvoyant faculty, and does, in doing 
so, not rely on any reasoning strategy. 
(7.5.2)  Norman comes to believe certain things effectively 
by way of his clairvoyant faculty, and does, in doing 
so, rely, in part, on a reasoning strategy along the fol-
lowing lines: “Affirm that which comes to you spon-
taneously and seemingly from nowhere.” 
 
If (7.5.1) provides the correct reading of the scenario, it should be 
noted that we often—indeed, constantly—find ourselves in Norman-
like scenarios, namely when it comes to our ordinary perceptual be-
liefs. After all, we most often do not know and in many cases do not 
even have any beliefs to the effect that our perceptual faculties are 
effective. Does this make all our perceptual beliefs unjustified? That 
seems unreasonable. After all, why would everyone short of neuro-
logical or cognitive scientific expertise, or anyone living at a time prior 
                                                           
12 See BonJour (1985) for the original formulation of this case. Bonjour for-
mulates the case exclusively in terms of reliability. If anything, my 
reformulation in terms of effectiveness creates an even stronger case against 
the reliabilist. 
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to anything even close to a correct, scientific description of our per-
ceptual apparatus, be unable to form justified perceptual beliefs? I see 
no reason why. 
If (7.5.2) provides the correct reading, however, we have to 
remember that RC not only requires effective belief-forming proc-
esses, but also effective reasoning strategies. Clearly, affirming that 
which comes to one spontaneously and seemingly from nowhere is 
not, in general, an effective reasoning strategy—which is exactly the 
kind of strategy that Norman, on this description, is following. Hence, 
in this case, RC yields the verdict that Norman is, in fact, unjustified, 
which, according to the proponents of the problem of reliable clair-
voyance is the correct answer. 
But what about if Norman’s reliable clairvoyance was, in fact, 
frail? In that case, RC would yield the verdict that he would be unjusti-
fied. But given the above analogy between Norman and ordinary 
perceivers, this raises a troubling question: What if our perceptual 
faculties are frail? This brings us to yet another scenario that has been 
considered a problem for accounts of justification defined in terms of 
reliability and power, and that was briefly attended to above: the evil 
demon scenario. Remember, the two main characters in the evil de-
mon scenario are Alice and Beth, both of whom are just as responsi-
ble, but only the former of which forms her belief by way of effective 
heuristics. Clearly, RC yields the verdict that Alice and Beth are not 
justified to the same degree—Alice is justified while Beth is not. I do 
not wish to deny that this runs contrary to some epistemologists’ 
intuitions. However, I do wish to deny that this is a very wise intuition 
to hold dear. More specifically, I will do two things: First, I will iden-
tify the general assumption that yields this particular judgment in the 
evil demon scenario, and then, by applying these assumptions in other 
cases, show why they are misguided.  
As for the first step, I take it that the judgment that Beth is 
justified stems from two assumptions: (a) that Anna and Beth are just 
as epistemically responsible, and that (b) that there cannot be a differ-
ence in justificatory status without a difference in epistemic responsi-
bility. Before evaluating these assumptions, we need to better under-
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stand the notion of epistemic responsibility at work here. To my 
mind, there are two general ways in which such responsibility can be 
cashed out: 
 
Subjective Responsibility (SR) 
A subject, S, is epistemically responsible iff she does her best 
to make sure that her beliefs are formed in accordance with 
what she takes to be the ideal way of forming beliefs. 
 
Objective Responsibility (OR) 
A subject, S, is epistemically responsible iff she does her best 
to make sure that her beliefs are formed in accordance with 
what is, in fact, the ideal way of forming beliefs (whether or 
not she takes this to constitute the ideal way of forming be-
liefs). 
 
Now, assume that we are working with SR, and consider the follow-
ing scenario:  
 
The Diligent Guesser 
Celia forms a large set of her beliefs by way of guessing. More 
than this, she diligently makes sure that everything she believes 
by other means, i.e., through sense perception, reasoning on 
various levels of abstraction, etc., is in accordance with what 
she takes to be the ideal way of forming beliefs, namely 
through guesswork. However, guesswork is an unreliable way 
of forming beliefs. 
 
Is Celia justified? If we stick to SR, and hold on to (a) and (b) above, 
we would have to say that Celia is, in fact, justified—perhaps even 
more justified than Alice and Beth, namely if Celia’s diligence and 
sense of epistemic responsibility exceeds that of Alice and Beth’s. 
After all, she is doing her very best to make sure that her beliefs are 
formed in accordance with what she takes to be the ideal way of form-
ing beliefs. That she happens to be gravely mistaken in this is simply 
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beside the point on an SR reading of responsibility. I take this to 
provide us with sufficient reason to reject SR as an implausible ac-
count of epistemic responsibility. 
This leaves us with OR. However, on OR, Celia comes out un-
justified, at least if we let the ideal way of forming beliefs be linked to 
that which is conducive to the formation of true belief—something 
that, as we have seen, lies at the very heart of epistemic evaluation. 
Furthermore, on OR, our evil demon victim Beth turns out to be 
unjustified too. In other words, on pain of subscribing to an implau-
sible account of epistemic responsibility, namely the one that not only 
seems to be at work in leading some of us to believe that Beth is, in 
fact, justified, and but also commits us to saying that Celia is justified 
too, we will have to agree that degree of justification is intimately 
connected to the effectiveness of the underlying belief-forming proc-
esses and reasoning strategies. And this, as we have seen, is exactly 
what RC suggests. 
 
 
7.6. HOW SCIENCE SOLVES THE GENERALITY PROBLEM 
I now turn to what some epistemologists take to be a wide-ranging 
problem for an account like RC, due to the fact that it is formulated in 
terms of types of heuristics. Some epistemologists—perhaps most 
persistently Richard Feldman and Earl Conee—have viewed this as a 
potential problem: How, they ask, are we to identify the particular 
type relevant to the evaluation of a process or method’s tendency to 
generate true belief, given that every process or method token, like 
any particular anything, is an instance of indefinitely many types?13 
This is the so-called generality problem. 
In a recent paper, Klemens Kappel makes a helpful distinction 
between recognitional capacities and theories of determination, where the 
former make up (conscious or tacit) capacities to pick out relevant 
types, and the latter constitute substantial theories about why certain 
                                                           
13 See, e.g., Feldman and Conee (1998), and Feldman (1993; 1985). See also 
Plantinga (1988). 
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types are relevant, while others are not.14 What those moved by the 
generality problem want to draw our attention to is that we seldom—
if ever—are in possession of anything like a full-fledged theory of 
determination. Moreover, they take this to present a problem for any 
account understanding knowledge or justification (in part or in whole) 
in terms of the reliability or power of belief-forming processes and 
reasoning strategies since  
 
(7.6.1)  any theory defining justification in terms of process 
or method types needs some way of distinguishing 
the relevant from the irrelevant types, and  
(7.6.2)  the only way to do so is by way of a full-fledged the-
ory of determination.  
 
For simplicity’s sake, let us focus on accounts formulated in terms of 
reliability, since any point made against such an account may be easily 
reformulated in terms of power (as will any reply to such a point). 
Moreover, let us refer to any such account as reliabilist. Now, why do 
reliabilist accounts need a way to distinguish relevant from irrelevant 
types? The reason is that, in want of a way to distinguish processes 
and methods thus, the reliabilist account runs the risk of being empty. 
After all, on reliabilism, a belief is, to a first approximation, justified in 
so far as it is generated by reliable heuristics. This, however, tells us 
nothing about what beliefs are justified, unless combined with a story 
about what heuristic type a particular belief-forming process or 
method token belongs to—i.e., what is, in fact, the relevant type. 
Hence, Feldman:  
 
We have no idea what the theory implies about the epistemic 
status of beliefs until we know which types are relevant to 
                                                           
14 See Kappel (2006). Kappel actually refers to recognitional capacities as 
criteria of relevance, but I have settled for the former terminology since I con-
sider it not only more in line with entrenched philosophical terminology, but 
also a more fitting term for the phenomenon at issue. 
 224 
their evaluation. Without specifying relevant types, the theory 
is seriously incomplete.15  
 
This is the first of two aspects of the problem of generality. I will 
refer to this aspect as the problem of vacuity. This brings us to (7.6.2) and 
the idea that the only way to provide such a story about the relevancy 
of types is by way of a full-fledged theory of determination, i.e., a 
substantial theory about the features that make a process or method 
type relevant. I will eventually reject this assumption and claim that 
we can solve not only the problem of vacuity but also the second 
aspect of the generality problem—an aspect that I will refer to as the 
problem of testability—with mere recourse to certain recognitional ca-
pacities that, furthermore, seem to be at work in a particularly refined 
and determinate form in the natural sciences. First, however, I will 
spell out this second aspect by looking into and criticizing what has 
come to be a particularly popular way of trying to solve the generality 
problem, while subscribing to both (7.6.1) and (7.6.2) above, namely 
psychological realism. 
Psychological realism tries to solve the generality problem by 
rejecting what seems to be an underlying assumption among many of 
the latter’s proponents, namely that there are no objective, psycho-
logical facts of the matter that determine which type is the relevant 
one, i.e., the type of which the particular process or method should be 
deemed a token. Elaborating on Alvin Goldman’s idea of cognitive 
processes as functional operations or procedures that map inputs onto 
outputs,16 William Alston writes: 
 
[…] every belief formation involves the activation of a psycho-
logically realized function. That activation yields a belief with a 
propositional content that is a certain function of the proxi-
mate input. This function will determine both what features of 
the input have a bearing on the belief output and what bearing 
                                                           
15 Feldman (1993, p. 41). 
16 See Goldman (1979). 
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they have, that is, how the content of the belief is determined 
by those features.17 
 
In other words, the causally operative function determines the epis-
temologically relevant type. The underlying assumption here is a form 
of psychological realism, an idea to the effect “that there is always a 
unique correct answer to the question ‘What mechanism, embodying 
what function, was operative in the generation of this belief?’”18 This 
assumption might, of course, be challenged, but it is important to 
note that, in order to come to terms with the generality problem, the 
assumption need not necessarily be that bold. For one thing, it is both 
compatible with a fallible access to the facts of the matter, as well as 
some degree of indeterminacy of psychological functions—as long as 
the degree of determinacy is sufficient to fix the relevant type, of 
course. 
However, there is another problem with this solution: It runs 
the risk of simply relocating the problem of vacuity. To see this, note 
what kind of work psychological realism is supposed to do here: it is 
supposed to makes sure that there is always a unique and correct 
answer to the question of what functional operation is at work in the 
formation of a token belief. However, it is somewhat unclear why the 
generality problem cannot just as well be raised for (types of) func-
tional operations as for belief-forming process or method types. Re-
member, it is the former that is supposed to determine the relevant 
features of the latter, and if the latter can instantiate an indefinite 
number of kinds, why cannot the former do the same? Functional 
operations are specified by proximate input and belief output, and 
both of these factors can be specified along the lines of a rich multi-
tude of aspects, which is exactly the kind of conditions that got the 
generality problem off the ground on the level of belief-forming 
processes and methods. And if the mere purpose of psychological 
realism is to ban these kinds of question in the case of functional 
                                                           
17 Alston (2005, p. 126). 
18 Alston (2005, p. 139). 
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operations, then why not simply cut the middleman and postulate that 
there is always a uniquely correct answer already at the level of belief-
forming processes and methods? I cannot see why that strategy would 
be any less ad hoc. 
Now, I do not want to claim that this problem is insurmount-
able. In fact, I believe that promising attempts have been made at 
solving it.19 However, what I do want to claim is that we do not need 
psychological realism in order to deal with the generality problem, for 
the simple reason that we do not need to provide a theory of deter-
mination in order to come to terms with the latter—or so I will argue. 
More specifically, I will, in the following, deny (7.6.2) and argue that 
(7.6.1) may be handled without reference to anything like a theory of 
determination. In doing this, I will also address a potentially serious 
methodological problem raised by Feldman, introduced in the follow-
ing paragraph: 
 
If every belief is an instance of many types, some reliable and 
some not, by picking the right type for any particular case, you 
can make it look like a positive instance of reliabilism or a 
counterexample to the theory. It may be that the theory looks 
good to its advocates simply because they've gerrymandered 
the types to make it have the right results. Similarly, reliabilism 
may look bad to its critics partly because they gerrymander 
types in ways that appear to pin incorrect implications on the 
theory.20 
 
This is the aforementioned problem of testability; without a robust way 
of adjudicating claims about the relevancy of types, philosophers are 
free to define relevance in a way that suits their particular theory. 
However, I will deny Feldman’s assumption that any strategy aiming 
to adjudicate such disputes on a case-by-case basis, rather than with 
                                                           
19 See, e.g., Beebe (2004), especially what he refers to as the second part of his 
solution. 
20 Feldman (1993, p. 42). 
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reference to a theory of determination, necessarily has to be “arbitrary 
and ad hoc” and, hence, philosophically unacceptable.21 Next, I will 
discuss the typing of ordinary, middle-sized objects and, thereby, 
provide a framework for an elaboration on how a more refined and 
consistent case-by-case adjudication, of exactly the kind that may 
solve generality problems, regularly and consistently takes place within 
the sciences in relation to the typing of mental and methodological 
tokens. 
We may start out by noting that successful inductive inference 
requires not only (a) an ability to pick up on regularities but also (b) on-
point dispositions to posit certain underlying mechanisms for some of 
these regularities. This is because regularities as such are cheap and 
abundant, while the ones that matter—i.e., the ones that depend on 
actual, non-accidental structures and relations in the world—are far 
more rare but also immensely more valuable to inductive creatures. 
So, given the obvious advantage of being able to weed out the irrele-
vant and accidental from this abundance, it should come as no sur-
prise that our disposition to posit underlying mechanisms seem to be 
heavily constrained by what might just be innate, conceptual struc-
tures that, furthermore, are likely to mirror extra-mental structures in 
nature.22 
As a consequence, we are pretty good token typers. That is, we 
are pretty good at putting things (tokens) in inductively valuable cate-
gories (types). This is certainly not to say that we enter the world with 
fixed and ready beliefs about the structure of the world. Quite the 
contrary; within this possibly innate framework, our dispositions to 
posit underlying mechanisms are most likely highly sensitive to new, 
experiental data that may serve to provide further and more fine-
grained restrictions on our token typing tendencies. More specifically, 
our typing dispositions are most likely experientially adaptive through 
conceptual development.23 Although this, in no way, implies that our 
                                                           
21 Feldman (1985, p. 159). 
22 See Kornblith (1993). 
23 See, e.g., Murphy (2002) and Murphy and Medin (1985). 
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dispositions are introspectively accessible, they can, nevertheless, be 
expected to guide and influence our conduct in a variety of respects.  
Against the background of this, scientific inquiry presents a 
particularly interesting interface between hard-wired adaptations and 
acquired heuristics. In particular, I will now argue that, within the 
natural sciences, our token typing abilities extend beyond the picking 
out of middle-sized objects and phenomena in the world, to the typ-
ing of our own cognitive means and tools. More than this, successful 
typing of this sort is exactly what is required to solve the generality 
problem, and natural science can, as such, be expected to solve gener-
ality problems on a daily basis—or so I will now argue. 
Let us start by considering the typing of methodological tokens. 
For example, consider Dr. Robert Koch, who discovered the bacillus 
of tuberculosis. Now, let H be the hypothesis that tuberculosis is 
caused by a bacillus. In testing H, Koch not only relied on already 
existing methods—such as using bacterial growth media—but also 
improved upon those methods significantly. In other words, one of 
the first things Koch must have done is (a) identified what methods 
researchers had been using before him (e.g., as they pertained to the 
use of bacterial growth), (b) evaluated if those methods led to correct 
predictions and experimental success, and to what extent the domains 
of success may be related to the domain of H, and (c) applied or revised 
them correctly in relation to H. In doing this, Koch must have typed 
the token methods and, in doing so, (consciously or unconsciously) 
made substantial assumptions about which properties of the individ-
ual tokens should or should not count towards the type in question. 
The generality problem looms. So, let us ask ourselves: What kinds of 
factors is he likely to have included and excluded, respectively? 
Given substantial background knowledge as well as certain 
general (and most likely implicit) assumptions about the world, he 
most likely included factors pertaining to experimental apparatus used 
(e.g., the agar plates used to culture microorganisms), theoretical as-
sumptions made (e.g., about the conditions under which a bacillus can 
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at all be said to be the cause of a disease), and any potentially interfer-
ing factors (e.g., failure to sterilize the agar plates, or failure to prepare 
the nutrients, salts, and amino acids for the sterile dishes properly) 
while not taking into account the color of the agar plate, that the 
name of his wife (who suggested the use of agar plates) started with 
an “E,” nor that the final digit of the year of the experiment in ques-
tion was an even number. And even though there might not be any 
principled way of ruling out the latter factors as part of the type in 
question, and that Koch might have been ever so unable to construct 
a full-fledged theory of determination—again, the workings of token 
typing abilities might be ever so introspectively inaccessible—his 
background knowledge and implicit assumptions about the world still 
must have radically constrained what he, in the end, considered to be 
the relevant type. 
After all, although most often excellent at science, scientists 
are notoriously bad at describing how they do science. This is to be 
expected since an ability to φ far from always implies knowledge as to 
how one φ-s—particularly when φ-ing, like doing science, pertains to a 
large extent to practical skills and know-how. Having said that, is 
Koch likely to have identified a uniquely correct type? Probably not 
and, to this extent, the generality problem might actually be raising a 
real, practical issue. However, it should be noted that inductive suc-
cess does not require picking out uniquely correct types. Realistically 
speaking, it is likely that there will be a set of correct types that, al-
though differing in a variety of subtle details, nevertheless, all serve 
the practical purposes of correct prediction and experimental success 
well. And if so, the interesting question is not so much whether Koch 
identified a uniquely correct type, as whether the following holds: Was 
the type identified by Koch a member of the set of correct types that 
are all such that they may serve the practical purposes of correct pre-
diction and experimental success to a satisfactory degree? Given the 
success of his research, the answer would have to be ‘yes.’ 
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Let us now turn to the ability to type more basic, mental to-
kens. After all, in evaluating H, Koch must not only have typed a set 
of methodological tokens, but also been sensitive to a whole host of 
mental tokens, and, thereby, to the conditions under which he could 
trust his own perceptual apparatus. More specifically, in typing the 
mental thus, he most likely must have been sensitive to the lighting 
conditions in the room of the experiment as well as to any interfering 
factors pertaining to, say, fatigue and distractions. However, experi-
mental success in no way required that he was sensitive to whether he 
happened to wear a red sweater at the time of the experiment, that his 
first name started with an “R,” nor that the experiment took place on, 
say, a Thursday. In other words, even though there might not be any 
principled way to rule out the latter factors as part of the type in ques-
tion—again, regularities as such are cheap—nor possible to construct a 
full-fledged theory of determination for the relevant mental types, his 
background knowledge and previous experience must have radically 
constrained what he, in the end, would have considered relevant, by 
virtue of his sensitivity to the types that served the practical purposes 
of accurate prediction and experimental success to a satisfactory de-
gree. 
Similar examples are abundant in the history of science. Take 
Tycho Brahe, for example. Brahe was one of the first astronomers to 
conduct exact, astronomical observations and his data were inherited 
by Johannes Kepler who, as a result, was able to finish the project, 
started by Copernicus, of providing a heliocentric theory of the solar 
system. Brahe famously rejected the idea that stars and other astro-
nomical objects were attached to layered crystalline spheres, and, in 
conducting his observations, more or less had to revise all existing 
astronomical tables. Needless to say, this cannot have been a small 
task. When claiming that everyone else is wrong, you better check 
your digits and the way in which you have produced them. As such, 
Brahe’s project must have required a minute attention to methodol-
ogy, in the identification, evaluation, application, and revision of pre-
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viously accepted methods (e.g., as those methods pertained to the use 
of astronomical tables). Furthermore, Brahe must not only have been 
sensitive to the (relevant) conditions under which he could trust his 
own perceptual apparatus (e.g., in astronomical observation), or per-
form the required reasoning task (e.g., in calculation and inference); 
he also employed state of the art equipment the proper use of which 
required detailed technological knowledge, hosts of experimental 
assumptions, as well an impressive sensitivity to possibly interfering 
factors. And the fact that his results not only were some fifty times 
more accurate than that of Jonathan Muller’s—the pupil of George 
Purbach, the founder of observational astronomy—but also were 
applied with astounding success by astronomers as well as farmers, 
sailors, and watchmakers, provided as good reasons as any that he got 
many things right.24 Needless to say, this would, most likely, have 
been impossible if he was unable to pick out relevant methodological 
and mental types. 
Consider also Charles Darwin—the father of the theory of 
evolution and natural selection. Just like Brahe, Darwin came to con-
struct theories that conflicted with what, in many ways, was the re-
ceived view at the time. Substantial parts of his impressive set of data 
were collected over the course of a six-year trip over the world on the 
Beagle, but the formulation of the theory that Darwin eventually was 
to endorse would have been impossible if it was not also for his ability 
for theoretical synthesis. Almost fifty years before Darwin set about 
his journey on the Beagle, geologist James Hutton reached the conclu-
sion that the world was, most likely, hundreds of thousands of years 
old—not just over six thousand, like it says in the Bible. Charles Lyell 
was soon to provide an, at the time, even more stunning hypothesis, 
when he claimed that the world might even be millions of years old.  
This provided a new framework for explaining natural phe-
nomena and, in particular, the possibility for small, incremental 
                                                           
24 Mason (1962, p. 134). 
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change making a big difference in the long run. Darwin combined this 
framework with a principle that he essentially borrowed from the 
economist and demographer Thomas Malthus, to the effect that hu-
mans—and, Darwin hypothesized, animals in general—tend to pro-
duce a surplus of offspring despite limited resources. Providing the 
missing piece of the puzzle, Darwin noted that this made possible an 
evolution of species, such that, given natural intra-species differences as 
a result of the offspring never being perfect copies of their ancestors, 
only those most fit for survival under the conditions provided will get 
the chance to reproduce their kind, which, over time, will give rise to 
adaptations as a result of a natural selection.  
This is relevant to the matters at hand since such a remarkable 
synthesis of methods and data (the results of which were highly con-
troversial) only are possible given an extraordinary attention to meth-
odological considerations, requiring not only an ability to (a) identify 
methods correctly (and, hence, demarcate the relevant from the ir-
relevant factors) and (b) evaluate their robustness successfully—i.e., 
determine the extent to which they may be applied across experimen-
tal and theoretical domains—but also (c) apply or revise them within 
the new domain. And only given an exceptional sensitivity to the 
relevant aspects of methods can lessons from such diverse fields as 
geology, economy, and demography be successfully applied in biol-
ogy. Darwin was, most likely, fully aware of this, and, upon returning 
from his journey on the Beagle, spent twenty three years deliberating 
over his empirical data, and the conclusions that could be inferred 
from them, before publishing his results in 1859, probably being 
highly sensitive not only to the epistemic qualities of the methods 
used, but also to the mental types pertaining to which he could trust 
his perceptual apparatus (e.g., in observing biological phenomena over 
extended periods of time under varying circumstances), or perform 
the required reasoning task (e.g., in inference).25 
                                                           
25 Mason (1962, pp. 416-417). 
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By way of conclusion, successful science involves inquirers 
that are on-point token typers of the mental as well as of the meth-
odological. In other words, within successful science, there are people 
who are good token typers with respect to the very domain of the 
generality problem—belief-forming processes and methods—and 
that, as such, solve generality problems on a daily basis. Furthermore, 
the fact that science constantly solves generality problems provides us 
with the material to solve the problem of vacuity. From the theoreti-
cal end, reliabilism suggests that justification is a matter of reliable 
belief-formation. From the practical end, science fills in the details as 
for exactly what types individual belief tokens fall under. However, 
this is not done by way of anything like a full-fledged theory of de-
termination (again, scientists are notoriously bad at describing their 
own practice), but by virtue of demonstrably on-point capacities to 
distinguish relevant from irrelevant types on a case-by-case basis, as 
illustrated by the above examples from the history of science. To-
gether, science and reliabilism, thereby, solve the problem of vacuity.  
But what about the problem of testability? Remember, the 
problem of testability was the problem that philosophers might arbi-
trarily type tokens in a way that favors their particular theory. As I 
framed the problem above, it indicated a need for an adjudicator who 
can settle disputes regarding the typing of the mental and methodo-
logical, in cases where people’s categorizations differ in ways that (a) 
makes a difference as for the evaluation of theories of justification, 
and (b) cannot simply be resolved through discussion or deliberation. 
In light of the recognitional capacities called attention to above, and 
the fact that science constitutes one of our most successful and fruit-
ful intellectual endeavors, I suggest that science can be expected to 
constitute a very promising—if not the most promising—candidate for 
successfully adjudicating relevancy claims. That is, in cases where 
there is actually a genuine dispute as for what type a particular token 
belongs to (and I suspect that such disputes are somewhat less com-
mon than the proponents of the generality problem seem to think), 
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science may step in and use its recognitional capacities to either nar-
row down the live options or, if that does not solve the dispute, actu-
ally pick out the relevant type, understood either as a uniquely correct 
type, or a type that is part of a set of types that all serve the purpose 
of accurate prediction and experimental success to a sufficient degree. 
Clearly, this is not to say that scientists always coincide in their catego-
rization claims. However, it is to say that the scientists behind success-
ful science will be able to reach verdicts determinate enough to solve 
most relevancy disputes, so as to ensure that philosopher’s relevancy 
claims are not just arbitrarily connected to the theory one happens to 
favor—and this is all the adjudication that we need. This solves the 
problem of testability, and concludes my solution to the generality 
problem. 
 
 
7.7. IMPLICATIONS AND PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Now, let us turn to the epistemological implications of RC. To under-
stand these implications, we first need to remember that unconscious 
heuristics tend to pertain to involuntary, often hard-wired processes, 
while reasoning strategies pertain to choices over which we may (and 
often do) deliberate. This has important implications for justificatory 
discourse. In one sense, whether or not I am justified in trusting, say, 
my perceptual beliefs might be something that I can not, in any help-
ful sense, do anything about, since it pertains to the workings of my 
perceptual apparatus, the make up of which I can not (on pain of 
invasive surgery) adjust. However, given information about how I am 
thus hard-wired may enable me to design my reasoning strategies so 
as to utilize or work around whatever sub-optimal aspects of my 
perceptual apparatus that I might come by (and, in the simple percep-
tual case, perhaps simply start wearing glasses or hearing aid). 
This generalizes to all unconscious processes and provides an 
interesting point of departure for guidance directed epistemology. 
Against the background of the empirical work done on the actual 
track-records of lower order and largely automatic mental processes 
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and heuristics, such epistemology plays a role in the development of 
reasoning strategies that specify ways to reason—particularly in rela-
tion to the collection and processing of evidence—that tend to be 
effective, taking into account the imperfections as well as adaptive 
success of lower-order belief-forming processes and heuristics. This 
focus on reasoning strategies is also motivated by the fact that the 
type of question facing the typical epistemic inquirer, arguably, is not 
so much (the overly philosophical) “How do I act in accordance with 
my epistemic duties?” or “Do I have any good reasons to think that 
any of my beliefs about the world are true?” as the following more 
straightforward question, or rather question schema: 
 
(Q3) Is it the case that p? 
 
This brings us to my plan for implementing the reconstructed concept 
of justification: Taking (Q3)—as well as its tense modified versions 
“Was it the case that p?” and “Will it be the case that p?”—as one of 
the most central question schema of epistemic inquiry, the next chap-
ter will discuss empirical research relevant to understanding the way 
we reason and what this research may teach us about how we could 
reason better. 
As it happens, such empirical work currently makes up a flour-
ishing discipline, perhaps most pertinently within cognitive psychol-
ogy and, in particular, within the influential heuristics and biases pro-
gram initiated by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky26 in the 
1970’s, as well as the more recent fast and frugal heuristics program of 
Gerd Gigerenzer and the ABC Research Group.27 Taking this work 
into account turns our task of constructively analyzing justification 
into an explicitly empirical one, since it shifts the attention from pure 
concept-oriented philosophy towards the scientific studies that tell us 
                                                           
26 See Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) for a collection of some classical 
papers within the heuristics and biases tradition, and Gilovich, Griffin, and 
Kahneman (2002) for a more recent collection of essays. 
27 See, e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) and Gigerenzer et al. (1999). 
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what does, in fact, satisfy the above criterion for effective heuristics—
something that can not be settled on a purely conceptual basis. Focus-
ing on the development of sound reasoning strategies, thereby, also 
enables us to turn the analysis of justification away from detached 
armchair speculations to hands-on prescriptive epistemology, explic-
itly directed not only at studying but also at aiding epistemic inquiry in 
providing material for identifying the very strategies and processes 
that will serve us well in the pursuit of significant truths in naturalistic 
settings. 
 
 
7.8. CONCLUSION 
The present chapter started out with the quite pervasive idea that 
being justified pertains to having good reasons for taking a (set of) 
proposition(s) to be true—an idea that we then spelled out in three 
phases. First, we returned to points made in chapters 2 and 3 about 
the more specific goal of attaining and maintaining true belief in sig-
nificant matters. Second, we ventured into the details of the specific 
purpose that JUSTIFICATION fulfills in relation to this goal, concluding 
that the purpose of JUSTIFICATION is to flag appropriate sources of 
information, as in sources that tend to produce true belief. Third, and 
in light of the failures of Deontologism and IBAI reviewed in chap-
ters 5 and 6, it was argued that the most plausible way to understand 
this appropriateness was in terms of effective heuristics, designating justi-
fication conferring processes on a continuum stretching from uncon-
scious belief-forming heuristics to conscious reasoning strategies, 
effective in so far as they strike a good balance between generating a 
lot of true belief (power) and generating a majority of true belief (reli-
ability). 
We also noted that one important—and in my opinion ex-
tremely welcome—consequence of such a concept of justification was 
that it classifies justification as a perfectly natural phenomenon, per-
taining to the actual and possible track-records of belief-forming 
mechanisms. It was also noted that this, furthermore, has very intrigu-
ing methodological implications, in that it enables us to paint a more 
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positive picture than the one resulting from the largely negative task 
that has been preoccupying us in the course of rejecting candidate 
analyses of justification. As I will argue in the next chapter, the way to 
paint this picture is to focus on the pursuit of significant truths and, 
against the background of what cognitive science and psychology may 
teach us about the way we reason, to develop reasoning strategies 
that, enlightened by psychological research on our limits and poten-
tials, may improve our cognitive outlooks and take us beyond the 
potentially bleak implications for human rationality and justification 
that some of the results may seem to motivate at first glance.28 
                                                           
28 See, e.g., Nisbett and Borgida (1975). 
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Chapter 8. 
On the Improvement of Reasoning Strategies 
 
 
 
Having reconstructed JUSTIFICATION in terms of effective heuristics, 
it is the task of the present chapter to put this concept to work, in 
providing hands-on advice for epistemic inquiry. This is an ambitious 
task, to say the least, perhaps too ambitious, some would say. As 
pointed out by Goldman in Epistemology and Cognition—a valiant at-
tempt to provide a related evaluation of our basic cognitive proc-
esses—cognitive science is still “groping its way toward the identifica-
tion of basic processes.”1 This is, unfortunately, as true now as it was 
in 1986. And any truly naturalistic epistemology will necessarily be 
limited exactly to the extent that science is still to figure out the rele-
vant details. Consequently, there is a respect in which naturalistic 
epistemology commits itself to contingency in result and conditional-
ity in formulation. 
Still, this is no excuse for the epistemologist to not get her 
hands dirty. Even though parts of her inquiry will have to remain 
tentative, it may still provide an idea of what a more satisfactory ac-
count would look like, if the relevant empirical details were to be filled 
                                                           
1 Goldman (1986, p. 181). 
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in. The following is my attempt to outline such an account and I 
would like to preface it by pointing out some similarities as well as 
dissimilarities with two related attempts. First, Goldman’s Epistemology 
and Cognition. Like Goldman, I am interested in the contribution that 
cognitive science can make to epistemology and, in particular, to the 
analysis of justification. However, Goldman is mainly concerned with 
a theoretical evaluation of the epistemic properties of basic psycho-
logical processes, or what I have referred to as unconscious heuristics.2 
My project is, in a sense, complimentary to his, in that I will mainly be 
concerned with the morals that can be pulled out of cognitive science 
for the evaluation and improvement of reasoning strategies. Further-
more, and unlike Goldman, I am explicitly interested not just in a 
theoretical evaluation but also in the construction of explicitly regula-
tive strategies, designed to not only inform epistemology but also 
guide epistemic inquiry. 
In this respect, my project is more in line with Bishop and 
Trout’s, as laid out in their intriguing book Epistemology and the Psychol-
ogy of Human Judgment.3 In a critique of what they refer to as Standard 
Analytic Epistemology—defined as a methodology not too different 
from DCA (see §1.3 above)—they suggest that epistemology’s mis-
sion should be to provide normative recommendations about how we 
ought to reason. The way to do this, they argue, is not by way of the 
analysis of epistemic concepts, but rather through what they call ame-
liorative psychology, which is a branch of psychology dealing with the 
construction of successful reasoning strategies on the basis of testable 
results. Bishop and Trout are particularly interested in the evaluation 
and construction of so-called statistical predication rules (SPRs), which 
are rules or algorithms yielding predictions on the basis of a specified 
set of cues and a (preferably simple) formula for combining these 
cues. We will have more to say about such rules in §8.2 below. 
However, Bishop and Trout explicitly distance themselves 
from the idea that their normative framework presents anything like a 
                                                           
2 See Goldman (1986, p. 184). 
3 See Bishop and Trout (2004). 
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theory of justification.4 Justification, they claim, is a property of individ-
ual belief tokens and, hence, pertains to something which ameliorative 
psychology—occupied with the assessment and development of rea-
soning strategies—does not dwell on. As defined, or rather recon-
structed, above, however, there is no such opposition on my account. 
Justification, as construed here, is primarily a property of epistemic 
agents believing propositions, and only derivatively of the belief to-
kens themselves. Furthermore, and as we saw in the previous chapter, 
what it is for an agent to be justified is intimately connected to—
indeed, a function of—effective (i.e., reliable and powerful) heuristics, 
which, on the conscious side, corresponds to sound reasoning strate-
gies. In this respect, I see a continuity between naturalistic and tradi-
tional epistemology that Bishop and Trout denies. 
Again, the claim is not that this framework unveils our ordi-
nary concept of justification. In that respect, I wholeheartedly agree 
with Bishop and Trout that theorizing about reasoning strategies is 
independent of questions of justification, as traditionally construed. 
Consequently, the claim that degree of justification is determined by 
the epistemic qualities of the heuristics underlying the beliefs held to 
be true by an agent, should not be expected to mesh with our catego-
rization intuitions in all cases. To have our account of justification and 
our intuitions mesh thus has not been a desideratum of our analysis, 
for reasons that were discussed in the first part of the study. Granted, 
our intuitions reveal the outlines (be they fuzzy or not) of our con-
cepts and an exhaustive analysis would, indeed, provide an exact and 
in all cases faithful story about these contours and, hence, not admit 
any conflicting intuitions. As argued in chapter 3, however, it is possi-
ble to question the very business of providing exhaustive analyses, 
since there is no guarantee that our current concepts—as unveiled 
                                                           
4 See Bishop and Trout (2004, p. 54). Although, see Bishop (2000, pp. 203-
205), where Michael Bishop seems to defend (or at least consider) a revision 
of what it is to be epistemically responsible—one component of which is 
justification—in terms of using reliable reasoning strategies. 
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through conceptual analysis—serve us well, i.e., provide us with good 
tools in the attainment of our epistemic goals.  
For this reason, I argued that the operative question for epis-
temology should be whether the epistemic concepts and norms that 
we employ could be improved so as to enable us to reach our epis-
temic goals to a greater degree. Consequently, our current epistemic 
repertoire is primarily interesting to the extent that it informs us of a 
starting point of potential improvement. This, however, does not 
require an exhaustive analysis—it only requires what I, in chapter 4, 
introduced as Meaning Analysis. And as we saw in chapters 5 and 6, 
there is even evidence to the effect that, if “our current concepts” 
look anything like what epistemologists have supposed, they do, as a 
matter of fact, not serve us very well. This motivated reconstruction, in 
accordance with the recommendations of the ameliorative methodol-
ogy defended in the first part of the study. 
The reconstruction in question was expounded in the previous 
chapter. Qua reconstruction, the idea that justification consists in 
effective heuristics underlying the beliefs held true by an agent does 
not constitute an “analysis” of our concept of justification, in any 
traditional sense of the word, and is, hence, not susceptible to con-
flicting categorization intuitions. Our intuitions might be ever so 
internalist and maybe even deontological. Be that as it may—if the 
arguments put forward in chapters 5 and 6 are at all plausible, these 
intuitions, nevertheless, supply us with largely useless theories about 
justification, and should, as such, carry no more weight than folk 
intuitions about physical matter should to informed physicists. In this 
sense, the reconstructed concept of justification that I propose corre-
sponds not to what we do mean but to what we should mean by justifi-
cation. The “should” in question is an explicitly instrumentalist one. 
The idea is that, in so far as we subscribe to the truth-directed, epis-
temic goals that I have been claiming that we do, we are better served 
by using the reconstructed concept of justification than any of the 
concepts that tie justification to epistemic duties or introspective 
scrutiny, for the simple reason that the former will enable us to reach 
those goals to a greater degree than the latter two. 
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As we saw in chapter 2, this is also the proper locus of epis-
temic normativity in the case of justification—justification is valuable 
in so far as it is aligned with our epistemic goals, and our concept of 
justification is good in so far as it provides a useful tool in the attain-
ment of these goals. In other words, the normativity of justification is 
inherently connected to our epistemic goals. If it is objected that this 
does not yield pure, categorical normativity, I would reply that it is 
unclear to me why epistemology—construed as a discipline thor-
oughly interested in not only describing epistemic inquiry, but also 
providing tools for epistemic inquirers that may aid her in attaining 
her goals—should be interested in anything but impure normativity, 
which, interestingly enough, seems to be exactly the kind of normativ-
ity that speaks to the needs, desires and typical situations of epistemic 
inquirers. 
This brings us to the proper mission of this chapter, i.e., that 
of investigating the generally normative virtues of, in some cases, very 
basic heuristics in order to formulate action-guiding normative rea-
soning strategies, identifying ways in which the reconstructed concept 
of justification could be put to use in the creation of hands-on advice 
for epistemic inquiry. The plan is as follows: I will pull out three 
themes from cognitive psychological research on the way we tend to 
reason—including what can best be described as annoying cognitive 
tics, impressively adaptive heuristics, and several things in between—
and investigate the extent to which it is possible to pull out concrete 
strategies for improving epistemic conduct in typical epistemic situa-
tions, using the reconstructed concept of justification as my norma-
tive framework. Focusing on three versions of question schema (Q3) 
above, i.e., “Is it the case that p?”, the three themes that are to be 
discussed are prediction, i.e., reasoning about what will be the case, 
diagnosis, i.e., reasoning about what is the case, and retention, i.e., reason-
ing about what was the case. 
Before doing this, however, I would like to spell out and, 
hopefully, appease some worries regarding the extent to which the 
project to be undertaken presupposes a far-reaching optimism as for 
our abilities to change the way we tend reason. 
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8.1. REASONS FOR MODERATE OPTIMISM 
Any ameliorative approach to the ways in which we reason has to 
steer clear not only of the Scylla of assuming a too optimistic picture 
of our ability to change our epistemic ways, yielding a largely unrealis-
tic and useless epistemology, but also the Charybdis of assuming a too 
pessimistic picture, rendering the resulting epistemology uninteresting 
and irrelevant. In this section, I will try to say something about how 
my own project steers clear of both.5 
The most optimistic version of an ameliorative project would 
assume perfect internalization. By perfect internalization I mean the 
ability to take ameliorative suggestions to heart and let them permeate 
one’s epistemic dispositions, as manifested in everything from every-
day reasoning to sophisticated, scientific inquiry. However, cognitive 
psychology gives us little reason to be that optimistic. We have already 
seen how we tend to underestimate the extent to which we suffer 
from cognitive biases, despite the fact that every single one of us has 
substantial evidence to the effect that she is no different from anyone 
else on this score. And unfortunately, this tendency to over-rate our 
capabilities and ourselves is not restricted to the occasional anchoring 
or attribution error, but pervades our overall sense of who we are and 
what we are capable of doing.6 Adam Elga sums up the psychological 
research as follows: 
 
It turns out that people have inflated views of their own abili-
ties and prospects. People (nondepressed people, at least) rate 
themselves better—friendlier, more likely to have gifted chil-
dren, more in control of their lives, more likely to quickly re-
cover form illness, less likely to get ill in the first place, better 
leaders, and better drivers—than they really are. And that’s just 
                                                           
5 Thanks to Hilary Kornblith, Kirk Michaelian, and Jeremy Cushing for press-
ing me on this point. 
6 See, e.g., Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994). 
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the beginning. There is a great deal of work documenting the 
persistent and widespread positive illusions (about themselves) 
to which people are subject.7 
 
As Elga also points out, depressed people have been found to have 
more accurate self-evaluations than non-depressed people. In fact, 
there is even reason to believe that there is a strong connection be-
tween the presence of positive illusions and increased happiness, 
motivation, persistence, and the ability for productive work.8 
In light of this, perfect internalization might not only be un-
founded—the mere deliverance that certain ameliorative measures can 
be taken simply does not seem to have that great of an impact on 
us—but also undesirable, given the connection between positive illu-
sion and happiness. So, let us turn to the second extreme, which I 
would like to refer to as dismal incorrigibility. If we assume dismal incor-
rigibility, we are assuming that our epistemic ways are so set in stone 
that no attempt to improve them has any likelihood whatsoever of 
succeeding. Clearly, given such an assumption, there would be no 
reason to engage in any form of amelioration; it would be doomed to 
fail already from the start. Luckily, however, one does not need to 
look very far to find evidence refuting dismal incorrigibility. For one 
thing, methodological considerations within the sciences has, clearly, 
enabled us to not only identify but also implement improved ways of 
reasoning, for example through formal logics as well as through ap-
plied mathematics, especially in the form of probability theory and 
statistics. So, by modus tollens, dismal incorrigibility cannot be true. 
Having thus steered clear of Scylla and Charybdis, it remains 
to say something more substantive about the exact route to be taken 
in between the two—a route I will refer to as moderate optimism. First, 
moderate optimism acknowledges the empirical data ignored by per-
fect internalization. As we have already seen, we suffer from a great 
variety of cognitive biases, even some of which involve the common 
                                                           
7 Elga (2005, p. 117). 
8 See Taylor and Brown (1988). 
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conviction that we do not. However, given extensive research on 
these biases, and the conditions under which they may be more or less 
severe, we may alleviate them in situations where it is important that 
our epistemic goals be satisfied. The qualification in terms of such 
situations is important since one crucial difference between moderate 
optimism and perfect internalization is that the former does not as-
sume that amelioration can take place across the board. In fact, as 
already noted, the aforementioned research on the connection be-
tween positive illusions and happiness might even suggest that across-
the-board amelioration would be directly undesirable, even if attain-
able. 
However, this is not to deny that there are situations in which 
positive illusions are harmful and accurate reasoning is important. 
Medical diagnostics is a good example, and also one that we will dis-
cuss at length below. Nor is it to deny that nothing can be done to 
make accurate reasoning a more prevalent feature in such situations. 
For example, it will be suggested in the following that even a brief 
training in statistics may lead to significant improvement in predictive 
reasoning. Furthermore, it will be suggested that framing such statisti-
cal data in terms of frequencies rather than in terms of probabilities 
may decrease the chances of errors to an even greater extent. Finally, I 
will look into some results indicating that taking care to frame one’s 
data in terms that enable one to elaborate on them in depth, and then 
maximize the lag between the periods of elaboration, will significantly 
increase memory power, which, given accurate input, may increase the 
accuracy of our beliefs. 
The empirical assumptions underlying my interest in these re-
sults are that (a) we often fail to live up to what has traditionally been 
considered ideal rationality (roughly defined in terms of conduct in 
complete accordance with probability theory, principles of maximiz-
ing expected utility, etc.), (b) it is possible to pin-point quite well in 
what ways we fail to do so since it is, after all, the case that (c) we do 
sometimes engage in good (i.e., roughly, truth-conducive) reasoning 
and, finally, that (d) pin-pointing the ways in which we fail to live up 
to ideal rationality may enable us to device reasoning strategies that 
 246 
bring out our good rather than bad cognitive tendencies. I take it that 
(a) is fairly uncontroversial. So is (b), at least among people that have 
any interest in an empirical study of human reasoning. And to the 
extent that one accepts (b), one seems committed to (c)—after all, if 
one was convinced that we suffer from several cognitive biases but 
did not think that we, at least occasionally, engaged in sound reason-
ing, the only reasonable strategy would be to shun honest inquiry 
altogether (at least if honest inquiry implies an honest inquiry into the 
truth).  
However, among the four, it is (d) that would motivate the 
particularly ameliorative mission that I will undertake in this chapter, 
and it is also that very assumption that, ultimately, motivates moder-
ate optimism. This, however, is not to say that moderate optimism 
rests on an article of faith. Rather, I take it that the results to be con-
sidered, and the fact that they indicate ways in which human reason-
ing not only can, but, in fact, has been significantly improved, within 
such diverse areas as prediction, diagnosis, and retention, all provide 
reasons—indeed, straightforwardly empirical reasons—for embracing a 
moderate optimism. So, without further ado, let us turn to our first 
area of investigation: prediction. 
 
 
8.2. PREDICTION AND STATISTICAL REASONING 
Over the last fifty years, psychologists have amassed a substantial 
body of data indicating that, in many clinical situations, the most 
accurate predictions are made not by relying on clinical judgments of 
experts, but by using so-called linear prediction models. A linear pre-
diction model (I will henceforth leave out the qualifier “prediction”) 
is, in essence, a simple weigh-and-add equation of the following form: 
 
V = w1c1 + w2c2 + … wncn. 
 
V here represents the predicted value of a target property (i.e., the 
property to be predicted), c1 through cn a set of cues, and w1 through 
wn the weights assigned to those cues. The first evidence to the effect 
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of the superiority of such surprisingly simple models came when Paul 
Meehl famously reviewed 22 studies comparing the clinical judgments 
of expert psychologists and psychiatrists with linear models based on 
nothing but the empirical data on the relevant events.9 The results 
were stunning; in all studies, the linear models either performed 
equally well or outperformed the expert clinicians. 
Following up on Meehl’s study twelve years later, Jack Sawyer 
reviewed 45 studies comparing clinical and statistical predictions via 
linear models.10 Again, not in a single study were the former superior 
to the latter. As if this was not enough, Sawyer even included two 
studies in which the clinicians had access to more information than was 
fed into the linear models, only to find that the clinicians under those 
conditions, in fact, performed even worse. As noted more recently by 
Robyn Dawes, David Faust, and Meehl, these and similar research 
outcomes have since been widely replicated, to the extent that there 
are now “nearly 100 comparative studies in the social sciences” such 
that, “[i]n virtually every one of these studies, the actuarial [i.e., statis-
tical] method has equaled or surpassed the clinical method, sometimes 
slightly and sometimes substantially.”11 
Why are linear models so successful? To answer this question 
we need to make a distinction between two types of linear models 
that have figured in the literature: proper and improper. Proper linear 
models are linear models with weights devised to maximize the fit 
between the component cues and the target property. This is not the 
case for improper linear models, the most prominent forms of which 
are random linear models, unit weight models, and bootstrapping 
models. In the case of random linear models the weights are assigned 
random values, while unit weight models are such that every cues is 
assigned equal weight. Bootstrapping models are devised so as to not 
directly mirror the target property but rather mimic the prediction of 
a subject (e.g., a clinician) predicting that property. 
                                                           
9 See Meehl (1954). 
10 See Sawyer (1966). 
11 Dawes, Faust, and Meehl (2002, p. 719). 
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Now, if the aforementioned superiority of linear models over 
clinical judgments was restricted to proper models, explaining their 
success might not have been that big of a challenge. It could have 
been explained, at least in part, with recourse to how the employment 
of such models minimizes the influence of performance errors per-
taining to limitations in memory, attention and computational capa-
bilities on part of the person doing the prediction.12 As noted by 
Dawes, Faust and Meehl, such factors as “fatigue, recent experience, 
or seemingly minor changes in the ordering of information or in the 
conceptualization of the case or task can produce random fluctuations 
in judgment [which] decreases judgmental reliability and hence accu-
racy.”13 In contrast, Hastie and Dawes points out, a proper linear 
model “uses valid, independent information from as many cues as 
convey such information, is ‘calibrated’ to the ranges of values on all 
the variables available in the situation, and operates relentlessly and 
consistently.”14 However, one of the most astounding results to come 
out of the research on linear models is that clinicians generally are 
outperformed not only by proper but also by improper models.15 
How do we explain this? 
Granted, the above explanation in terms of performance er-
rors may provide part of the explanation of the relative success of 
bootstrapping models over the clinicians they are devised to mimic. If 
it can be assumed that the bootstrapping model latches on to the 
heuristic that the clinician is using, but fails to use perfectly due to limi-
                                                           
12 For a more complex explanation of the success of proper linear models, 
invoking assumptions about the prevalence of ordinal or monotone (rather 
than crossed) causal interactions in nature and the ease with which such 
causal relationships are approximated by linear models, see Hastie and Dawes 
(2001, pp. 58-62). 
13 Dawes, Faust, and Meehl (2002, p. 724). 
14 Hastie and Dawes (2001, p. 62). 
15 See Goldberg (1970) for a classical study on bootstrapping models, Dawes 
and Corrigan (1974) on random linear models, and Howard and Dawes 
(1976) on unit weight models. 
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tations in memory, attention, and computational capabilities, it should 
come as no surprise that the model often outperforms the clinician. 
Still, this explanation, clearly, does not generalize to random linear 
and unit weight models. Instead, one of the most popular explana-
tions for the success of improper models rather refers to the so-called 
flat maximum principle.16 What this principle states is that, under certain 
conditions, any linear model (be it a proper or improper) will perform 
roughly as well as any other. These conditions are as follows: 
 
(a)  The signs of the coefficients are right. 
(b)  The cues used in the model are fairly predictive yet 
somewhat redundant. 
(c)  The prediction pertains to a difficult problem in the spe-
cific sense that no proper model will be especially reli-
able. 
 
As one might reasonably suspect, many social prediction problems—
Which business venture will maximize share-holder value? Which 
prospective graduate student will perform best if admitted? Which 
convict will fall back into crime if released from prison?—pertain to 
fairly difficult problems, in the sense that no predictive model will be 
that much more reliable than any other, and most predictive cues that 
we come by in these contexts will be fairly predictive yet somewhat 
redundant. And if so, the only thing we have to do is get the signs of 
the coefficients right. This explains why improper linear models often 
tend to be as reliable as proper linear models. Furthermore, since 
proper linear models tend to be just as or more reliable than clini-
cians, we thus also have an explanation of why improper linear mod-
els often outperform clinicians. 
Even explanation aside, however, linear models demand our 
attention as manifestly very powerful predictive tools. As Meehl stated 
already in 1986: 
 
                                                           
16 See, e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth (1975) and Lovie and Lovie (1986). 
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There is no controversy in social science that shows such a 
large body of qualitatively diverse studies coming out so uni-
formly in the same direction as this one. When you are push-
ing 90 investigations, predicting everything from the outcome 
of football games to the diagnosis of liver disease and when 
you can hardly come up with a half dozen studies showing 
even a weak tendency in favor of the clinician, it is time to 
draw a practical conclusion, whatever theoretical differences 
may still be disputed.17 
 
The conclusion, it seems, is fairly straightforward: 
 
Clinical Prediction via Linear Models (CPLM) 
When faced with a clinical prediction problem, ask the experts 
what cues and weights to use (unless you plan to employ a ran-
dom or unit weight model) and then let a linear model 
combine the information from those cues to make the judg-
ment.18 
 
The rationale for such a strategy is, of course, that, if there is any truth 
to the research just discussed, other things being equal, clinical predic-
tions made on the basis of linear models tend to be just as accurate as, 
and often more accurate than, those based on the actuarial judgments 
made by clinicians. This is a somewhat more modest version of 
Bishop and Trout’s Golden Rule of Predictive Modeling, stating: “When 
based on the same evidence, the predictions of SPRs [i.e., statistical 
prediction rules] are at least as reliable, and are typically more reliable, 
than the predictions of human experts.”19  
Let us consider an example. Take a medical doctor who re-
ceives a patient complaining over pains that may indicate an ensuing 
heart attack. Being pressed for time and resources, the doctor needs 
                                                           
17 Meehl (1986, pp. 373-374). 
18 Cf. Hastie and Dawes (2001, p. 58). 
19 Bishop and Trout (2004, p. 12). 
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to act fast and asks herself “Is it likely that this patient will suffer a 
heart attack anytime soon?” When answering this question, she 
should start by considering whether there are any applicable predic-
tion models relevant to, in this case, classifying potential heart attack 
victims. As a matter of fact there is. Take, for example, the following 
very simple model, adapted from Breiman et al. working with binary 
yes/no values rather than real numbers, and where a high-risk patient 
is supposed to designate someone likely to suffer from a heart attack 
soon, and a low-risk patient someone who is not: 
 
Is the minimum systolic blood pressure over the initial 24 hour 
period > 91? 
If no, the patient is high risk. 
If yes, is the patient’s age > 62.5? 
If no, the patient is high risk. 
If yes, is sinus tachycardia present? 
If no, the patient is low risk. 
If yes, the patient is high risk.20 
 
It should be noted that, when applying this method, it is important 
the doctor assigns a greater weight to the recommendations derived 
from the method than to her own clinical expertise. The reason is, of 
course, that, if there is any truth to the research surveyed above, pre-
diction models are more likely to produce accurate predictions when 
not taken in conjunction with the supposedly less reliable judgment 
(relatively speaking) of the doctor going on her own clinical expertise. 
Clearly, there is a need to further specify exactly what models 
to use in what situations. Although the task of providing such a 
specification goes far beyond the present study, I encourage the 
reader to look at the vast body of literature on the subject since 
Meehl’s study, ranging from predicting loan and credit risks,21 the 
chance of criminal recidivism,22 violent behavior,23 and the risk of 
                                                           
20 See Breiman et al. (1993). 
21 See Stillwell et al. (1983). 
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recidivism,22 violent behavior,23 and the risk of SIDS24 to the quality 
of red Bordeaux wine.25  
Here, however, I will instead turn to another question: What 
about the cases in which there are no available models? To answer 
this question, we need to make a distinction between two aspects or 
stages of prediction by way of linear models. More specifically, I sug-
gest that we understand prediction by way of linear models in terms 
of (a) the selection of a set of weighted cues and (b) the production of a 
prediction through the combination of these weighted cues. In the cases 
where there are models in place, we do no need to worry about the 
selection phase—the selection of cues is already done. So, in those 
cases, we can simply heed to CPLM and apply the model in question.  
However, in the cases where there are no applicable models, 
we need to come up with new ones. In the following, I will focus on 
the crucial yet less discussed selection phase and demarcate conditions 
under which people select better rather than worse cues. After all, in 
so far as we want to engage in prediction through statistical reasoning, 
there is no getting around the fact that someone has to pick out the 
weighted cues and that there, in many high-risk situations, are obvious 
reasons for why we would want that selection to be made as sensibly 
as possible; sometimes, the cost of an inaccurate prediction is simply 
too high. I will assume that one important factor in making such 
selections is a sensitivity to statistical information. By way of illustra-
tion, let us start out by considering a scenario, described by Nisbett, 
Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda: 
 
Harold is the coach for a high school football team. One of his 
jobs is selecting new members of the varsity team. He says the 
following of his experience: “Every year we add 10 to 20 
younger boys to the team on the basis of their performance at 
                                                           
22 See Carroll et al. (1982). 
23 See Faust and Ziskin (1988). 
24 See Carpenter and Emory (1977). 
25 See Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde (1995). 
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the try-out practice. Usually, the staff and I are extremely ex-
cited about the potential of two or three kids—one who 
throws several brilliant passes or another who kicks several 
field goals from a remarkable distance. Unfortunately, most of 
these kids turn out to be only somewhat better than the 
rest.”26 
 
What psychologists have found is that, when faced with the question 
why Harold usually has to revise downward his opinion of players 
that he originally thought were brilliant, people tend to invoke a series 
of causal explanations—Did Harold’s eagerness lead him to overesti-
mate the brilliance of some players during the try-out? Did the se-
lected players slack off in face of all the encouragement they may have 
gotten from Harold after the try-out?, etc.—while ignoring a very 
basic statistical phenomenon that is likely to occur in situations like 
these, namely regression toward the mean. 
Consider the first sample at the try-out: a fairly large selection 
of high school students. Within this selection, some will be better 
football players than others. If being a good football player was a 
completely transparent property, Harold’s job would be easy. One 
factor that makes it harder, however, is luck—good as well as bad. 
Sometimes good football players perform badly for no other reason 
than that they happened to be unlucky and sometimes bad football 
players perform well for no other reason than that they happened to 
be lucky. Maybe they just happened to stand at the right (or wrong) 
place at the right (or wrong) time; maybe a lucky (or unlucky) gust of 
wind happened to assist them in throwing that magnificent (or disas-
trous) pass. In other words, luck works both ways. However, given 
that there are more un-exceptional than exceptional players (which 
seems to follow from the meaning of the terms), it is more likely that 
an exceptional performance was the result of an un-exceptional player 
who got lucky than that a poor performance was the result of an 
exceptional player who got unlucky. 
                                                           
26 Nisbett et al. (2002, p. 523). 
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This is not to deny, of course, that any given player is equally 
likely to have good or bad luck. But now consider the second sample, 
i.e., the sample we have got after the try-out: a significantly smaller 
selection based on the performance at the try-out. If the above is true, 
picking out this sample on the basis of performance on the try-out 
makes good luck matter more than bad luck. More specifically, given 
the preponderance of un-exceptional players in the first sample and 
the equiprobability of good and bad luck for any given player, there 
are more opportunities for good luck to shift someone to the category 
of exceptional performance than for bad luck to shift someone to the 
category of unexceptional performance. Consequently, picking out a 
sample on the basis of exceptional performance at the try-out is more 
likely to reveal good luck than bad luck. However, given that good 
luck is a significantly less stable property than actual competence, this 
good luck cannot necessarily be counted on in the varsity team. 
Hence, it is to be expected that the performance of the new varsity 
team players will regress toward the mean, which, given the prepon-
derance of un-exceptional players, unfortunately, means that they will 
perform worse than they did on the try-out. 
In fact, regression effects occur in any scenario in which vari-
ables (here, performance at try-out, performance on the varsity team 
player) are not perfectly correlated. Furthermore, the above example 
may easily downplay the potential problem with neglecting regression 
toward the mean. Consider the following scenario from Kahneman, 
Slovic, and Tversky: 
 
In a discussion of flight training, experienced instructors noted 
that praise for an exceptionally smooth landing is typically fol-
lowed by a poorer landing on the next try, while harsh criti-
cism after a rough landing is usually followed by an improved 
on the next try. The instructors concluded that verbal rewards 
are detrimental to learning, while verbal punishments are bene-
ficial, contrary to accepted psychological doctrine. This con-
clusion is unwarranted because of presence of regression to-
ward the mean. As in other cases of repeated examination, an 
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improvement will usually follow a poor performance and a 
deterioration will usually follow an outstanding performance, 
even if the instructor does not respond to the trainee’s 
achievement on the first attempt. Because the instructors had 
praised their trainees after good landings and admonished 
them after poor ones, they reached the erroneous and poten-
tially harmful conclusion that punishment is more effective 
than reward.27 
 
By the same token: Within public policy, any intervention aimed at an 
unusual characteristic or a group that is very different from the aver-
age is likely to appear successful, while success often is nothing but an 
instance of regression to the mean. This is perhaps especially perti-
nent in public health interventions, which are often aimed at sudden 
increases in disease. Analogously, the phenomenon can lead to misin-
terpretation of results of tests, new treatments, as well as to a placebo 
effect in clinical practice, especially if participants in the studies are 
recruited on the basis of scoring highly on a symptom index. In other 
words, it should be beyond doubt that regression toward the mean is 
a phenomenon the ignorance of which affects issues of high signifi-
cance. 
How does this relate to the selection phase? Most likely, if 
Harry was more versed in statistics, he would not take the fact that 
certain boys performed extraordinarily well at the try-out to be such a 
powerful predictor of extraordinary performance at the varsity team, 
and, hence, would lover the weight assigned to that cue, while assign-
ing a greater weight to long-term performance—a cue more sensitive 
to regression toward the mean. Similarly, if the flight instructors in the 
above example were more familiar with statistics, they might have 
been able to see through the tempting but most likely false explana-
tion of improved performance in terms of admonishment and instead 
have predicted future performance on the basis of some more valid 
                                                           
27 Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982, p. 10). This particular example is 
discussed in more detail in Kahneman and Tversky (1973). 
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cue, such as whether or not the pilots in question had undergone 
extensive and repeated training. And if public health interventions 
were conducted against the background of a better understanding of 
common, statistical phenomena, they would be less likely to invite the 
misinterpretation of research results, and, thereby, promote public 
health to a greater extent. 
In other words, in order to pick out good cues, people need to 
be sensitive to statistically significant properties and phenomena. 
Here, however, we run up against a long and largely negative psycho-
logical tradition according to which people tend to be quite bad at 
reasoning in accordance with statistics and probability theory.28 
Rather than delving into this debate, however, I will (a) focus on what 
most researchers agree on, namely that there are conditions under 
which people do not tend to commit statistical fallacies, and then (b) 
say something about how these conditions may be generalized into a 
sensible reasoning strategy for cue selection. 
Before looking into the specific conditions under which we are 
likely to engage in correct statistical reasoning, let us try to determine 
the general conditions under which we tend to reason statistically at 
all. “Statistical reasoning” is here to be understood as any reasoning 
about populations by way of samples and relations of frequency or 
probability (not necessarily involving any kind of numerical or formal 
representation), e.g., “You always forget to lock the door, so I’m sure 
you forgot to do so this morning too.” Such reasoning should be 
contrasted with causal reasoning, which might very well invoke prob-
abilities, but that typically only involves considerations about the 
causal relationships and interactions between individual entities or 
phenomena—e.g., “I overslept this morning and had to run to the 
bus. That’s why I forgot to lock the door”—rather than populations 
at large, samples therein, and any statistical regularities that may hold 
between the two. 
Now, according to Nisbett et al, there are three main factors 
conducive to statistical reasoning, the first one being clarity of sample 
                                                           
28 See Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982). 
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space and sampling process.29 In other words, people are more prone to 
use statistical reasoning (other things being equal) when pondering the 
chance of a coin falling heads or tails than whether to join this or that 
school, since the former case involves a clearer sample space (heads, 
tails) than the latter (good or bad relationship with the faculty and 
fellow students, good or bad campus, good or bad prospects for a 
career, etc.) and, hence, a more straightforward repeatability, which 
makes it easier to conceptualize one’s observations as samples. 
The second factor conducive to statistical reasoning is recogni-
tion of the operation of chance factors. For example, due to the salience of 
chance and, as a consequence, unpredictability in the production of an 
event such as coin tossing, and the much more subtle aspect of 
chance in the events following the choosing of one school over an-
other, we are more prone to explain the outcomes in statistical terms 
in the former than the latter kind of case, rather than coming up with 
a causal explanation. 
The third and, perhaps, most straightforward factor is cultural 
prescriptions of statistical reasoning. That is, people are more prone to use 
statistical reasoning within a given domain when statistical reasoning 
is the culturally prescribed way to think about events within that do-
main. Furthermore, Nisbett et al. found a connection between experi-
ence within an area and a tendency to use statistical reasoning in ex-
plaining events within that area. For example, when presenting the 
example of Harold the football coach to 157 University of Michigan 
students, subjects with an athletic team experience preferred a statisti-
cal explanation while a majority of those without any such experience 
preferred a non-statistical explanation. The same phenomenon was 
found in an analogous formulation of the scenario in terms of audi-
tions, where most of the subject with acting experience preferred a 
statistical explanation while those without acting experience preferred 
a non-statistical explanation.30 
                                                           
29 See Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (2002). 
30 See Nisbett et al. (2002, p. 524). 
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Now, of course, a proneness to reason statistically is not, in it-
self, valuable unless one also tends to reason correctly. However, it is 
highly plausible to assume that training in statistics improves people’s 
abilities to apply those principles correctly, since such training pro-
vides general skills that not only facilities identification of sample 
spaces and processes as well as the potential operation of chance, but 
also makes accessible and expands the repertoire of statistical rules. 
Hence, in a study on college students without training in statistics, 
graduate students with a fair amount of training, and PhD level scien-
tists with several years of training, Krantz, Fong, and Nisbett not only 
found a correlation between training in statistics and a tendency to 
give statistical explanations (whether or not there was a statistical cue 
in the examples provided to the subjects) but also that only 10% of 
the statistical answers given by the first category were rated as good, 
while almost 80% of the answers from the third category were rated 
as good.31 
So, consider the following reasoning strategy: 
 
Selection via Statistical Training (SST) 
Learn (more) statistics so that, when you face a prediction 
problem for which there is no established prediction model, 
you can not only identify as clearly as possible the relevant 
sample spaces and processes as well as the potential operation 
of chance, but also utilize this information in picking out sta-
tistically relevant cues. 
 
In accordance with the research just surveyed, the rationale for this 
strategy is that learning statistics will serve the dual function of both 
(a) increasing the likelihood of you framing events in statistical terms 
and, hence, not neglecting relevant, statistical phenomena, and (b) 
providing you with the statistical tools necessary for picking out statis-
tically relevant cues. 
                                                           
31 Manuscript discussed in Nisbett et al. (2002). 
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So, what does it meant to “learn (more) statistics”? As noted 
by Bishop and Trout, when considering new reasoning strategies, we 
have to take into account the start-up cost—i.e., “the cost associated 
with adopting new reasoning strategies,”32 pertaining to search, im-
plementation, etc. And interestingly enough, another study by Fong, 
Krantz, and Nisbett suggests that even a very brief training in statis-
tics can make a big improvement in people’s statistical reasoning 
about everyday events.33 In the study, subjects were given a training 
package, covering formal aspects of sampling and the law of large 
numbers, as well as demonstrating how sampling notions may be used 
as heuristic devises in modeling statistical problems. When weighed 
against a control group given no instructions, three experimental 
groups consisting of adults and high school students showed signifi-
cant training effects, especially for those who had received a combina-
tion of sampling and modeling training. What is more, Fong, Krantz, 
and Nisbett showed that it made no difference whether the training 
utilized probabilistic cues, objective attribute problems, or subjective 
judgment problems, which, according to Nisbett et al., suggests that 
“training on specific problems types can be readily abstracted to a 
degree sufficient for use on widely different problem types.”34 
In other words, the start-up cost of SST might not be as sub-
stantial as one might initially suspect, and even brief statistical training 
does, in fact, render people (a) more prone to reason in statistical 
terms and (b) less prone to commit various statistical fallacies than 
people who do not heed to SST. Consequently, heeding to SST in the 
selection of cues for linear models will, most likely, promote the pro-
duction of true belief at a reasonable cost, and enable epistemic in-
quirers to construct efficient linear models, that then may be em-
ployed in accordance with CPLM. It should be noted, however, that 
this certainly is not to say that everyone should learn statistics (in 
accordance with SST) and always employ linear models in prediction 
                                                           
32 Bishop and Trout (2005, p. 62). 
33 Manuscript discussed in Nisbett et al. (2002). 
34 Nisbett et al. (2002, p. 530). 
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(in accordance with CPLM). Such specific recommendations would 
have to be preceded by an evaluation of the situational costs of taking 
such measures, and how these costs relate to the possible detriments 
involved in making false predictions. 
What is more interesting for our purposes, however, is the re-
sult we get when combining the above results with the reconstructed 
justificatory framework developed in the previous chapter: 
 
S is justified in believing that p to the extent that p is produced 
by effective heuristics, i.e., heuristics that, in all or a very wide 
sub-set of the epistemically relevant worlds, (i) generate a lot 
of true beliefs, and (ii) generate a set of belief that will contain 
a majority of true beliefs. 
 
First, consider contexts with available prediction models. If there is 
any truth to the above research, we may infer the following: 
 
(8.2.1) Other things being equal, people basing their clinical 
predictions on linear models are just as justified, and 
often more justified, in the resulting beliefs than peo-
ple basing their clinical predictions on the inferences 
of expert clinicians. 
 
A couple of comments are at place. First, for reasons discussed above, 
justification requires not only effective reasoning strategies but also 
effective unconscious heuristics, i.e., underlying belief-forming proc-
esses. Naturally, employing linear prediction models rather than con-
sulting clinicians directly does not, in itself, imply that the models are 
being employed for the right reasons, e.g., as a result of sound deduc-
tive or inductive reasoning, as opposed to guesswork, or wishful 
thinking. That is, it might very well be possible that someone chooses 
their strategies by way of frail strategy determining heuristics.  
Consequently, as stated, (8.2.1) does not imply that you are al-
ways more justified in working with linear prediction models rather 
than consulting clinicians in predictive matters. For one thing, such a 
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claim would have to be made under the assumption that the strategy 
determining heuristics involved in choosing one reasoning strategy 
over another are, as a matter of fact, at least as effective as those 
underlying the choice of consulting a clinician. Consequently, a per-
son employing a highly effective linear prediction model may still be 
less justified than a person consulting a clinician, if the strategy choice 
of the former was a result of, say, guesswork and the choice of the 
latter was a result of sound inductive reasoning. 
For another—and this brings us to the second point—parity 
of strategy determining heuristics is not the only factor embedded in 
the “other things being equal” clause. Another such factor is the power 
of the reasoning strategy used, be it employing a linear model or 
whatever heuristic the clinician’s inferences pertain to. Consequently, 
(8.2.1) is perfectly compatible with claiming that a person basing her 
predictions on the inferences of clinicians may be more justified than 
someone basing her predictions on inferences reached by way of a 
linear model, due to the former being the result of a more powerful 
reasoning strategy. 
Next, let us turn to the scenarios in which there are no appli-
cable prediction models. Combining the above results in relation to 
SST with our justificatory framework, we get the following: 
 
(8.2.2)  Other things being equal, people who heed to SST 
(or any stronger variant thereof) in the selection of 
cues, tend to be just as justified, and often more justi-
fied, in the beliefs resulting from the employment of 
the forthcoming predictive model than people that 
do not do so. 
 
As above, this is certainly not to say that everyone should learn statis-
tics (in accordance with SST). Such specific recommendations would 
have to be preceded by an evaluation of the situational costs of taking 
such measures, and how these costs relate to the possible detriments 
involved in constructing unhelpful models. However, all that is re-
quired for the strategies suggested here to be at all relevant is that 
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there are numerous situations in which implementing demonstrably 
effective strategies is worth the cost. Needless to say, such situations 
exist. Hence, the centrality of teaching statistics to people of high-risk 
judgment professions, the prevalence of statistical reasoning within 
many scientific areas, and the significance that we tend to bestow 
research on the extent to which we do or do not fall prey to various 
statistical fallacies. That being said, we will, in the following section, 
look into yet another aspect of statistical reasoning as a means to 
attaining our epistemic goals and, in particular, how certain ways of 
framing statistical data may result in substantially more tractable rea-
soning strategies than others. 
 
 
8.3. BASE RATE NEGLECT IN DIAGNOSIS 
I will now turn to so-called base rate neglect in diagnosis. Base rates 
are prior probabilities, frequencies or proportions, for example re-
garding the prevalence or exceptionality of a particular phenomenon 
in a given sample. Base rate neglect typically occurs when subjects are 
reasoning from symptoms (i.e., effects) to causes in order to reach a 
conditional probability (the probability of the cause given the symp-
toms) and, in doing so, simply equates this probability with its inverse 
(the probability of the symptoms given the cause). For example, con-
sider a hypothetical case where a test T tests for condition C with an 
accuracy of 80%. Now, say that a subject S has been tested for C via 
test T and the test comes out positive. What is the probability that S 
has C? Faced with this kind of question, people tend to judge that the 
probability is 80%, thereby equating the conditional probability 
 
P((S has C)|(S tests positive for C on T)), 
 
with its inverse 
 
P((S tests positive for C on T)|(S has C)). 
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The mistake in doing so may be brought out by a simple analogy: The 
probability that Amy is pregnant given that she has had sex is, clearly, 
not equal to the probability that she has had sex given that she is 
pregnant.35 
So, what is the correct way to approach these kinds of ques-
tions? If we turn to probability theory, the standard approach invokes 
Bayes’ Theorem, stating that 
 
(8.3.1)  
 
where A represents the (alleged) cause and B the symptom or effect. 
As this theorem makes clear, the conditional probability of A given B 
is not equal to the probability of B given A, but instead intimately tied 
to the base rate, i.e., to the prior probability of A and the prior prob-
ability of not A. 
Now, given that Bayes’ Theorem is something you typically do 
not encounter (let alone utilize) until you have taken one or two 
classes in statistics or probability theory, it should come as no surprise 
that people in general do not automatically reason in accordance with 
Bayes’ Theorem and, hence, tend to ignore base rates. However, 
further studies indicate even people that can be expected to be fairly 
well versed in statistical reasoning in general and Bayes’ Theorem in 
particular fail to use this theorem in diagnostics. In a study on the 
faculty and staff at Harvard Medical School on a diagnosis problem 
similar to the one above, only 18% provided the answer given by 
Bayes’ Theorem.36 Similarly, David Eddy asked 100 practicing physi-
cians to estimate the (posterior) probability of cancer given a positive 
result, only to find that 95 of them estimated it to be between 70% 
and 80%, rather than the 7.8% yielded by Bayes’ Theorem.37 
What are the normative implications of this? At the face of it, 
this might seem to lend some credibility to Tversky and Kahneman’s 
                                                           
35 This analogy is borrowed from Bishop and Trout (2005, p. 139). 
36 See Casscells, Schoenberger, and Grayboys (1978). 
37 See Eddy (1982). 
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claim that “In his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently not a 
conservative Bayesian: he is not a Bayesian at all.”38 And given that 
Bayesian reasoning provides a powerful tool in the attainment of 
truth—indeed, in such highly significant matters as medical diagnos-
tics—that would clearly be bad news for the epistemic inquirer (not to 
mention the patient). However, there is reason to believe that the 
aforementioned failures reviewed by psychologists are artifacts of a 
particular way of presenting probabilistic information rather than 
evidence that we are inherently bad at reasoning in statistical terms. 
Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage has argued that any 
claim against the human instantiation of a cognitive algorithm—be it a 
Bayesian one or not—is impossible to evaluate unless the information 
format on which it is designed to operate is also specified.39 More 
specifically, they hypothesize that the mind has not evolved to handle 
statistical inferences in just any format and, in particular, that the 
mind is more prone to reason in terms of frequencies than probabili-
ties. This, however, does not imply that the human mind is incapable 
of reasoning in Bayesian terms, but rather that whether or not they 
are able to do so will be strongly dependent on the particular format 
in which the problem she is confronted with is framed.  
So, consider the following hypothetical scenario: 
 
Imagine an old, experienced physician in an illiterate society. 
She has no books or statistical surveys and therefore must rely 
solely on her experience. Her people have been afflicted by a 
previously unknown and severe disease. Fortunately, the phy-
sician has discovered a symptom that signals the disease, al-
though not with certainty. In her lifetime, she has seen 1,000 
people, 10 of whom had the disease. Of those 10, 8 showed 
the symptom; of the 990 not afflicted, 95 did. Now a new pa-
                                                           
38 Kahneman and Tversky (1972, p. 450). 
39 See Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). 
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tient appears. He has the symptom. What is the probability 
that he actually has the disease?40 
 
Now, to calculate the probability, the physician may utilize either of 
two mathematically equivalent formats. Either, she may use Bayes’ 
Theorem, in accordance with (8.3.1) above. Or she may go with what 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage calls “natural sampling,” in which case all 
the physician needs is the number of cases that had both the symp-
tom and the disease (i.e., 8) and the total number of symptom cases 
(8+95) and then solve the following equation: 
 
(8.3.2)  
 
where B & A is the number of cases with symptom and disease and B 
&
! 
¬A the number of cases with the symptom lacking the disease (i.e., 
false positives).  
Clearly, (8.3.2) is more transparent and tractable than (8.3.1), 
but why? For one thing, it involves fewer and seemingly less cogni-
tively demanding operations. But remember that Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage’s hypothesis is stronger than this; they want to claim that the 
tractability of equations like (8.3.2) pertained not primarily to them 
being less computationally demanding but to their frequentist format, 
and that this format is more suited than its probabilistic equivalent to 
fit our cognitive architecture. If that is so, however, it is not sufficient 
to contrast a complicated Bayesian format with a simple instance of a 
frequentist equivalent. More specifically, if Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s 
hypothesis is true, we should expect to get the following experimental 
result: If subjects are presented with a diagnosis problem, they will 
have a significantly greater success in approximating the Bayesian 
answer if the problem is framed in terms of frequencies rather than 
probabilities, even in cases where the computations involved can be 
expected to be equally demanding. 
                                                           
40 Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, pp. 686-687). 
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In fact, this is exactly what Gigerenzer and Hoffrage found. 
When presented with a problem framed in probability terms, only 
16% got the Bayesian answer. However, when presented with the 
same problem framed in frequentist terms and involving an equally 
complex or parsimonious algorithm, the percentage rose to 46%.41 
Similar results have been found by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby.42 
Presenting 50 Stanford students with questions similar to the ones 
presented by Casscells et al. to a group of faculty, staff, and fourth-
year students at Harvard Medical School, 76% of the participants in 
Cosmides and Tooby’s study gave the correct Bayesian answer—as 
compared to 18% in Casscells et al.’s original study.43 And what was 
the difference? Cosmides and Tooby framed their questions in terms 
of frequencies, not probabilities. 
Interestingly enough, the results seem to generalize to other 
“fallacies” as well. Take the following story, for example: 
 
Ben is an alcoholic tennis star who starts drinking a fifth a day 
on his 25th birthday. Which of the following two scenarios is 
more likely? 
 
(1) Ben wins a major tournament shortly before his 
26th birthday. 
(2) Ben joins Alcoholic Anonymous, quits drinking, 
and wins a major tournament shortly before his 
26th birthday.44 
 
Despite the fact that scenario (2) cannot be more likely than scenario 
(1), for the simple reason that the probability of a conjunction of 
events cannot be more likely than the probability of one of its con-
                                                           
41 See Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, pp. 687-688) for the algorithms (or 
“menus,” as they call them) used and p. 693 for the result. 
42 See Cosmides and Tooby (1996). 
43 See Casscells et al. (1978). 
44 This example is borrowed, in part, from Hastie and Dawes (2001, p. 129). 
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juncts, most people feel inclined to say that it is. However, Klaus 
Fiedler has argued that people’s tendency to commit this so-called 
conjunction fallacy—i.e., to ascribe the probability of a conjunct a 
higher probability than a conjunction in which it figures—is radically 
reduced if the problem is cast in frequentist terms.45 Similarly, Giger-
enzer, Hoffrage, and Klenbölting reports that our notorious and 
experimentally well-established tendency to over-estimate our abilities 
to answer factual questions correctly is diminished when we are asked 
to estimate the amount of questions we have answered correctly in 
terms of frequencies rather than probabilities.46 
Why is this so? Cosmides and Tooby invokes an evolutionary 
explanation: 
 
In the modern world, we are awash in numerically expressed 
statistical information. But our hominid ancestors did not have 
access to the modern system of socially organized data collec-
tion, error checking, and information accumulation which has 
produced, for the first time in human history, reliable, numeri-
cally expressed statistical information about the world beyond 
individual experience. […] What was available in the environ-
ment in which we evolved was the encountered frequencies of 
actual events—for example, that we were successful 5 times 
out of 20 times we hunted in the north canyon. Our hominoid 
ancestors were immersed in a rich flow of observable frequen-
cies that could be used to improve decision-making, given pro-
cedures that could take advantage of them. So if we have 
adaptations for inductive reasoning, they should take fre-
quency information as input.47 
 
So, as has been pointed out by Keith Stanovich and Richard West, 
there may just be “remarkably efficient mechanisms available in the 
                                                           
45 See Fiedler (1988). 
46 See Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Klenbölting (1991). 
47 Cosmides and Tooby (1996, pp. 15-16). 
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brain—if only it was provided with the right type of representation.”48 
And in the words of Gigerenzer and Hoffrage: if the evolutionary 
hypothesis in question is true, “Testing people’s competencies for 
Bayesian inference with standard probability formats […] seems 
analogous to testing a pocket calculator’s competence by feeding it 
binary numbers.”49 
What is important for our purposes, however, is the methodo-
logical implication that may be extracted from the experimental re-
sults—not the exact (and admittedly controversial) hypotheses about 
underlying psychological modules that the results may or may not 
warrant. As noted by Bishop and Trout, the above results suggest an 
obvious reasoning strategy: “When faced with a diagnosis problem 
framed in terms of probabilities, people should learn to represent and 
solve the problem in a frequency format.”50 Adapting a suggestion 
from Gigerenzer and Hoffrage,51 Bishop and Trout suggest the fol-
lowing more specific reasoning strategy for diagnosis problems, here 
applied to the disease afflicting the illiterate society in the example 
above, and with some slight reformulations by me: 
 
Diagnosis via Frequencies (DF) 
When faced with a diagnosis problem, do as follows: 
1. Draw up a hypothetical population of 1,000. (Literally, 
draw a rectangle that represents 1,000 people.) 
2. Make a base rate cut, determining how many people (of 
1,000) have the disease. (In a corner of the rectangle, color 
in the space representing the 10 people having the disease.) 
3. Make a hit rate cut, determining how many of those with 
the disease will test positive. (In the base rate corner of the 
rectangle, color in the space representing the 8 true posi-
tives.) 
                                                           
48 Stanovich and West (2002, p. 439). 
49 Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, p. 699). 
50 Bishop and Trout (2005, p. 141). 
51 See Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). 
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4. Make a false alarm cut, determining how many of those 
(990) without the disease will test positive. (In another 
corner of the rectangle, color in the space representing the 
95 false positives.) 
5. Determine the fraction of true positives (8) among the 
positives (8+95). This will tell you how many of those who 
test positive actually have the disease (8 in 103, or about 
7.8%).52 
 
As mentioned above, Bishop and Trout does not want to grant a 
connection—or at least not an implication—between good reasoning 
strategies and justified belief. However, against the background of the 
reconstructive framework presented in part 1 of this study, and util-
ized in chapter 5 through 7 to argue that the concept of justification 
should be reconstructed so as to be understood in terms of effective 
heuristics, I want to make plausible the claim that there is, in fact, 
such a connection. In line with the vocabulary introduced in the pre-
vious chapter, DF is a perfectly legitimate reasoning strategy. As such, 
its epistemic qualities have implications for the extent to which beliefs 
formed as a result of its employment can constructively be deemed 
justified or not. More specifically, remember the suggested recon-
struction of justification from the previous chapter: 
 
S is justified in believing that p to the extent that p is produced 
by effective heuristics, i.e., heuristics that, in all or a very wide 
sub-set of the epistemically relevant worlds, (i) generate a lot 
of true beliefs, and (ii) generate a set of belief that will contain 
a majority of true beliefs. 
 
So, does belief-formation resulting from DF yield justified belief? As 
understood here, this is an empirical question, hinging on whether or 
not DF satisfies the criteria cited in the reconstruction of justification. 
For one thing, it should be fairly uncontroversial that statistical rea-
                                                           
52 See Bishop and Trout (2005, pp. 141-142). 
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soning, if done correctly, has a significant tendency to yield true belief. 
And it is exactly in relation to the qualification “if done correctly” that 
our question becomes relevant, since the very truth-conductivity of 
statistical reasoning is what makes us interested in finding out how to 
reason correctly in statistical matters. More specifically, we are here 
concerned with the comparative question of the extent to which DF 
aids us in doing so to a greater extent than does its aforementioned 
rival, i.e., framing Bayesian reasoning in probabilistic terms. Let us 
refer to the probabilistic analogue of DF as DP and consider the 
following argument:  
 
(8.3.3)  Given accurate input, Bayes’ Theorem yields accurate 
outputs in diagnostic matters. 
 
This much should be beyond doubt. Indeed, it is, supposedly, by 
virtue of this very fact that we are at all interested in the extent to 
which actual diagnoses proceed along Bayesian lines and may be wor-
ried when they do not.53 Furthermore, it should also be beyond doubt 
that 
 
(8.3.4)  applying Bayes’ Theorem correctly (i.e., making no 
performance errors) has a tendency to yield a major-
ity of true belief. 
 
This seems to follow from the logical validity of the theorem, under 
the assumption that we tend to believe that which results from he 
methods we apply. Let us, furthermore, assume that 
 
                                                           
53 Note, however, that this is certainly not to say that Bayesian Epistemology is 
beyond doubt. Bayesian Epistemology is a substantial normative thesis about 
the proper (i.e., rational) way to attain knowledge through a formal apparatus 
of probabilistic induction, one central component of which is the principle of 
conditionalization. An appreciation of the merits of employing Bayes’ Theo-
rem, however, in no way commits one to this particular normative theory. 
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(8.3.5)  frequentist and probabilistic framings are mathemati-
cally equivalent. 
 
This follows from the equivalence of “x%” and “x out of 100.” Also, 
following from Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s results is the plausibility of 
assuming that, 
 
(8.3.6)  in the general case, a frequentist framing is less likely 
to give rise to performance errors than a probabilistic 
framing. 
 
If so, however, we may infer that, 
 
(8.3.7)  DF has a greater tendency than DP to yield a set of 
belief containing a majority of true belief. 
 
Hence, we have identified a rationale for Bishop and Trout’s reason-
ing strategy, suggesting that, when faced with a diagnosis problem, we 
should learn to represent and solve the problem in a frequency for-
mat. Furthermore, if combined with the reconstruction of justification 
defended here, we may conclude that, 
 
(8.3.8)  other things being equal, people reasoning by way of 
DF are more justified in taking their resulting beliefs 
to be true than are people reasoning by way of DP. 
 
Two comments are relevant. First, in analogy with our result in §8.2, a 
factor embedded in the “other things being equal” clause is a parity of 
underlying strategy determining heuristics as well as of the power of 
the reasoning strategy used. Consequently, (8.3.8) is perfectly com-
patible with claiming that people reasoning by way of DP may be 
more justified than people reasoning by way of DF, due to the former 
instantiating more effective strategy determining heuristics and/or 
employing more powerful reasoning strategies. 
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Second, (8.3.8) might seem to have a counter-intuitive ring to 
it, if taken to imply that the beliefs resulting from diagnostic infer-
ences performed by subjects being so naïve of probabilistic and statis-
tical inference that they have to use DF rather than DP are more justi-
fied than the inferences conducted by skilled statisticians, employing 
DP in accordance with what they were taught in advanced classes in 
graduate school. Is this implied by (8.3.8)? Yes and no. If the subject 
performing the inference and forming a belief as a result of it is so 
versed in probability theory that she rarely, if ever, makes any per-
formance errors, she would constitute an exception to the general fact 
identified by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage and, hence, fall outside the 
scope of the “in the general case” clause in (8.3.6) above.  
At the same time, however, we have also seen evidence to the 
effect that not even the faculty and staff at Harvard Medical School 
falls outside of this clause, which raises the question whether there is 
any practical point to assuming that there are very many people for 
which utilizing DF rather than DP would, in fact, constitute a more 
effective strategy. (For one thing, such an assumption seems to ne-
glect a pretty important base rate, pertaining to the prevalence of 
people who fail to employ Bayes’ Theorem correctly in diagnosis.) For 
this reason, I conclude that we may reasonably assume that, in so far 
as Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s results show anything at all, a person 
utilizing DF is generally and with few exceptions more justified in 
taking her beliefs to be true than is a person utilizing DP. 
 
 
8.4. ELABORATION, LAG, AND RETENTION 
Relevant to the idea that people under certain circumstances tend to 
neglect base rates is the idea, defended by Nisbett and Ross, that base 
rates are neglected in favor of vivid information. As defined by Nisbett 
and Ross, information is vivid to the extent that it is (a) emotionally 
interesting, (b) concrete and image-provoking, and (c) proximate in a 
sensory, temporal, or spatial way.54 Admitting that the empirical evi-
                                                           
54 See Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 45). 
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dence for the claim that base rates are neglected in favor of vivid 
information is “spotty and indirect,”55 they support their claim by 
citing a study by R. M. Reyes, W. C. Thompson, and G. H. Bower on 
drunk driving trials, where vivid as opposed to pallid information, 
interestingly enough, influenced not the immediate judgment but the 
delayed judgment, given on the second day of the experiment.56 More 
specifically, subjects exposed to vivid prosecution testimony—
involving colorful descriptions of the defendant knocking over bowls 
of guacamole dip, “splattering guacamole all over the white shag 
carpet”57—tended to shift toward a guilty verdict, while subjects ex-
posed to vivid defense testimony tended to shift toward a not-guilty 
verdict. 
R. Hamil, T. D. Wilson, and Nisbett58 have found a similar 
phenomenon in a study where subjects were given a description of a 
welfare case in an experimental setting summed up by Nisbett and 
Ross as follows: 
 
The description (condensed from an article in the New Yorker 
magazine) painted a vivid picture of social pathology. The cen-
tral figure was an obese, friendly, emotional, and irresponsible 
Puerto Rican woman who had been on welfare for many years. 
Middle-aged now, she had lived with a succession of “hus-
bands,” typically also unemployed, and had borne children by 
each of them. Her home was a nightmare of dirty and delapi-
dated plastic furniture bought on time at outrageous prices, 
filthy kitchen appliances, and cockroaches walking about in the 
daylight.59 
 
Nisbett and Ross continues: 
                                                           
55 Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 47). 
56 See Reyes, Thompson, and Bower (1980). 
57 Reyes, Thompson, and Bower (1980, p. 4). 
58 See Hamil, Wilson, and Nisbett (1980). 
59 Nisbett and Ross (1980, pp. 57). 
 274 
 
In a second set of conditions, the article was omitted and sub-
jects were given statistics showing that the median stay on wel-
fare for middle-aged welfare recipients was two years and that 
only 10 percent of recipients remained on welfare rolls for 
four years or longer.60 
 
As it turned out, however,  
 
[t]he surprising-but-pallid statistical information […] had no 
effect on subjects’ opinions about welfare recipients. In con-
trast, the vivid description of one particular welfare family 
prompted subjects to express more unfavorable attitudes to-
ward recipients than control subjects did. Thus highly proba-
tive but dull statistics had no effect on inferences, whereas a 
vivid but questionably informative case history had a substan-
tial effect on inferences.61 
 
Against the background of this and similar studies, one hypothesis 
delivered by Nisbett and Ross as to why vividness has such a large 
impact on our judgments is that vivid information is more likely to be 
stored and remembered than pallid information is.62 However, Nis-
bett and Ross’ hypothesis has been challenged on empirical grounds. 
In particular, and as pointed out in a review article by Shelley Taylor 
and Suzanne Thompson63, several studies have directly discredited the 
idea that there is, in general, a strong link between retention and con-
creteness—i.e., item (b) in Nisbett and Ross’ characterization of vivid-
ness. As for a tendency to provoke (mental) images, however, it is 
interesting to note that the one area in which we actually seem to get a 
vividness effect is in studies concerning case histories. Nevertheless, 
                                                           
60 Nisbett and Ross (1980, pp. 57). 
61 Nisbett and Ross (1980, pp. 57-58). 
62 See Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 45). 
63 See Taylor and Thompson (1982). 
 275 
Taylor and Thompson are skeptical as to whether this effect really 
should be explained with recourse to vividness, especially in light of 
an alternative and perhaps more plausible explanation: subjects are 
not so much overutilizing vivid information as underutilizing—and, 
hence, failing to retain—base rate and other statistical information for 
the simple reason that they often do not understand them very well.  
Perhaps this should come as no surprise in light of Gigerenzer 
and Hoffrage’s study, given that the standard format used in psycho-
logical studies is probabilistic—not frequentist.64 To my knowledge, 
there is no study that has tested this hypothesis, i.e., investigated 
whether the same vividness effect arises (and to the same extent) 
when subjects are presented with statistical information in a frequency 
format rather than a probabilistic format.  
What is fairly established, however, is the more general fact 
that manipulations that “increase the ‘depth’ to which information is 
processed—roughly, the extent to which the subject processes the 
material’s meaning—result in better memory,” to quote Goldman.65 
Hence, T. S. Hyde and J. J. Jenkins found that subjects’ abilities to 
remember random words were significantly better when asked to rate 
the pleasantness of the words as opposed to merely identify their 
component letters.66 Similarly, S. A. Bobrow and G. H. Bower asked 
subjects to remember simple subject-verb-object sentences versus to 
remember sentences they themselves generated, and found that sub-
jects had significantly better success in remembering the sentences in 
the latter case.67 
By way of illustration of the possible mechanisms behind the 
positive influence of semantic elaboration on retention, consider the 
following simple but illuminating example due to John Anderson68, 
where a subject is asked to remember the following sentence: 
                                                           
64 See Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). 
65 Goldman (1986, p. 212). 
66 See Hyde and Jenkins (1973). 
67 See Bobrow and Bower (1969). 
68 See Anderson (1980). 
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The doctor hated the lawyer. 
 
Now, the subject attempting to remember this sentence will, most 
likely, store a number of other propositions in memory as well, e.g., 
about where the experiment took place, particular associations and 
feelings that it gave rise to, etc. More specifically, on deliberately pon-
dering the sentence, the following propositions might arise to her: 
 
Lawyers sue doctors for malpractice. 
The lawyer had sued the doctor for malpractice. 
The malpractice suit was the source of the doctor’s hatred.69 
 
As pointed out by Goldman, elaboration on these propositions may 
lead to better memory for two particular reasons. First, such elabora-
tion may present additional retrieval routes for recall: 
 
Suppose that at the time of the test, the subject is given the 
word doctor and asked to retrieve the original sentence. The link 
from the node representing doctor to the target node, represent-
ing the sentence The doctor hated the lawyer, may be too weak to 
revive the latter. But because elaborations have led to addi-
tional associative links, recall may still be possible. From the 
prompt doctor, the subject might recall the proposition that the 
lawyer sued the doctor for malpractice. And from here the 
subject might be able to recall the target node. Thus, an alter-
native retrieval route may succeed if the more direct one 
fails.70 
 
Second, elaboration may facilitate memory retrieval by way of ena-
bling the subject to infer the target information. Hence, Goldman: 
 
                                                           
69 See Anderson (1980, pp. 193-194) 
70 Goldman (1986, p. 213). 
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For example, the subject who cannot immediately recall the 
target sentence from the prompt doctor might think as follows: 
 
I cannot remember the target sentence but I can re-
member conjecturing that it was caused by the lawyer 
suing the doctor for malpractice and I can remember it 
was a sentence with a negative tone. 
 
From this he might infer that the target sentence was The doctor 
hated the lawyer.71 
 
Today, the idea that semantic elaboration has a clear, beneficial effect 
on retention constitutes a fairly well established hypothesis72 and is 
further strengthened by recent educational research. For example, 
building upon research by Ference Marton and Roger Säljö on so-
called “deep learning,”73 Donald Bacon and Kim Stewart monitored 
the retention curve for university students enrolled in a course on 
consumer behavior from 8 to 101 weeks after course completion and 
found that information that could reasonably be assumed to have 
been acquired at a deeper level of understanding (for example, due to 
the student engaging in an elaborative process to find additional 
meanings and interconnections in the material) was more likely to be 
retained than information acquired at surface level.74, 75 
                                                           
71 Goldman (1986, p. 213). 
72 See Kirchhoff, Schapiro, and Buckner (2005) for a recent study and discus-
sion. 
73 See, e.g., Marton and Säljö (1976a, 1976b). 
74 See Bacon and Stewart (2006). 
75 Yet another relevant area of research is the relation between sleep, memory 
consolidation and memory strengthening. According to a popular neurologi-
cal hypothesis, memory is first encoded by the hippocampus and later trans-
ferred to the cerebral cortex, particularly the neocortex, and it is believed that 
sleep plays a crucial role in the latter process (Stickgold, 2005). Furthermore, 
there are reasons to believe that there are ways to boost the mechanisms 
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Now, given that elaboration has a positive influence on reten-
tion, two reasoning strategies suggest themselves, one particular and 
one general. The general strategy may be characterized as follows: 
 
Retention through elaboration—general (RE-G) 
When faced with data the retention of which is crucial, take 
care to frame this data in terms that enable you to elaborate on 
it in depth. 
 
Now, combine this idea with the evidence put forward by Gigerenzer 
and Hoffrage76, suggesting that statistical material often is misunder-
stood not primarily due to humans being incapable of statistical rea-
soning by nature, but because probabilities—i.e., what has become the 
standard format of statistic material—tends to be significantly less 
tractable than alternative formats, such as a frequency format. This 
suggests a further and more specific reasoning strategy:  
 
Retention through elaboration—frequentist (RE-F) 
When faced with statistical data the retention of which is cru-
cial, frame this data in terms of frequencies rather than in 
terms of probabilities, whenever possible. 
 
Furthermore, as noted by Goldman, given that an increased strength 
in retention does not only correspond to an ability to recall a larger set 
of belief, but also an increased reliability in retention, the relationship 
between retention and depth of processing might actually suggest that 
                                                                                                               
involved in this night-time communication between the hippocampus and the 
neocortex. One particularly interesting line of research here has been pursued 
by neuroscientist Jan Born and his research team at the University of Lübeck, 
who have found evidence to the effect that subjects that are presented with 
an odor during learning and then re-exposed to the same odor during slow-
wave sleep perform significantly better on subsequent memory tasks (Born et 
al., 2007). 
76 See Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). 
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there are situations in which power and reliability are not conflicting 
desiderata.77 Take the case of inductive inference, for example. Given 
that a subject’s experience is fairly reliable, the more experience the 
subject recalls correctly, the more accurate data there is to feed into 
the induction. And the more accurate data there is to feed into the 
induction, the greater is the likelihood of a true inductive conclusion. 
Returning to RE-G, let us look closer at what it means to 
elaborate on data in depth. Take the following paragraph: 
 
As conceived by classical Muslim jurists, ijtihad is the exertion 
of mental energy in the search for a legal opinion to the extent 
that the faculties of the jurist become incapable of further ef-
fort. In other words, ijtihad is the maximum effort expended 
by the jurist to master and apply the principles and rules of 
usiil al-fiqh (legal theory) for the purpose of discovering God’s 
law.78 
 
Now, say that you have to remember the information contained in the 
above paragraph. On RE-G, you should take care to frame it in terms 
that will allow you to elaborate on it in depth. To not elaborate on it in 
depth would involve reading through it without thinking much about 
its component concepts or their interrelations. To do elaborate on it in 
depth, however, would (at the very least) involve doing two things. 
First,  
 
(8.4.1)  identify the key concepts.  
 
In the above passage, the key concepts are ijtihad, law, and God. As 
for the first one, one may note that the word derives from the Arabic 
verbal root of jimm-ha-dal (jahada, “struggle”), which is the same root 
as jihad—a shared etymology worth noting, as both words relate to a 
struggle or dedicated effort. As for the second concept, law, it would, 
                                                           
77 See Goldman (1986, p. 214). 
78 Hallaq (1984, p. 3). 
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furthermore, be worth elaborating on the concept of a law in a Mus-
lim context, as intimately connected to the recommendations, prohi-
bitions, and demands of the referent of our third concept: the Muslim 
God or Allah. Second,  
 
(8.4.2)  consider the interconnections between the key con-
cepts. 
 
When considering the interconnections between the key concepts of 
the above passage, one may note that Muslim legal scholars are en-
gaged in an explicitly non-secular pursuit, namely in a study of the 
word of Allah as dictated to his prophet Muhammad and written in 
the Qur’an; that ijtihad for etymological reasons may be expected to 
relate to a dedicated effort in this particular kind of study; and, finally, 
that ijtihad, thereby, pertains to something along the lines of a dedi-
cated effort of a legal scholar to understand the law of God. 
Now, if there is any truth to the research of Marton and Säljö, 
and the more recent studies by such scholars as Bacon and Stewart, a 
person elaborating on a piece of information along the lines of the 
above illustration will be more successful in subsequent memory tasks 
than a person that does not elaborate thus, ceteris paribus. To anyone 
who has ever employed this method, the hypothesis, undoubtedly, 
seems very plausible. 
There are further ways in which we may increase memory 
power, over and above increasing depth of processing. In a study by 
S. A. Madigan on subjects’ abilities to recall single words, forty-eight 
words were presented at the rate of 1.5 second, some once and some 
twice.79 What Madigan found was that, in the case of the words that 
were presented twice, there was a robust correlation between the 
number of intervening words between the two presentations, or what 
we may refer to as lag, and the probability of recall on part of the 
subject. More specifically, there was a rapid increase in the probability 
of recall with increasing length of the initial lag, and the probability 
                                                           
79 See Madigan (1969). 
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kept increasing, although less radically, with further increased lag. This 
is the so-called spacing effect and its robustness has been substantiated 
in more recent studies.80 Furthermore, its obvious application should 
come as no surprise to anyone having first-hand experience with the 
difference in performance that usually comes out of repeated versus 
last-minute study: 
 
Retention through elaboration and lag (REL) 
When faced with data the retention of which is crucial, take 
care to (a) frame this data in terms that enable you to elaborate 
on them in depth, and (b) maximize the lag between the peri-
ods of elaboration. 
 
Taking this reasoning strategy into account, we may add a third step 
to remembering the above paragraph about Muslim legal study, to the 
effect that we should 
 
(8.4.3)  maximize the time elapsed between the episodes 
wherein you elaborate on the key concepts and their 
interconnections. 
 
More than this, armed with this reasoning strategy, we may say some-
thing interesting about retention and justification. Given that the 
research discussed above is on the right track,  
 
(8.4.4)  reasoning in accordance with REL increases the power 
as well as reliability of memory, i.e., our ability to not 
only remember a large set of propositions but also to 
remember them accurately. 
 
                                                           
80 See Kahana and Howard (2005) for a recent demonstration of the 
beneficial effects of spacing and lag on retention. See also Bacon and Stewart 
(2006) for some practical suggestions as to how one may utilize these effects 
in educational contexts. 
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Note that, as here understood, remembering accurately implies that the 
proposition recalled is identical to the one that was originally believed, 
not that the proposition is true. For example, if I today come to form 
a belief to the effect that the Weimar Period ended in 1935 and to-
morrow remember this very proposition, my memory is accurate (i.e., 
the proposition originally believed is identical to the one later recalled) 
even though the proposition recalled is false (the Weimar Period ended 
in 1933). However, 
 
(8.4.5)  in so far as a majority of the propositions recalled are 
true (which is a question of having reliable processes 
feed into memory in the first place), powerful and re-
liable memory will significantly increase the likelihood 
of memory yielding a large set of belief containing a 
majority of true beliefs. 
 
So, given the reconstructed concept of justification that we have been 
working with in the above, stating that  
 
S is justified in believing that p to the extent that p is produced 
by effective heuristics, i.e., heuristics that, in all or a very wide 
sub-set of the epistemically relevant worlds, (i) generate a lot 
of true beliefs, and (ii) generate a set of belief that will contain 
a majority of true beliefs, 
 
we may conclude that, 
 
(8.4.6)  given that (a) a majority of the propositions recalled 
is true and (b) the underlying strategy determining 
heuristics are effective, reasoning in accordance with 
REL will significantly increase the likelihood of being 
justified in subsequent beliefs formed by way of 
memory. 
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It is important to note that that (8.4.6), unlike (8.4.4), is not primarily a 
claim about accurate memory—i.e., of beliefs being properly pre-
served over time. (8.4.6) is a claim about how to form true beliefs 
about the world by way of memory. Note also that (8.4.6) is not a 
comparative claim, unlike (8.2.1), (8.2.2), and (8.3.8). The above re-
search indicates that memory power and reliability is increased by 
elaboration and increased lag between the episodes of elaboration, 
and in so far as the majority of what is, thereby, remembered is also 
true, it is reasonable to assume that both conditions (i), regarding the 
generation of a lot of true belief, and (ii), regarding the generation of a 
majority of true beliefs, of our reconstructed concept of justification 
will tend to be satisfied (given effective strategy determining heuris-
tics, of course). Naturally, this is not to deny that justification comes 
in degrees and that alternative strategies may yield a greater or lesser 
degree of justification than REL does. However, it is to say that, given 
that a majority of the propositions recalled is true, REL will, in many 
cases, yield a sufficient degree of justification. 
This concludes our third and final demonstration of how the 
reconstructed concept of justification may be put to use in relation to 
empirical evidence about our cognitive tendencies, in order to reach 
hands-on advice for the epistemic inquirer to follow in her pursuit of 
significant truths. 
 
 
8.5. CONCLUSION 
Armed with a concept that speaks to our epistemic goals, there is no 
reason for epistemology to not answer to the time-honored challenge 
of not only describing but also guiding epistemic inquiry. The present 
chapter was an attempt to provide a sketch, however tentative, of how 
such a challenge might be answered. And although future research 
might very well call for a re-evaluation of this sketch, this is all as it 
should be. The purpose of this study has not been to provide results 
the basis of which are beyond all possible doubt. Rather, the aim has 
been to demonstrate how a certain critical study of philosophical 
analysis, and the methodological reconsiderations that it motivates, 
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may yield a framework for justification that, in turn, can be used to 
generate hands-on advice for epistemic inquirers reasoning on signifi-
cant matters. As such, these advices are highly revisable and, indeed, 
should be revised if evidence indicates a need to do so. Hence, the 
claims and strategies defended are contingent upon empirical evidence 
that, for all we know, might turn out to be misguided tomorrow. But 
that is the fate of any fallible inquiry into the world we live in, and 
should in no way discourage the epistemologist from doing what may 
rightly be considered her job—to guide the epistemic inquirer in her 
attempts to negotiate and make sense of a complex and, in many 
ways, uncertain world. 
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Epilogue on Future Research 
 
 
 
As noted in the beginning of chapter 8, there is a sense in which natu-
ralistic pursuits commit themselves to a contingency in result and 
conditionality in formulation. So, considering the overall naturalistic 
approach of the present study, I find it suitable to end it by identifying 
a set of themes for future research that might serve to further the 
ambitions of the present study as well as provide the outlines of a 
methodology that, in the longer run, might attain the goal of guiding 
epistemic inquiry to an even greater extent. 
The first theme is that of epistemic value. At the moment, there 
is a lively debate within epistemology—particularly as it pertains to so-
called virtue epistemology—regarding the extent to which different 
approaches to knowledge are able to provide an explanation of why 
we should take knowledge to be valuable and, in particular, why we 
should take it to be more valuable than mere true belief.1 The prob-
lem was, in a sense, introduced already by Plato, when he had Meno 
point out that there does not seem to be any practical difference be-
tween having knowledge and having mere true belief. For example, 
                                                           
1 See Pritchard (2007) for a recent overview and Zagzebski (2004), Kvanvig 
(2003), and Swinburne (1999) for three influential contributions to the debate. 
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regardless of whether you know where Larissa is, or merely have a 
true belief to that effect, your chances of finding your way there will 
be equally great. 
Apart from taking it to be an interesting problem in its own 
right, I also believe that providing a solution to it would enable us to 
get clearer on our epistemic goals and, hence, the potential multiplic-
ity of epistemic desiderata relevant to the constructive analysis of 
epistemic concepts. Furthermore, it would enable us to apply the 
present methodological framework to KNOWLEDGE, which brings us 
to the second theme: application to other epistemic concepts. For one thing, 
such an inquiry would serve to evaluate the robustness of the present 
methodological framework for different epistemological contexts. In 
the present study, I have been working with an explicitly instrumental-
ist framework. That is, I have been assuming that the analysandum is 
properly understood as utilized in a context of certain norms and 
goals and that its normativity is to be understood in relation to these 
norms and goals. I suspect that there might be concepts the normativ-
ity of which does not lend itself to such a characterization. Perhaps 
this is the case for certain moral and aesthetic concepts such as MOR-
ALLY GOOD, RIGHT, and OBLIGATORY.  
However, to the extent that we focus on instrumentalist con-
cepts, I believe that chances are good that the methodology devel-
oped here will yield interesting and helpful results. Unlike a frame-
work exclusively focused on concepts, a constructive analysis takes 
into account what may be found out about the cognitively external 
world—especially as revealed by what has proved to be one of our 
most effective ways of uncovering significant facts: science. Also, and 
unlike a framework that shuns concepts altogether, a constructive 
analysis acknowledges that analysis is done for a reason, that this 
reason is connected to the purpose of the concept under analysis, and 
that an insight into that purpose requires that we attend to that which 
we wish to attain by employing the concept in question. 
This also connects with the third theme: application in practical 
contexts. Epistemologists tend to assume a substantial homogeneity 
among the specific goals of different epistemic practices. To a certain 
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extent, this study is no exception. While such a focus is not without 
its merits—for one thing, it serves to provide a unified treatment of 
what may reasonably be taken to be a common denominator of dif-
ferent epistemic pursuits—it does run the risk of ignoring the some-
times quite diverse situations and conditions of different epistemic 
inquires. In particular, it runs the risk of not providing a fine grained 
enough understanding of what we strive for in ordinary circum-
stances, and the particular ways in which epistemic and non-epistemic 
desiderata interact in naturalistic settings. 
One interesting and important example here is that of evi-
dence-based medicine. Ever since Archie Cochrane’s famous series of 
lectures in the early 1970’s, many have come to question whether 
diagnostic experience is sufficient ground for claims to knowledge in a 
medical context, or whether such experience much be accompanied 
by systematic evidence.2 Although the evidence surveyed in the previ-
ous chapter regarding statistical prediction rules lends some credibility 
to the idea that experience should be amended thus, my point here is 
merely that this is exactly the kind of issue in which a constructive 
analysis may be helpful. Does the current concept of knowledge 
within medical context serve our needs well, as specified by our best 
theories of the typical goals and desiderata of medical practice? Is it 
possible to find reason for refinement or reconstruction? These ques-
tions are, clearly, of high significance, and I can at present only submit 
that constructive analysis presents a promising candidate to answer 
them. 
There is a further and more general worry, however, which 
brings us to the fourth theme: inter-cultural variations in reasoning patterns. 
As was noted in brief above, psychologists—most notably Richard 
Nisbett3—has provided us with some reason to believe that there are 
substantial, cultural differences in the way people think, as in differ-
ences that can not be explained away merely with reference to differ-
ent data or epistemic inputs. If true, this has important implications 
                                                           
2 See Cochrane (1972). 
3 See Nisbett (2003). 
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for naturalistic epistemology. In particular, attending closely to this 
kind of research may enable us to better grasp either the prospects for 
devising more flexible reasoning strategies that have a more universal 
applicability, or the extent to which such strategies simply have to be 
customized to fit different cultural contexts. 
These are but four themes for future research and I imagine 
that there are many more with relevance to the general ameliorative 
project of which the present study is a part. It is my hope, however, 
that I, over the course of this study, have been able to shed some light 
not only on the history and conditions of contemporary epistemology 
but also the ways in which it could be conducted in more stimulating 
and productive ways in the future. And only the future will tell if my 
particular suggestions as to how the methodology of epistemology 
should be improved will prove to be as constructive as I believe them 
to be. If I am at all on the right track, however, there are significant 
reasons for being optimistic about tomorrow’s epistemology. 
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Summary in Swedish 
 
 
 
Filosofin har under de senaste tio åren gått in i en självkritisk fas. 
Följaktligen har metodologiska antaganden som i årtionden – i vissa 
fall århundraden – tagits för självklara på sistone fått utstå omfattande 
kritik. Denna studie utgör ett inlägg i denna kritiska granskning av 
filosofisk metodologi, speciellt med avseende på kunskapsteoretisk 
metodologi. Den börjar sin undersökning i filosofins vagga med Pla-
tons sokratiska metod, för att sedan blottlägga en omfattande meto-
dologisk likhet mellan denna och modern filosofi, som består i att 
filosofiska teorier tar formen av definitioner som väsentligen försvaras 
eller förkastas med hänvisning till intuitioner. 
Det föreslås att denna metodologiska kontinuitet ska förstås i 
termer av en strukturell likhet mellan, å ena sidan, Platons teori om 
Former och rationell insikt och, å andra sidan, en modern men impli-
cit teori om begrepp – den moderna filosofins huvudsakliga under-
sökningsobjekt. Enligt denna teori representeras begrepp bäst via 
enkla och skarpt skurna, nödvändiga och tillräckliga villkor, tillgängli-
ga för filosofen genom ett (ofta introspektivt) studium av våra katego-
riseringstendenser. Det första problemet med denna teori är att mo-
dern psykologisk forskning inte ger oss några skäl att anta att begrepp 
ska förstås på detta sätt, varför en metodologisk förbättring i termer 
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av så kallad prototypteori föreslås. Att på detta sätt inkorporera psy-
kologisk forskning väcker den vidare frågan huruvida en traditionell 
länsstolsmetod verkligen erbjuder en lämpligare metodologisk ut-
gångspunkt än modern psykologisk forskning. Denna fråga blir dock 
relevant först under antagandet att filosofer bör söka fullständigt 
uttömmande analyser av våra epistemiska begrepp. Jag argumenterar för 
att detta antagande är ogrundat och att en förståelse av våra begrepp 
främst är intressant som en approximativ utgångspunkt i sökandet 
efter begrepp som underlättar våra kognitiva åtaganden till en större grad 
än vad våra nuvarande begrepp gör. 
Mer specifikt föreslås det att kunskapsteoretisk metodologi 
bör förstås i termer av två uppgifter, indelade i två deluppgifter varde-
ra. Den första uppgiften är deskriptiv och går ut på att (a) identifiera 
undersökningsobjektet genom att plocka ut ett antal paradigmatiska 
exempel, för att sedan (b) aggregera dessa objekts egenskaper med syftet 
att finna en rättvis karaktärisering av det epistemiska fenomenet i 
fråga. Utöver att aggregeringen är väsentligen empirisk bör det också 
noteras att identifikationen knappast förutsätter en särskilt omfattande 
begreppsanalys. Jag föreslår istället att den senare ska förstås i termer 
av meningsanalys, som istället för att arbeta med uttömmande definitio-
ner arbetar med så kallade stereotyper – listor av typiska egenskaper som 
varken bestämmer referensen eller nödvändigtvis utgör en korrekt 
teori för denna, men som ändå kan sägas fånga en viktig, kognitiv 
aspekt av det korresponderande begreppet. 
Varken vikten av empiri eller den uppenbart modesta me-
ningsanalysen innebär dock att begrepp i sig själv inte spelar någon 
central roll inom kunskapsteoretisk analys, vilket leder oss till filoso-
fins andra och normativa uppgift: att (a) utvärdera i vilken mån våra 
begrepp verkligen underlättar våra kognitiva åtaganden samt (b) för-
bättra dem i den mån de kan tänkas göra detta till en större grad än 
vad de faktiskt gör. Inte heller dessa moment förutsätter dock tradi-
tionell begreppsanalys, då denna tenderar att ignorera teleologiska 
frågor rörande varför vi kategoriserar världen som vi gör och för vilka 
syften vi därmed använder våra begrepp, genom att uteslutande foku-
sera på applikationsvillkor och att vi kategoriserar världen på ett visst 
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sätt. Jag förslår därför en mer rimlig typ av analys som jag döper till 
begrepplig syftesanalys. Denna typ av analys syftar till att blottlägga den 
roll som våra begrepp kan förväntas spela inom våra diverse kognitiva 
åtaganden, för att därmed föregå samt vägleda en närmare undersök-
ning av de sätt på vilket våra begrepp skulle kunna förbättras och 
därigenom öka våra chanser att nå våra mål. 
Jag väljer att kalla denna metodologi för konstruktiv analys. 
Namnet är valt mot bakgrund av att analysen i fråga lämnar rum inte 
bara för mindre förfinanden utan även för rekonstruerandet av begrepp i 
den mån de inte fyller sin funktion, samt för att analysen därigenom 
även kan förväntas spela en konstruktiv roll i relation till praktisk, epis-
temisk verksamhet. Detta illustreras i studiens andra del där den kon-
struktiva analysen tillämpas på ett fenomen som uppmärksammats 
mycket inom modern kunskapsteorisk diskussion: epistemiskt berät-
tigande. 
En närmare betraktelse över två inflytelserika teorier avslöjar 
här flera problem. Det första förslaget – tanken att berättigande består 
i att ha uppfyllt vissa epistemiska plikter – faller på faktumet att vi inte 
har någon makt över formandet av våra trosföreställningar och följ-
aktligen inte heller kan klandras för att vi formar vissa trosföreställ-
ningar snarare än andra. Det andra förslaget kan förstås som en mind-
re rekonstruktion av det förra, genom att den (åtminstone i vissa fall) 
håller fast vid talet om epistemiska plikter men hävdar att objektet för 
epistemisk utvärdering inte är formandet av trosföreställningar utan 
snarare introspektionsakter. Berättigande består utifrån detta förslag 
nämligen i att ha skärskådat grunden för sina trosföreställningar ge-
nom introspektion. Även detta förslag stöter dock på allvarliga pro-
blem: enligt modern kogntivpsykologisk forskning har vi sällan intro-
spektiv tillgång till varför vi tror vad vi tror. Dessutom har vi, i många 
fall där vi faktiskt har sådan tillgång, en tendens att ge en allt annat än 
korrekt utvärdering av giltigheten hos våra skäl. 
Detta motiverar utarbetandet av en mer rimlig rekonstruktion 
som inte lider av ovanstående problem och som därigenom kan utgö-
ra ett bättre verktyg givet våra specifika epistemiska förutsättningar 
och desiderata. Det poängteras än en gång att empirisk forskning är 
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högst relevant för förståelsen av dessa förutsättningar och desiderata 
och i en närmare undersökning karaktäriserar jag de senare i termer av 
ett sökande efter signifikanta sanningar, dvs. sanningar som anknyter till 
vad vi anser vara viktiga frågor, problem, hypoteser o. dyl. Jag utarbe-
tar sedan en rekonstruktion som väsentligen består i att identifiera 
berättigande med användandet av effektiva tankemönster, förstådda som 
antingen medvetna resonemangsstrategier eller omedvetna 
tankeprocesser som tenderar att generera uppsättningar av 
trosföreställningar som innehåller (a) många sanna trosföreställningar 
samt (b) en majoritet av sanna trosföreställningar. 
Detta leder oss till avhandlingens sista kapitel där jag fokuserar 
på våra epistemiska förutsättningar och specifikt på möjligheten att 
använda vårt rekonstruerade begrepp för att utveckla förbättrade 
resonemangsstrategier. Mot bakgrund av en studie av relevant psyko-
logisk litteratur, tillämpar jag detta begrepp inom tre specifika områ-
den: prediktion, diagnostik och retention, i sin mest generella form 
svarandes mot frågorna Vad kommer att vara fallet? Vad är fallet? och 
Vad var fallet? Mer specifikt försöker jag illustrera hur den föreslagna 
rekonstruktionen kan användas för att, i kombination med empirisk 
forskning, generera direkta rekommendationer som syftar till att un-
derlätta våra epistemiska strävanden. Till exempel diskuteras forskning 
som indikerar att även en specifik men mycket kort statistisk träning 
minimerar riskerna för en rad ökända statistiska felslut och därmed 
underlättar konstruerandet av bevisligen högst effektiva prediktions-
regler; hur omformulerandet av diagnostiska problem i termer av 
frekvenser snarare än sannolikheter radikalt minskar riskerna för 
diagnostiska felslut; samt specifika strategier för att förbättra vår för-
måga att minnas även högst detaljerad information. 
Givet en förväntad filosofisk skepsis rörande den mån i vilket 
denna typ av resultat alls har några implikationer för vårt berättigan-
debegrepp argumenterar jag som följer: Givet (a) de ovan berörda 
problemen med våra filosofiska teorier om berättigande, speciellt med 
avseende på hur de lämpar sig dåligt vad gäller att underlätta vår strä-
van efter (b) de specifika mål vi önskar uppnå som epistemiska varel-
ser, samt (c) faktumet att ett begrepps raison d’âitre är (eller åtminstone 
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bör vara) direkt proportionellt till den mån i vilket det fyller sin funk-
tion, har vi goda anledningar att i vissa sammanhang helt enkelt låta 
det rehabiliterade berättigandebegreppet ersätta det (eller de) begrepp 
vi råkar ha ärvt från våra kunskapsteoretiska föregångare.  
Därmed tar jag mig även för att ha visat hur kunskapsteorin, 
förstådd i termer av konstruktiv analys, kan leva upp till den traditio-
nella och minst sagt hedervärda utmaningen att inte bara beskriva 
utan även vägleda faktiskt kunskapssökande verksamhet—en utma-
ning som bör ligga varje naturalistisk kunskapsteori nära hjärtat.   
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